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ABSTRACT
LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE CASE OF MARIATEGUI

PHILOSOPHY AS "CALIBAN" OR A DEFENSE OF PHILOSOPHICAL
CANNIBALISM

RAUL ARMANDO CRUZ-CORTES,
Ph.

D.,

B.

UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

A.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Dr.

Robert Paul Wolff

This dissertation is a critical re-assessment of Latin

American philosophical tradition and its quest for an
authentic philosophical identity.

This re-evaluation is

brought about through a distinct reading of the writings of
the Peruvian Marxist, Jose Carlos Mariategui (1895-1930).

The analysis which is exercised in this inquiry proposes

that its philosophical production should not be considered
as an obscure or secondary form of European philosophy, or
in the most unfortunate case,

as a radical denial of the

latter's philosophical heritage.
In attention to the central question concerning this

dissertation it is claimed that

a

hermeneutic strategy of

devising a re-interpretation of

a

single theorist could

yield preferable and more illuminating results than just an

extensive survey of the numerous philosophers who belong to
the Latin American philosophical tradition.

The "case

study" which has been performed is that of the Peruvian

Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui (1895-1930).
vi

This dissertation argues that regardless of the broad

range of studies on the writings of this Peruvian

revolutionary thinker, there is still much to say about his
idiosyncratic interpretation of the Peruvian society of his
times and about his eminently anti-dogmatic conception of
Marxism.

In his own discursive practice he unveiled a

critical response to the inherent and rigid determinism of
the Marxist dogmatic orthodoxy widely accepted in Latin

America and the rest of the world during his lifetime.

His

self-education and theoretical practice is described as

a

virtual "ingestion" of the 1920s Marxism and many other non-

Marxist philosophical and theoretical notions which were
critically transformed into an innovative and effectual
thought replete with revolutionary relevance.
The purpose in stressing this point in Mariategui's

critical "adaptation" of Marxism is to accentuate the

undeniable Eurocentric core of Marxism with which the
Peruvian thinker had to contend.

The reading of Mariategui

which has been suggested, characterizes his theoretical
practice as an immanent critique of Eurocentric Marxism.
for the
The relevance that Mariategui's writings bear

posited as
problem of Latin American philosophy can be

a

discourses of
critique by practice of the traditional
of thought.
legitimation imposed on non-Eurocentric forms

Vll
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PREFACE

DEFINING AUTHENTICITY
Since its origins, philosophical reflection in Latin

America has persisted in a process of self-interrogation.
When the Argentinean philosopher "inaugurated" the [Latin]

expression "American philosophy" in 1842

1
,

it was evident

that he had meant to raise the question of Latin America’s

philosophical identity.

He believed that such a project

could be accomplished in the precise terms of

a

reflection

focused on the peculiar problems of the emerging new nations
Since then, numerous Latin

in Central and South America.

American (and non-Latin American: e.g. Crawford, 1966;
Davis,

1972) philosophers and historians have returned to

this topic.

How could there be an authentic Latin American

philosophy ?

It seems,

at least at face value,

that in Latin

America philosophy presents all the characteristics of what
we will define as unauthenticity, lack of originality,

superficiality, disjointedness, and above all an imitative

dependency on the philosophical production of some of the
so-called "cultural metropoli" (i.e. Continental Europe,
Great Britain, United States).
As in other cultural disciplines, philosophy in Latin

America seems to some Eurocentric-minded observers like

a

^Comments on Alberdi’s Ideas para—pre s idi r—a—l_a
confeccion del curso de filosofia contemporanea (1842) will
constitute a leitmotif along this first chapter for its
significance concerning the problem of Latin American
philosophical identity.
x

reverberation of what is being
"cultural metropoli".

manufactured" in those

To examine the critical significance

of this situation was the commitment of thinkers such as

Andres Bello (Chile), Jose Marti (Cuba) Alejandro Korn
(Argentina), Jose Carlos Mariategui (Peru), Francisco Romero

(Argentina), Samuel Ramos (Mexico), and Agusto Salazar Bondy
(Peru),

among many others.

A major influence concerning the question of defining

the notion of "authenticity" in the Latin American

philosophical tradition is the writings of the Mexican
philosopher, Leopoldo Zea (b.1912).

Necessarily,

if we want

to formulate an adequate definition of "authenticity" in

this particular context, we are required to examine Zea’

contributions.

An exceptional amount of his intellectual

production has been devoted to that problem (e.g. 1963,
1965,

1969,

1974,

1981b,

1982,

1988,

1988-89).

In an essay published for the first time in 1942

("Concerning an American Philosophy", 1965: 424-436)

2
,

Zea

posits the problem of "possibility or impossibility of an

American philosophy" (Zea, 1965:).

A few years before,

another Mexican thinker, Samuel Ramos, had pointed out the
imitative character of Mexican culture (Ramos, 1969: 15-43).

Following Ramos’ line of argumentation, Zea declares that
copy
the Latin American philosophical worldview is a "'bad
^This essay could be regarded as a programmatic
exposition of what is going to constitute his subsequent

philosophical production.
xi

of the European philosophy"

(Zea,

1965:

433).

He believes

that "we (Latin Americans) do not feel it is ours.

We feel

like bastards using property to which they have no right.
We feel like one putting on a suit that is not his, and we

feel it is too big for us"

(Zea,

1965:

427).

The quest for

authenticity in Latin American philosophy has been

characterized by the use of terms such as "otherness"
[ajenidad, otredad] and "alienation" [alienacion,
d i s tanc iamiento

,

ext ranamiento

]

.

Hence, we foresee that the

realization of an authentic Latin American philosophical
discourse is conceived as a radical return to Latin America
as a special

(but not "sui generis") cultural universe.

Following that line of thought, Zea proposes two

fundamental ways to realize authenticity of any indigenous
(Latin American) philosophical discourse.

Firstly, Zea

suggests that it is indispensable to consider what European

philosophy designates as "universal themes", that is, themes
whose abstractness makes them valid at any historical time
or space:
of America.

"viewed from circumstances applicable to the man
•

our own" (Zea,

Hence, when we approach abstract questions of
1965:

432).

Secondly, the treatment of

questions related to the Latin American specific
circumstance:

"this future philosophy of ours must try to

solve problems which our own circumstance poses" (Zea, 1965:
432).

In both instances,

authenticity is interpreted as the

acknowledgment of the Latin American perspective and
XI

1

thematic distinctiveness vis a vis that of the "cultural
metropolis".

It supposes a theoretical revindication of the

concrete circumstance of the Latin American nations.
Nevertheless, Zea is fully aware that philosophy has always

devoted itself to universal themes applicable to every human
Focusing on what is genuinely Latin American is not

being.

the final objective, but just a means to attain

universality; regardless, Zea cautions that the articulation
of an authentic philosophical discourse should not be

programmatically opposed to the deliberation of universal
themes
It is not enough to try to discover an
American truth, we must also try to discover
a truth valid for all men, even though we may
We must not consider
not in fact succeed.
in themselves, but as
ends
as
American
things
That
purpose.
extensive
more
of
a
frontiers
American
form
an
to
attempt
is why any
philosophy, with the sole aim that it be
One
American, will be doomed to failure.
purely
philosophy,
a
form
must endeavour to
and simply, and the American part will be
added unto it (Zea, 1965: 436).

The dichotomy between the particular and the

universal as persistent topics in Latin American

philosophy occupies most of Zea’s later writings (e.g.
Zea,

1981b,

1988,

1988-89).

complementary formulations:

Zea operates with two
the dichotomy between the

concrete circumstance (i.e. "the situation") and the
one
universal circumstance; the other dichotomy is the

between the concrete man and an
nature"

In both formulations,

a

assumed "human

Zea maintains that

universality can only be "attained" by the mediation of
Latin American singularity and concreteness.

Although

"part" of the Latin American situation is universal,

namely, that which corresponds to Latin American as

human beings, another is that which "corresponds to us
as Latin Americans".

That concrete circumstance is

what Zea suggests to his fellow Latin American

philosophers as the problem to which they should commit
themselves, for "commitment with the universal, without
being able to single out at least one concrete

commitment, is the same as not to engage at all" (Zea,
1952b:

213).

Zea believes that an authentic philosophy

would have to institute the Latin American "situation"
as a central theme in its reflection.

"Which is then our situation (the author’s
emphasis) from the point of view of what we
are? What is our Being? Here are some
questions that need to be reflected upon.
From the outcome of the elucidation of such
questions will emerge our coveted philosophy
(Zea, 1952b: 37)
On the other hand, Zea affirms that only an analysis of

man in situation

humanity.

,

will disclose what constitutes his

"In concreteness

-

in any man

-

is where

universality is contained, what is valid in all men
(Zea,

1952b:

213).

In Zea’s Conciencia y posib ilidad

the
del mexicano [Consciousness and Possibility of

Mexican] we read:

"In concreteness,

xiv

in that which

forms humanity,

is where

it

is perceived,

unambiguously, the only possible man" (Zea, 1952a: 20).
The influence of the Spanish philosopher Jose

Ortega y Gasset, is perceptible in these formulations.
The historicism

(

perspect i vism

)

in his philosophy

pervaded a significant area of Latin American thought
from the 1930s to the 1950s (Davis, 1972: 3-4).

According to Ortega y Gasset, there are not universal
and absolute truths.

Truth is always concrete and the

product of a viewpoint or individual perspective.

Ortega y Gasset claimed that this perpectivism could be
applied even to mathematics (Ortega y Gasset, 1957a:
115).

This philosophical perspect ivism was

emphatically welcomed by many Latin American thinkers
theoretically inclined toward

a

culturalist approach.

Gracia in his work, Latin American Philosophy in the

Twentieth Century

,

points out that

Orteguian perspect ivism introduced in Latin
America by many of Ortega’s disciples,
particularly Jose Gaos, is to a great extent
responsible for the popularity of the
culturalist view in Latin America. A
philosophy that emphasizes the value of the
particular and idiosyncratic lends itself
quite easily to support the views of
culturalist thinkers. Consequently, many of
them adopted this view unhesitatingly,
adapting it to their conceptual needs. This
is how the idea of a Latin American
philosophy as a philosophy peculiar to the
continent came about, a philosophy different
from that of other cultures, and particularly
opposed to Anglo-Saxon philosophy (Gracia,
,

1986:

211).
xv

Ortega’s philosophical formulations as mediated in
Zea’s views expressed the thesis that every philosophy
is relative to

particular historical circumstance.

the case of Latin America,

In

its own particular

"situation" would be assumed as its object.

Together

with the direct influence of Ortega y Gasset, we also

recognize in Zea the evident presence of French

existentialism, with its characteristic principle of
locating man’s Being in its concrete existence, in
situation.

Thus, philosophical historicism and

existentialist philosophical anthropology have provided
a theoretical foundation to many Latin American

nations’ struggle to validate their respective national

(cultural) identities.

Zea’s appeal to "return" to the

"concreteness" of truth, to where Latin America’s
"Being" truly lies, to its particular "reality",

belongs to the extensive cultural movement indicated
above by Gracia, which was attempting to restitute and

re-evaluate the diverse Latin American national
cultures
Unfortunately, Zea has never specified adequately
the connection between the circumstance pertaining to

the Latin American specificity, and "universality".

The way to achieve universality through the analysis of
a

concrete object was never determined.

Such

relationship cannot be determined by means of an
xvi

inductive operation,

for it would be invalid in

ana-

logical system to infer universal constituents from
just a single case.

Neither could it be decided by an

eidetic abstraction,

in which the "essence" would be

"discovered" by merely examining a single specimen, for
Zea definitely rejects a human essence (Zea, 1952a:
19)

.

If we follow Zea’s reasoning,

the dichotomy

between the concrete singular and the universal cannot
be overcome.

Abelardo Villegas appropriately addressed

the tension between a philosophy that posits as its

object its own concrete circumstance and the

pretentiousness of trying at the same time to attain
thought valid under any circumstance.

a

He demonstrated

that there is an inherent "contradiction" in the so-

called "philosophy of the Mexican"
If we declare ourselves devotees, along with
Zea, of the universality of philosophical
truths, we will not be saying anything new,
in any case, we would have to admit a sure
disapproval in the sense that it is
impossible a philosophy relative to the
Mexican or to the (Latin) American (Villegas,

1960:

152).

There would be effectively a contradiction if authentic
Latin American philosophy is conceived as a reflection
on the peculiar characteristics of a historical

reality.

The contradiction would be overcome, if the

have
achievement of an authentic philosophy would not

character of
to depend upon the peculiar or distinctive
xvi i

its object.

The concern with its specific circumstance

mentioned by Zea would not have to be understood as an
analysis of its singular characteristics, but rather as
an adaptation of thought to its needs and purposes.

The attempts to respond to Villegas would require still

another characterization of what should be understood
as an authentic Latin American philosophy.
In other writings,

Zea suggests an interpretation

of the concept of authenticity that does not consist

necessarily in concentrating the analysis on the
indigenous in opposition to the extraneous.
en la historia

,

In America

Zea explicitly denies that the

originality of culture, and thus of philosophy, has to
be understood as "the creation of something unique,

special

...

inimitable"

.

"Distinctiveness is not being

sought just to challenge something else", he admitted,
"but rather to collaborate with that something else”.

Diversity is what is being pursued, but in order to
merge into a totality to which it belongs.

This

totality is Western culture, in which the American man

Originality would rather

places himself as member.
consist,

in the "capacity.

.

.

to participate actively in

the creation or re-recreation of Western culture
1960:

11-12).

In a later work,

(Zea,

Zea insisted on an idea

that he had already introduced in earlier works.
that
Namely, an authentic philosophy would be the one

first, acquires consciousness of its reality and

subsequently, adapts to that reality ideas that are

"supposedly alien" to it.

Citing Arturo Ardao (La

filosofia actual en America Latina

.

1975:

9-20), Zea

admits as a form of authenticity the critical

adaptation of any foreign thought to "our real
situations and circumstances, to our effective problems
and necessities; but also to our own style or spirit,

that is, to our way of being"

(Zea,

1978:

17-18).

According to Zea, the assimilation of "foreign" ideas
to the Latin American reality which would form part of

what is called the "assumptive project" [proyecto
asuntivo]

q
,

would assume the historical reality of

Latin America, in order to transcend it, incorporating
to that reality expressions of other cultures.

"What

it cannot be done is to imitate without creating,

integrating.

or

And this is what happens when one negates

what is ours, substituting it for what is alien" (Zea,
1978:

275).

In those preceding paragraphs,

although

is derived from the Spanish word
translation to "asuncion"
literal
The English
"asuncion".
oneself] or elevatio n
upon
taking
would be assumption [i.e.
to a great dignity].
something
or
[i.e. to elevate someone
is
a very common
Uruguay
For instance, "asuntar" in
in a comprehensive
reflect
or
expression, meaning to think
the origina
"translated
We have
and totalizing way.
I admit that
"assumptive".
Spanish word "asuntivo", into
Spanish
the
adequately
"assumptive" may not convey
order
connotation [i.e. encompassing, comprehensive], but inmysel
to
self-awarded
to legitimate my final choice I have
"poetic license".

^The word "asuntivo"

xix

authenticity is still being presented as the concern
for what is properly "Latin American", the emphasis is

nevertheless being placed on other instances that would
permit us to obtain a slightly different (and combined)

definition of "authenticity":

the critical and

creative adaptation of the cultural products of other
societies that would respond appropriately to the
indigenous necessities and problems of the Latin

American reality.

According to this definition, the

concept of authentic philosophy would have now to be

differentiated from that of distinctive philosophy, to
avoid the contradiction indicated by Villegas.
In an attempt to define the notion of

"authenticity" in the context of the search for a Latin

American philosophical discourse, Augusto Salazar Bondy
in his work,

(1968:

;.Existe una filosofla de nuestra America?

72-79),

sets out a valuable distinction among

three concepts that are not mutually (and necessarily)
implied.

We believe that their dynamic consolidation

would provide a decisive clarification and definition
of the problem we are examining.

according to Salazar Bondy,
genu ineness [genuinidad]
[

pecul iaridad

]

(

,

These concepts are,

o r i g inal

i

ty

[

original idad

and pecul iar i ty

Salazar Bondy: 1968: 72).

The first concept (i.e. originality) refers to
"the contribution

-

in a greater or a lesser degree

xx

]

of new ideas and proposals, with regard to earlier

philosophical accomplishments (i.e. the European and

Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition), but sufficientlydifferentiated so they could be recognized as creations
and not mere repetitions of doctrinaire contents".

We

agree with Salazar Bondy, that provided this condition,
"an original philosophy would be identifiable by its

"unpublished" [ineditas] conceptual constructions of a

recognizable value".

On the other hand, whereas this

concept may overlap "originality", according to Salazar
Bondy,

"genuineness" is applied "to designate a

philosophical product (just as any other cultural
product)... that is indisputably given as such and not
falsified, deluded or without effectiveness".

Finally,

peculiarity is referred to "the presence of historicocultural features that give a distinctive character to
a

spiritual product, in this case philosophical; it is

about..., a local or personal (author’s emphasis) tone

which does not imply substantial innovations" (Salazar
Bondy,

1968:

72).

Although distinct, these terms are

obviously interconnected.

Also, their interrelations

define situations of conceptual dependence and
independence.
genuine,

Accordingly, if a thought is not

it could hardly be original,

but a thought

that is not original could well be peculiar.

On the

not
other hand, originality guarantees to a philosophy,

xx 1

only its peculiarity (which could be expressed even

though imitation might prevail in a particular case),
but also its authenticity (Salazar Bondy,

1968:

72-73).

By applying these distinctions to the case of

Latin American philosophy, we could argue that these

concepts are evident in all of the treatises and

arguments of indigenous Latin American thought.

On the

other hand, a survey of all Latin American thought is
out of the question.

We will not consider all

philosophical writing and thought that has occcured in
the Latin American countries.

We propose that what is

important and must be pursued is not the total sum of

philosophy in [en] Latin America but rather the
philosophy that comes

f rom

Originality will thus be

a

[de]

Latin America.

criterion of selection.

We agree, along with many others (e.g. Juan

Bautista Alberdi, Simon Rodriguez, Jose Marti, Jose
Lezama Lima, Jose Carlos Mariategui

)

,

that there

definitely is a genuine Latin American philosophical
discourse that comes

f rom

Latin America.

Our common

supposition is that (genuine) Latin American
philosophical thought assumes its authenticity in the
critical reception and acculturation of the European

philosophical discourses, and their "utilization"
according to the necessities of the Latin American
historical life, whether there is sufficient unity to
xxi 1

describe this under the simple heading

Latin American

philosophy" will have to be assessed in the discussion
of actually existing texts.

xxiii

CHAPTER

1

THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF A LATIN AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY
1.1

The Textual Testimonies
Some of the problems that any researcher is forced to

work out when the subject of the Latin American philosophy
is being scrutinized is the problem of the existence or the

non-existence of

philosophy or

a

a

Latin American philosophy, that is, of

peculiar manner of doing philosophy

a

,

original and agreeable to the diverse idiosyncracies of the

nations that constitute what is known as Latin America
This problem is not

a new one.

1

.

Without constraining too

much the terms of this debate, it can be established that
its origins can be traced back to the first decades of the

XIXth century; namely, to that period when Latin American

intellectuals understood and expressly set out the

compelling necessity to supplement and fortify the political
independence of the continent with an intellectual

liberation motivated by the sole attempt to be original.
Simon Rodriguez, Simon Bolivar's intellectual mentor
(the latter known to Latin Americans as the Liberator of
it has not been explicitly mentioned, we must
point out that under this rather inexact rubric of "Latin
America" we have not overlooked countries such as Brazil,
and the Spanish-speaking islands-nations in the Caribbean

Although

On the
Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico).
to the
approach
our
in
other hand (and as a matter of fact)
leading
many
with
complied
discussion we have agreeably
intellectual figures from Cuba that have at many points in
this extensive debate, contributed with perhaps the most
illuminating views; for instance, Jose Marti, Jose Lezama
(i.e.,

Lima

2

America) once claimed that America, that is, South America,

the Spanish-speaking one, necessarily had to be original
(Rodriguez,

1964

:

215)

2
.

This commitment engendered an

intellectual crusade for Latin American cultural autonomy
that would continue its struggle until it materialized, at
the level of philosophy, in the philosophical writings of
the Argentinean Juan Bautista Alberdi, particularly his

noted work, Ideas para oresidir

filosofia contemporanea (1842).

a la

confeccion del curso de

Alberdi consolidates in

this work the concept of philosophy with that particular

historical reality known as Hispanic America and talks of

American philosophy

as a way of designating the possibility

for the fulfillment of a new philosophy, namely, one that

Among the first thinkers who confronted the difficult
problem of providing the new Latin Americans nations (right
after the end of the Wars of Independence in the South
American continent) with a modern, original, and well
structured socio-political and cultural project, we have to
call attention to the distinguished case of the Venezuelan
Simon Rodriguez (1771-1854). He was an autodidact, school
teacher in the colonial Caracas, and a fervent reader of
Simon Rodriguez was also the private tutor of the
Rousseau.
youthful Simon Bolivar during the last years of the XVIIIth
In one of his works, Luces y virtud es sociales,
century.
Rodriguez cautions in the same style that most of his
sagacious contemporaries did, of the harmful consequences of
In
an irrational and blind imitation of European culture.
commonplace
a
was
that
contrast to the reverential attitude
among some of the colonized Latin American intellectuals of
his times who actually worshipped European civilization, he
presented a Europe with a more fallible human face. He
argued that Europe, besides being a civilization worth
looking at as a model for the recently instituted Latin
American nations, was also flawed and ignorant, incapable of
solving many of its own problems, let alone Latin America's.
2

3

will emanate from the national interests and necessities of
the distinct Latin American nations.
I

believe, along with the Peruvian philosopher, Augusto

Salazar Bondy, that "perhaps, Juan Bautista Alberdi may be

regarded as the first Hispanic American thinker who
explicitly posited the problem of our philosophy [our
However, it is convenient to

emphasis]" (Salazar Bondy 45).

indicate that the way in which the distinguished Argentinean

statesman conceives the originality of the Latin American

philosophy has

a

Latin

very particular connotation.

American philosophy will certainly be, according to Alberdi,
that thought which will emerge from the real and concrete

necessities of the Latin American nations, contributing to
the solution of their respective destinies.

That is, it

will be a philosophical discourse that will attune itself to
the Latin American circumstance

,

assisting its advancement

and configured by that same circumstance.

However, this

determination of Latin American philosophy by its geopolitical reality does not itself suggest, as Alberdi does,
that the philosopher in Latin America has to inaugurate his
has to
or her activity from a "cero" level, or if you like,

actually create "ex nihil".

The Latin American philosopher,

in the
simply because he or she lives his or her activity

Latin American situation

,

should not examine or teach

philosophy as an abstract knowledge in itself.

This

suggested, the Latin American philosopher, according

to

Alberdi, must approach philosophy as a practical science

applicable to the peculiar circumstances of every historical

moment of each nation.

Understanding philosophy in this

particular sense, the Latin American philosopher will
examine European philosophy in relation to the Latin

American reality.

In Alberdi' s own terms,

the Latin

American philosopher should be devoted to choosing from the
available European philosophical legacy the results that
seem to be more appropriate to the spirit of our nations
and prove to be the most beneficial to their development
(Alberdi 21-22).
As a way of providing a comprehensive presentation of

the field we have designated 3

,

we will present an

anthological sampling of many authors we estimate
indispensable along with historico-critical notes to each

philosopher regarding his contribution to this extensive and
intricate quest.

The exposition of this material is crucial

before engaging in the philosophical elucidation of the

problem of authenticity and therefore of identity in Latin

American philosophy.

For this reason we will not

concentrate in this chapter on the analysis of the most
significant arguments.

This treatment will occur in the

second chapter of this investigation

.

Considering the formal and academic standards and

limits that the nature of this research entails.

For a more extensive sampling of works by Latin
to the
American philosophers we will refer the reader case he or
work,
present
bibliographical section of the
our own inquest
she would appreciate the task of completing
4

m

5

1.2

A Critique of Other Approaches
In an issue dedicated exclusively to Latin American

philosophy, Jorge

J.

Gracia begins his extremely

E.

difficult anthological task 5 with

a

commentary that

jeopardizes the quality of this enterprise by its

restrictive historical, philosophical scope and by what
seems extremely critical in this intricate question of the

identity and authenticity of Latin American philosophy,
namely,

its political connotations.

To reinforce his

subsequent and rather famous remarks on the fundamental
status and identity of Latin American philosophy, he

shelters his claims behind the authority of one of the

foremost contemporary Latin American philosophers:

the

Argentinean Risieri Frondizi 6
In an effort to survey the situation of Latin American

philosophy, Risieri Frondizi published an essay forty years
ago in which he posed the fundamental question whether there

with his or her own work.
The Philosophical Forum, volume XX, No. 1-2, FallWinter, 1988-89.
5

Gracia has also edited or co-edited other
"representative" anthologies of major twentieth century
philosophers (e.g. Latin American Philoso phy in the
Twentieth Century: Man, Values, and the Searc h for
Although the above
Philosophical Identity 1986)
publication precedes in time the journal we are referring
to, unfortunately, it also suffers from the same limited
range and outlook employed later on.
6

,

.

6

is in fact such a "philosophy" 7

.

Undermining any promise

for an affirmative answer to that problem, he declares:

there is no Latin American philosophy in
the sense we give to the term when we speak
of British philosophy, or of German or of
French and Italian, or modern and
contemporary, or North American philosophy
beginning with Peirce, Royce and James.
In
other words, there has not been in Latin
America any original philosophy which may be
the genuine expression of the spiritual
characteristics of Latin Americans (our
emphasis)
The so called Latin American
philosophy is nothing more than the
reformulation of philosophical problems
originated in Europe. Hence, to be concerned
about its history is to the deal with the
influence that European philosophy had on it
(Frondizi 95)
.

.

.

.

Gracia appropriates Frondizi'

categorical

s

position at face value when he insists on his own terms
that "it does not take much research into the history
of Latin American philosophy to see that these words

were true at the time Frondizi wrote them" (Gracia
To conclude with what we regard as

a

4)

historically

fragmented and arbitrary approach of an enterprise

destined to debatable results, Gracia moves further on
to maintain that "it is true that we still cannot speak
of a Latin American philosophy in the sense of an

autochthonous philosophical tradition based on problems

"Panorama de la filosofia latinoamer icana
contemporanea" Minerva 1 (1944). This article has been
reprinted in Jorge J. E. Gracia, ed., Ris ier Frondizi
Ensayos filosoficos (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica,
7

,

1987)

.

7

of a Latin American philosophy in the sense of an

autochthonous philosophical tradition based on problems
raising from its own internal dialectic [our emphasis]
(

Gracia

4

)

.

To be able to refute Frondizi’s emphatic remark on

Latin American philosophy and in passing, Gracia’s,

with historical and textual testimonies, we are going
to refer to a rarely cited work by the nineteenth

century Argentinean philosopher, Juan Bautista Alberdi
(

1810-1886

1.3

)

.

Juan Bautista Alberdi and the Sources of Latin
American Philosophy

Alberdi was born in Tucuraan, Argentina, in 1810,
the son of one of the early proponents of Argentina’s

independence, and was educated largely in the
He was a

cosmopolitan capitol city, Buenos Aires.
well-known figure among Buenos Aires young
intellectuals (as

a

pianist and composer of waltzes and

minuets) when he attracted attention in 1837 with an

ingenious theory of law and politics expounded in his

Fragmento preliminar al estudio del derecho
[Preliminary Text to the Study of Law].

Alberdi was

both a natural realist, in the Scottish school of

8

positivist.

But he may be better comprehended as an

"Americanist", for the realism that was his most

outstanding characteristic was based on his

understanding of the effects of Latin American
experience upon law and institutions.

For instance,

when explaining the constitutional problem of his

country upon the basis of Latin American problematic

realities such as the "caudillo" 9

,

Alberdi proposed to

eliminate "all which is least contemporary and least

applicable to the social needs of our countries, the
means of satisfying which should furnish us with the

materials of our philosophy" (Alberdi

19)

.

The expression "American philosophy" (i.e. Latin

American philosophy) was first

introduced by Juan

Bautista Alberdi himself in 1842 in an essay of
and German ideas" (Alberdi Ideas 304). To this revealing
endorsement by Alberdi, Leopoldo Zea adds that "the
utilitarianism of Jeremiah Bentham and James Mill completes
the practical vision of the Hispanic Americans. Their
concern with attaining 'the greatest happiness for the
greatest number' led them to analyze the motives for the
actions of the individuals of this America, thus emphasizing
their innate defects. Once these motives were recognized,
the subsequent problem was their correction by means of an
adequate education" (Zea The Latin-American Mind 25).

The "caudillo" can be defined in the context of Latin
American history as a politico-military leader of a nation.
The origin of such figure in Latin American political life
can be traced from the first "caudillo" in our history:
Simon Bolivar known as the "the Liberator" who led
successfully the creole revolutionary armies against Spain
during the Wars of Independence. It must be pointed out
that the "caudillo" does not necessarily import a negative
connotation as a military dictator would, for the former
usually has the bearing of a populist type of leader.
9

,

9

fundamental relevance titled Ideas para oresidir

a

la

confeccion del curso de filosofia contemporanea [Ideas
to Preside at the Preparation of the Course in

Contemporary Philosophy]

.

Because of the consequence

of this text as a point of departure for the type of

discussion we are going to develop in this
dissertation, we will reproduce one of its most

illustrative paragraphs:
Then, there is no universal philosophy,
because there is no universal solution to the
problems which form its basis.
Each country,
each epoch, each philosopher has had his own
individual philosophy, which has grown more
or less, which has lasted more or less,
because each country, each epoch, and each
school has come forward with different
solutions to the problems of the human
spirit.
The philosophy of each epoch and
each country has been commonly, the Reason,
the Principle, or the governing and more
general feeling that has conducted the events
And that Reason
of its life and its conduct.
has emanated from the most imperious
necessities of each period and each country.
Hence we can speak of a Greek philosophy, a
It
German philosophy, a French philosophy.
therefore follows that there must be an
American philosophy [our emphasis] (Alberdi
302
)

.

Alberdi disproves right from the outset of his
essay the existence of

a

"universal philosophy" and

professes the necessity to vindicate the existence of
an American philosophy (i.e. Latin American

philosophy)
a

.

However, these statements entail already

philosophical problem when it comes to define the

fundamental nature of philosophy:

Is not philosophy,

10

given its own inherent disposition,

knowledge"?

a

"universal

If its subject matter gets "regionalized",

"nationalized",

or "particularized", are we not

assaulting philosophy's defining essence?

In this

essay, Alberdi seems to concede certain universality

regarding the objectives, procedures, means and ends
that would allow that a particular philosophical

doctrine prevails as "a" philosophy.

Still more, he

acknowledges in the current philosophical systems,
formal solutions of what he denominates as belonging to
a

"universal type".

But,

"the form of its solutions"

must be contrasted with the problems that cannot be
located in similar terms in all latitudes, in all
epochs, and in all nations.

Problems created by

particular and concrete needs, constitute the material
element that necessarily "situates" or "particularizes"
philosophy.

In this sense, Alberdi declares that our

philosophy (i.e. Latin American philosophy) will be the
direct consequence of, first, our needs in general, and
will be successively,

a

series of solutions at the

level of a systematic thought, imparted to the problems
and questions that concern the respective "national

destinies" (Alberdi 308).

Further on, Alberdi argues

that it is of no particular importance the sources from

11

which we obtain such solutions 10
Alberdi

,

.

According to

what is really critical is the manner in which

we enunciate the applications derived from such

"theoretical solutions" to our most distinctive
problems.

It is in this sense of application

.

instead

of creation that Alberdi construes the term "American

philosophy".

Finally, he declares in an unequivocal

attitude that "America practices what Europe thinks",
and philosophy in general will desist being "a barren

half-breed creature" (Alberdi 310)
For Alberdi, there does not exist a Latin American

philosophy, but he definitely affirms its possibility
of existence insofar as a philosophy that would

materialize right from the problems and needs of the
Latin American peoples.

According to him, what is

"American", or in Ortega y Gasset's terms, the American

"circumstance" would be the qualifying condition of our

autonomous philosophical activity.

This concrete

situation would "advance" its corresponding themes and
questions, it would deliver its own sense of ought-tobe and its mission; in one word, the American

circumstance

,

with its idiosyncratic needs, would

imprint its distinctive and appropriate constitution on

Latin American philosophy ("American philosophy", in
Alberdi, as we mentioned before, had a particular
he
strong influence of French positivism; an influence which
always made explicit.
10

12

Alberdi's own expression).

Ultimately, the originality

or inventiveness of Latin American philosophy suggested

by Juan Bautista Alberdi will consist, fundamentally,
in knowing to how choose the European philosophical

ideas more pertinent to the Latin American reality in

order to implement them in the solution of its concrete

needs
The case of Alberdi is by no means an isolated
case in Latin American intellectual history.

His

thought is closely related to Latin American

revolutionary movements of independence.

Alberdi,

along with other Latin American Liberal intellectuals

who came from the political elite, were influenced by a
quite formidable combination of philosophico-political
discourses.

According to Davies (1972), during the

independence years, five streams of European influence
may be distinguished.

The first is that of British

political economy, especially the utilitarianism of
Jeremy Bentham and James Mill.

Utilitarianism had a

profound influence upon the Venezuelan-Chilean Andres
Bello (1780-1865) during his long stay in London, and
upon Jose Maria Luis Mora (17947-1850) of Mexico,

Alberdi as we noted before, Jose Cecilio del Valle
(1780-1834) of Central America, and many others.

Actually, Bentham'

s

theories were taught as early as

13

1821 in the university founded in Buenos Aires by

Bernardino Rivadavia (Valle xxxiii-xli)
The French utopian socialism of Count Henri de

Saint-Simon, Frangois M.

Fourier, and their

C.

followers, was a second and, if anything, a more

significant stream of influence.

It found Spanish

American expression, for instance, in the Argentine

Association of May and in Esteban Echeverria's (1805Dogma socialista

1851)

.

the creed of the Association.

Among many others who could be mentioned as revealing
this influence is Francisco Bilbao (1823-1865) of
Chile.

According to Davies' account, the Revue

encyc loped igue and La globe

,

both of which diffused the

ideas of Saint-Simonism, were widely read throughout
America, especially in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay.

Both Bilbao and Echeverria also reflect the ideas
of the liberal French priest, Felicite Robert de

Lamennais (1782-1854), indicating

a

link between

utopian socialism and other romantic-liberal trends in
thought.

This romantic liberalism so often

characterized revolutionary Liberal movements that it
may well be called

a

third trend, although it embraces

elements of the others.

Bilbao and his circle of young

Liberal friends in Chile also took up the literary and

political thought of the Romantic French poet, Alphonse
Lamartine.

Under this influence they called themselves

14

Los Girondinos

.

adopting the names of the leaders of

the Gironde as pen names.
A fourth stream of influence is that of Victor

Cousin's eclecticism, and of Count Destutt de Tracy's
"ideology"

(Davis 65), a French school of thought which

combined idealistic (i.e. German) and "scientific"

philosophies of history.

Eclecticism helped to

introduce the ideas of German idealism and the

Jansenism of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662).

In Cuba its

effect may be seen in the lectures on philosophy

delivered there by Jose Manuel Mestre y Dominguez in
1861 (Mestre y Dominguez 1952).

Guillermo Francovich

and others have noted the spread of Cousin's ideas in

Brazil (Francovich 1943).
Latin American literary production of all kinds,
in its generally romantic tendency during these years,

embraced the last two trends of thought.

On occasion

this Latin American romantic idealism also exhibited
some of the traditionalist expressions of French

literary romanticism.

This literary romanticism

reminds us that romantic idealism embraced

a

wide range

of social principles and ideologies, ranging from those
of Liberal reformist tendencies to those of the French

traditionalism of Joseph de Maistre and the Spanish

traditionalism of Jaime

L.

Balmes (1810-1848)

.

In this

latter form, as we have seen, it was sometimes brought

15

to Latin America by traditionalist priests fleeing from

revolutionary regimes in Spain or Portugal.
This traditionalism is
influence.

a

fifth major stream of

A number of Latin American leaders, such as

Lucas Alaman (1792-1853) of Mexico, Dr. Jose Gaspar

Rodriguez Francia (known as Dr. Francia) of Paraguay,
Juan Manuel Rosas of Argentina, Diego Portales of
Chile, and Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos of Brazil,

expressed varieties of traditionalist thought that had
antecedents, if not an actual source, in de Maistre,
Balmes, or Juan Donoso Cortes (1809-1853).

With regard

to this fifth current, Davies disagrees with (66)

studies which claim that it was merely

a

other

reflection of

the European conservatism of the Metternich Era.

Davies insists that whereas these Latin American

traditionalist share with their European counterparts
an opposition to the romantic-liberal-socialist

revolutionary of the day, upon closer examination, they
also reveal close ties with the Latin American

experience.

The traditionalism of these Latin

Americans lacked the European element of defending the
old social order presided over by

a

nobility; and it

often differed from that of Europe in assimilating the

principles of liberal political economy.
One of the most notable aspects of the Latin

American thought of this period was

a

concept of

16

history expressed in its spirit of Latin American
rebellion against the authority of Europe.
Spanish movement

(

"desespanolizacion)

The anti-

one of the

,

outstanding aspects of the period, was not merely
political phenomenon.

a

It also embraced profound

cultural and philosophical trends.

For instance,

Andres Bello (1781-1864), in inaugurating the

University of Chile in 1842, called for
educational program and

a

a

national

culture which would be

"American" (i.e. Latin American) and Chilean in every

aspect

Another figure worth mentioning, for he is a
thinker of the same intellectual caliber of Alberdi and
his contributions are of major importance in the

foundational stage of Latin American philosophy, is

Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811-1888).

Along with

Alberdi he was part of the so-called "Generation of
18 3 7 " 11

.

n The most distinctively Latin American thought of this
period came in the "Generation of 1837" in Argentina and the
"Generation of 1842" in Chile. In Argentina the
dictatorship of Juan Manuel Rosas, extending approximately
from 1829 to 1852, resulted from a victory of the
Conservative and Federalist "hacendados" [landowners] of
In
Buenos Aires province over the reforming Unitarists.
party
Conservative
the
of
Chile, the coincident triumph
under the leadership of Diego Portales was the victory of an
oligarchy of landowners and merchants continued to dominate
In both countries,
Chilean politics for over three decades.
years of
middle
the
in
the leaders of thought who emerged
to
opposition
the
in
the century were Liberals nurtured
these dictatorial regimes (Davies 71)
.
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Sarmiento was

a

many professions.
a

man of extraordinary talent and

He was a journalist, a sociologist,

school teacher, a soldier,

a

diplomat, a state

governor, and the president of his country.

The

inconveniences he confronted in securing an education
in the midst of poverty undoubtedly motivated the later

successful battle for the public education of his
nation, a battle that won him the sobriquet "the school

teacher president"

.

With the slogan "to govern is to

educate", he made the struggle to liberate men's minds
his basic strategy to achieve in Argentina the larger

objectives of economic, social, and political freedom.
On the basis of these freedoms, the economic and

cultural progress were the ultimate goals to be
pursued.

His pugnacious spirit, frustrated during long

years of exile, found expression in an explosive,

sarcastic style of writing.

It was a literary style

implicit in the characteristic activist posture of his
generation,

a

generation which insisted that the

written and spoken word should lead to action (Bunkley,
395-396)

.

In 1831, when he was already a member of the

liberal youth of his country, his writing and teaching,

directed against the political system introduced by
Rosas resulted in threats of punishment which forced

him to spend most of the next twenty-two years in

18

exile.

During most of his time in exile he lived in

Chile, although he also spent part of the time in

Uruguay and also traveled in Europe and the United
States.

A meeting with Horace Mann had a lasting

effect on his educational ideas.

in Chile he achieved

fame as a journalist and teacher, founded a national

normal school, and in 1845 wrote his classic work

Civilizacion v barbarie
Quiroga

.

La vida de Juan Facundo

.

Facundo (as it is usually called) is

critique of the caudillo and "caudillismo"

a

devastating

.

Basically

it is a sociological study which described Facundo

Quiroga as a product of barbaric influences derived
from the "pampa" and expressed in gaucho life.

Unlike

Frederick Jackson Turner's explanation of the
"frontier" in the United States, Euclydes da Cunha

'

analysis of the backlands of Brazil, and the twentieth

century Bolivians' concept of

a "mystique"

of the land,

Sarmiento considered the telluric element (the land) to
be essentially malign.

He was led to this view by the

system that Quiroga and Rosas represented.

Hence,

in

reaction to these Argentine historical "realities", he
arrived at an overly simplified equation of

civilization with Europe and of barbarism with South
American "pampa".

On this premise he explained all of

Argentina's anarchy and bloodthirsty violence.

19

Unlike some Latin American intellectuals who were

highly reverent and gullible of Spain's prevalence over
Latin America's determination for an independent
cultural formation (e.g. the Cuban poet and essayist,
Jose Marti)

,

Sarmiento believed that Spain was not

synonymous with civilization, particularly the one he
identified with the European tradition.

The Hispanic

cultural heritage that Sarmiento rejected was precisely
the one brought by the Spaniards to Hispanic America.
On the other hand, justified on an ecstatic veneration
of North American European culture (i.e. British and

French)

,

Sarmiento felt an unfeigned contempt for the

American Indian.

For instance, concerning the mental

capacity of the Argentinean Indian, he disdainfully
declared:
The differences in brain volume that exist
between the individuals of a same race are
greater in direct proportion to the level of
It
civilization in which they are located.
is comprehensible ... that the superior races
exhibit more differences in degree of
intelligence among them than among the
inferior ones, which allows us to conclude
that the minimum is common to all the races,
whereas the maximum, which is rather weak for
the savages, is on the contrary, very high
for the civilized peoples (Sarmiento, 1915:
87-88)
.

One may readily see that in some respects

Sarmiento anticipated Darwinian social evolutionism and

positivistic racialism in explaining Argentine social
reality.

The inner contradictions of Sarmiento

's

20

positivistic racialism in explaining Argentine social
reality.

The inner contradictions of Sarmiento’s

thought expresses the romantic Liberal rebel’s concept
of cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil,

expressed in his own terms as "civilization versus
barbarism'.

That is, notwithstanding the progressive

outlook inherent to Sarmiento’s Liberalism and the

understanding of the magnitude of the historic forces
that created the social realities, the fierce

committment that drove him to strive to change the
course of that history in his own country might have

driven him to take such a retrograde stand upon ir

1.4

in

The Generational Method as an Anthological
Criterion:
the Testimonial Texts
In his thorough and highly reliable survey of the

sources of Latin American philosophy, Ivan Jaksic
(Jaksic 1988-89) indicates that there are many thematic

concerns that differentiate Latin American philosophers
i

n

It should be noted that Jose Marti ’s influential
essay "Our America", along with a large part of his entire
work, is an implicit and at times an explicit dialogue with
This revolutionary thinker
the Sarmiento’s theses.
was
no struggle between civilization
there
understood that
false erudition and nature
between
and barbarism, only
for he regarded it as a
postulate
Marti rejected Sarmiento’s
was falling
Sarmiento
that
He considered
false dichotomy.
his
In
colonizer.
into a trap skillfully set by the
remarkably
foreshadows
critique of Sarmiento Marti ’s thought
specifically,
mind,
Frantz Fanon’s theories of the colonized
the accurate characterization of the psychological
mechanisms of the colonized intellectual (see On National
Culture" in The Wretched of the Earth 1968: 206-248).
.

,
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world, but also among themselves

.

it is clear that

those who have concentrated on these themes have

already taken

a

position in regard to the nature of

philosophical activity in Latin America.

That is, they

tend to reject the notion that philosophy in the region

should conform to the philosophical activity in other
parts of the world, or at least should adopt it
uncritically.

And because of their attempt to use the

discipline to address larger social concerns, the
sources that they produce are not only different from
those of the universal current, but must also be

considered separately just as one would differentiate
between primary and secondary sources.

To the extent,

however, that philosophers of the universal tendency

produce original work for the field internationally,
their sources are to be regarded as primary.

But

according to Jaksic, this is not often the case in
Latin America (Jaksic, 1988-89: 150).

Philosophers in Latin America are different from

philosophers in other parts of the world.

It is not

surprising then that their interests should be
different as well, although one must not exaggerate,
for various reasons we will expose later on, the

uniqueness of the Latin American context.

The

philosopher of the region strives to practice his/her
trade according to international standards.

But such
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does not count with the means and the cultural

and institutional encouragement to do so.

As a result,

he/she must address themes of more immediate concern,
or attempt to pursue both a professional and a socially

oriented career.

Or he/she can, as many do, seek

sanctuary from all social and political pressures in

universities where he/she can attempt to replicate the
activities of philosophers in other, more fortunate
areas of the world.

The dilemmas of the Latin American philosopher and
the philosophers themselves have become important

subjects of recent concern within and without the
region.

These concerns range from the selection of

some of their most significant writings, to

interpretations of Latin American philosophical
activity based on generational characteristics.

Our

approach will follow Jaksic's thematic indexing of the
sources of Latin American philosophy and will perform a

hermeneutic treatment of all the available sources

articulating generational characterisitics

,

together

with what we considered pivotal writings regarding the

question of authenticity and

a

well-defined Latin

American philosophical identity.
The objections that the denominated "generational

method" has stirred up, as an organizational or

periodization criterion, are well known.

This is
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particularly true, when it is employed in
and rigid way.

However, due to:

first,

a

mechanical

the unity in

terms of the thematic problem (i.e. the identity and

authenticity of Latin American philosophy)

,

and second,

the extension and diversity of sources utilized for the

presentation of this synthesis and overview of the
history of Latin American philosophy, we were compelled
to employ such a method without discussing its

objective validity beforehand vis

a

vis other possible

methods (e.g. philosophical tendencies, countries,
etc.).

In the specific context of the history of

philosophy and the history of ideas in the Spanishspeaking world, this method was brought into practice
for the first time by Ortega y Gasset 13

every periodization is, in

a way,

.

Naturally,

artificial, but it is

always indispensable to use some form of it.

We simply

adopt the generational method as the most convenient
one in agreement in form and content with the material
we will be examining further on (in our case we just

could not do without

it)

.

Nevertheless, we must point

out that the application of this periodization

criterion, implemented in the context of Latin American

"^Por que se vuelve a la
Jose Ortega y Gasset.
in Obras completa s
generaciones"
las
filosofia?: El drama de
de
Revista
Madrid:
IV,
de Ortega v Gasset Volumen
89-93.
Occidente, 1957, pp.
13

,
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philosophy, has been fairly common in other efforts to

compile all the material available on this subject 14

.

The debate around the question of the existence of
a

Latin American philosophy has evolved within the

diachronic framework of four generations of Latin

American philosophers, from the middle of the past
century to the present.

In spite of how problematic

the generational method might turn to be, there is no

other convenient method that would permit us to

illustrate effectively the thematic persistence that
identifies Latin American philosophical activity since
its origins.

As we mentioned before, the usefulness of

the generational method will be guaranteed only if it
is not applied mechanically.

Even those who opposed

this strategy, because they regarded it as too
schematic, now have to accept the reality of

"philosophical generations" as

a

conventional

terminology in certain areas of cultural history.

We

are here defining "generation" as a system of current

and shared assumptions in the interior of

a

community

of men and women who live confronting their respective

contemporary problems.

The chronological standard of

birth-to-lif e-and-to-thinking has been extremely

Refer to other previous anthologies prepared by
Risieri Frondizi, Francisco Miro Quesada, Leopoldo Zea,
For the title of those anthological
Jorge J. E. Gracia.
of this dissertation.
bibliography
the
see
please
works
14
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satisfactory for distinguishing the existence
of

a

determinate generation with its own intellectual
characteristics.

To secure positive and clear results,

there must be a relative permissiveness when using
this

generational strategy.

1.4.1

The Founders

Working within the lines indicated by our
generational approach, we will denominate those young
thinkers who reacted to the writings of Alberdi and his

generation (i.e. the positivistic end-of-the-century
generation)
187 0's,

,

and were born approximately around the

as the generation of the founders

.

They broke

into the intellectual panorama as writers who dared to

impose their new convictions, opposing the previous

positivistic generation.

Their intellectual hegemony

is unchallenged until the end of the century.

As we

have already suggested, the intellectual milieu that

critically informed the generation of the founders was
strongly constituted by what the Argentinean

philosopher Alejandro Korn called "the positivistic
Lent 15 ".
15

Therefore, they were vehemently absorbed in

Although "Lent" is strictly known as the period of 40
days before Easter, Korn and the rest of his generation (who
embodied the anti-positivistic reaction in Latin America)
used the derisive expression "positivistic Lent", for
positivism in Latin America lasted approximately 40 years
(1870-1910).
Disregarding some minor fluctuations, this
periodization of the history of Latin American philosophy
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the radical critique of the dogmas of pure positivism;

because of this obsessive will to break with their

philosophical past, they pursued several European and
North American anti-positivistic philosophies, such as
the doctrines of Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche,

Dilthey, Bergson, Boutroux, Guyan, James, Croce, etc.

All of the authors belonging to this generation

were celebrated for being excellent writers and

educators as well.

Their "limitations" as

philosophers, as originators of authentic new

philosophical discourses, have to be imputed to

distinctive facts, such as, that they were

fundamentally self-taught 16

,

the lack of a

philosophical infra-structure (e.g. original works, updated publications, access to philosophical journals,
etc.), and the isolation in which they struggled and

worked.

The following belong to this generation of

philosophers:

Alejandro Korn (1860-1936, Argentina);

practically constitutes a consensus among many historians
(e.g. Arciniegas, 1971: 1-7; Crawford, 1961: 95-169; Davis,
97-134; Nicol,

1972:
16

1961:

45-46; Zea,

1963:

27-34).

It is not that we judge autodidacticism as an
"intellectual malady" in itself; but, for what this
condition allows in terms of the favorable conditions
required for the vigorous development of a well integrated
philosophical community with a foundational program. In the
philosophical education of these individuals, this
predicament determines the reception of only those
intellectual influences dictated by subjective and
individual preferences and idiosyncrasies, leaving out
(involuntarily) a broader range of essential and pertinent
readings
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Jose Enrique Rodo (1872-1917, Uruguay); Carlos Vaz

Ferreira (1872-1958, Uruguay); Enrique Medina (18711945, Chile); Alejandro Deustua

(1849-1945, Peru);

Raimundo Farias (1862-1917, Brazil); Antonio Caso
(1883-1946, Mexico); and Jose Vasconcelos (1882-1959,

Mexico), among others.

With regard to the central problem that engages
our essay, it will be clear from the scrutiny of some
of the key texts of the authors identified, that the

first generation of Latin American philosophers in the

twentieth century gathered from Alberdi's works the
ideal of an autochthonous thought
a

,

and aspired to write

philosophy beyond the simple and direct application

or adaptation of European sources.

For instance, with

special attention to that issue, the Argentinean

Alejandro Korn sets out the problem in the following
terms
... Argentinean philosophy (author's
I suspect the reader's smile in
emphasis).
face of this apparently meaningless epigraph
Since when
i e Argentinean philosophy).
have we an Argentinean philosophy? Can we
say that we have, perhaps, philosophers? If
philosophy is defined as the fulfilled
expression of the human spirit, could the
philosophical truth be different from one
nation to another? (Korn 29)
(

.

.

To this problem, Korn subsequently responds:
It would be permissible to remind you in
passing that philosophy is not an exact
science, neither will it assume a definite
form; we must, on the contrary, set aside the

exact sciences...

from the philosophical
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recognition.
Contemplating in advance any
possible objection, it would be sufficient to
estimate that the so-called absolute truth of
each historical epoch and each geographical
region details a different story. We have a
Greek philosophy and an Oriental philosophy,
we have a modern times, a French, a British,
and a German philosophy. Why in the
meantime, as a case of an educated nation,
are we not capable of also expressing,
according to our capacities, the
philosophical truth that conforms better to
our idiosyncrasy? (Korn 2)

Nonetheless, Korn concedes that we belong to the

Western cultural tradition which we have deliberately
aspired to incorporate; he also maintains that so far
as the moment in which he is writing, we

(i.e.

Latin

Americans) have only occupied ourselves in assimilating
and repeating imported ideas.

But,

... we cannot waive the right to discuss the
diverse influences that reach us, or the
right to conform them to our own environment;
we will not renounce either to the aspiration
of becoming a unity, not a "cero" in the
context of universal culture (Korn 30)

What is being resolved with these words should not
be construed as a request or a "programmatic"

invitation to start from cero from the perspective of
Latin American contribution to the history of
philosophy.

It should be clear that what Korn is

suggesting is that Latin America should set itself in
the historical position of a starting point in Western

culture; that is, to express creatively the

philosophical truth according to our particular
idiosyncrasies.

Which means, that philosophy, no

a
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matter how "universal" we may suppose its nature to be,
is a situational self-ref erential knowledge with its

foundation in effective history 17

.

Along the same lines, but perhaps, with

a

futuristic outlook and emphasis, Jose Vasconcelos from
Mexico, declares:

Every philosophy implies, at least in part, a
manner of thinking that originates from
collective life and in which it becomes
rooted... Not one important race evades the
duty to judge by itself all the inherited
precepts to adapt them to its own cultural
plan or to reformulate them if that is what
is dictated by the sovereignty that pulsates
within the entrails of the new life that is
originating (Vasconcelos, QEFL 49)
It should be underscored that in this context the

notion of "race" plays

Vaconcelos thought
'

,

a

specific technical role in

and consequently,

it does not have

17

Since we consider Korn's interpretive conceptual
framework to be relatively similar to that of Gadamer
philosophical hermeneutics, we are re-interpreting Korn's
ideas on an autochthonous Latin American philosophy assuming
this parallelism. Hence our premeditated introduction of the
concept (i.e. effective history) in this context. The
specific connotation that Hans-Georg Gadamer designates to
this idea in Truth and Method [Warheit und Methode, 4th ed.
1975] is central. "Effective history" Wirkungsgeschichte]
is, according to Gadamer, the on-going mediation of past and
present which encompasses subject and object and in which
tradition asserts itself as a continuing impulse and
To be aware of this effective history in the
influence.
process of understanding (and self-understanding) and
interpretation of a text or merely a historical event, is
what Gadamer calls further on "awareness of effective
This is the
history" [wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstein]
expressed recognition of the past as the determinant of our
consciousness, that is in Gadamer's own (translated) words,
that "Being is more than consciousness".
'

[

.
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relationship, direct or indirect, with any racist

ideology

.

Vasconcelos is forced to reconcile in his

philosophical discourse the unflattering picture he
offers (Vasconcelos, Indologia, una interpretacion de
la cultura iberoamericana

.

1926)

with the unbounded

aspiration of the future by asserting that human raw
material is extremely plastic; races can change, even
in one generation.

According to Vasconcelos, the

Indian has as a matter of fact changed notably since
the coming of European culture.

No bounds can be set

to what may happen in this first case of a sudden,

large-scale "hybridization" (Vasconcelos, 1926: 72-73).
To those who stigmatize the "mestizo" as an inferior
and credit the Anglo-Saxon's "prosperity" to his

uncompromising ethnocentrism, Vasconcelos asserts that
in the long run, mixture will be more productive, will

do more for humanity than any previous race has done

(Vasconcelos,

1926: 76).

task of the philosopher in
a

For this Mexican thinker, the
a

country where Indians form

major part of the population is

not of statistical statement.

a

task of synthesis,

Synthesis means adding

the heterogeneous to the homogeneous; it means the

vision of the whole in which nothing is lost from the
richness that variety gives, but all is transfigured

31

and seen teleologically, seen as part of a process
that

ends in the eternal (Vasconcelos

6)

In the context of this foundational stage,

Vasconcelos must certainly be regarded one of the most
interesting and controversial figures in the history of
Latin American philosophy.

superb writer,

a

A sagacious philosopher, a

devoted educator and political

activist; he represents with his life and work a

profound sense of the Mexican destiny and of the Latin

American culture in general.

In a series of works that

attained great popularity (e.g. Estudios indostanicos
1920

;

La raza cosmica

others)

1925; Indoloaia

1926; and many

According to him in his work La raza

he foresees that the base of this future is

.

constituted by what he calls
cosmica]

.

he passionately anticipates the future of

,

Latin America.
cosmica

.

.

,

a

a

"cosmic race"

[raza

synthesis of the four primary races of the

present world that will emerge in the region of the

Amazon and fulfill "the divine mission of America".

He

thought that in contrast with the ethnic egotism and

nationalism that incarnate in the Anglo-Saxon peoples
of Europe and North America, the new "race" would be

characterized by

a

"universalist" spirit based on love.

Vaconcelos should not be interpreted as to be
envisioning

a

Latin American philosophy for a national

or continental manipulation

,

that is, as a biased
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philosophy servile to

a

people or an ethnic group's

nationalism.
The generation of founders were a group
of

enthusiastic autodidact thinkers who had to struggle
without appropriate material means and in an
isolated
cultural environment for the ideal of founding

positivistic philosophy 18

a

non-

.

Like many of the major trends in contemporary Latin
American philosophy, they have emerged from the reaction
against positivism. Positivism as developed by the French
philosopher Auguste Comte (1793-1857) was a philosophical
discourse that was not only characterized by the mere desire
to know.
For this particular doctrine, knowledge was just a
servant of action and should lead to the solution of
concrete problems. This practical aspect, perhaps, was one
of the most captivating for Latin American intellectuals,
who desired to overcome anarchy, eradicate misery and
disease, and place their own countries on the path of
progress.
This, however, was not the only reason for the
wide acceptance of positivism. There were also reasons of a
strictly cultural and theoretical nature. Latin America had
been nurtured in Scholasticism and consequently, the
sciences of man were in a deplorable state.
Conceptual and
terminological vagueness, careless speculation, as well as
baseless and archaic dogmatism were predominant features.
Positivism, however, brought principles based on experience
and logical rigor, offered the certainty of constant
progress, insisting that its claims rested on proved
knowledge.
The optimistic perspective that the first
generation of Latin American philosophers held within the
positivistic conceptual framework, dictated that there would
be no more fruitless theories, superficial speculations, and
futile attempts. They thought that at last a sound
procedure had been found that, although it required great
effort, would lead to the gradual solution of Latin
America's serious social and political problems.
It
should also be added, that in Latin America positivism was
not only adopted but adapted
It was adopted, but it had to
adapt itself to the Latin American historico-cultural
characteristics.
Its assimilation, therefore, evolved
through its transformation. This adaptation did not take
place under identical circumstances all over the continent.
Latin american positivism not only is different from the
These
European, but it varies from one country to another.
.
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The second generation of Latin american

philosophers necessarily reversed the sense of the

problem of the existence of

a

Latin American

philosophy, giving more importance to the noun than to
the

ad~i

ect ive

.

so to speak.

They considered that there

cannot be Latin American philosophy if there is not as
a

primary condition, namely, philosophy

Following

.

this judgment of the situation of philosophy in Latin
America, they believed that the problem was a question

defined in terms of normalcy

philosophical activity

;

that is, that the

as far as its development

involved, required maturity in order to be assessed as

any other "normal" intellectual activity, such as

literature or art.

Therefore, this generation has been

denominated as the generation of normalcy

1.4.2

.

The Generation of Normalcy

This generation is born in the last decade of the

nineteenth century.

Their intellectual potential

started to be influential in the second decade of the

twentieth century.

There is no significant break among

them with regard to the generation of the founders at
the level of themes and aspirations of their

For instance,
two factors are equally important.
Argentinean positivism and Mexican positivism are very
different from the European types of positivism, but they
also differ from each other.
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philosophical undertaking.

Nonetheless, there is a

clear collective effort to diverge from the founders at
the met hodological level

.

They were persuaded that it

was imperative to normalize philosophical activity on

their continent, admitting the inescapable "flaws" of
the earlier stage:

autodidacticism, deficiency of

information, isolationism, scarcity of resources, etc.
For them, to normalize meant, essentially, to promote

philosophical reflection as

a normal

activity alongside

the differentiated activities that are developed in the

center of any authentic and flourishing culture.

their perspective philosophy was not

a

From

romantic and

intermittent task, undertaken by heroic and isolated
individuals.

The dominant preoccupations were then, to

get informed and formed in the original works of

Western philosophy, not in secondary sources.

They set

out to create an exhaustive and appropriate

philosophical infra-structure; that

material base that would guarantee
excellence and consistency in

a

is,
a

a

well provided

level of

normalized

philosophical activity for the Latin American
continent:

university tenures and faculties

specialized and committed to the teaching of
philosophy, philosophical journals, qualified

translations of original works, congresses and
international meetings; in short, everything that would
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facilitate the struggle to surmount cultural
isolation.
Naturally, following the logic of their agenda,
the

philosophical "modus operandi"of the generation of
normalcy became less exoteric, that
to the "outside" or lay readership.

is,

less directed

Perhaps,

encouraged by specialization and sophistication as an
ideal, this diversion to turn philosophy into an

elitist activity was

a

preliminary requirement for

their agenda to be carried out successfully.

It should

be emphasized, however, that they did not abandon at

any po int of their intellectual production the ideal of
an authentic Latin American philosophy

.

The influences they admitted into their respective

philosophical works were far more comprehensive and
diverse than the ones that informed the preceding
generation:

phenomenology, Marxism, historicism,

Orteguian vitalism 19
19

,

Neo-Thomism, Neo-Hegelianism,

The external influences on twentieth century Latin
American thought have come from various sources, but notably
from Spanish writers who, once again in the twentieth
century, have assumed a role suggestive of Spaniards of an
earlier age. The literary and philosophical renaissance
that accompanied Spain's loss of the vestiges of her empire
in the New World and the Far East in 1898 became a major
stimulus to Spanish influence in Latin American intellectual
activity.
For instance, the ideas of Unamuno and Ortega y
Gasset have had influence in Latin America. Ortega
popularized existentialist views derived from Wilhem Dilthey
and other Germanic sources, while Unamuno brought from Soren
Kierkegaard a dramatic emphasis on the tragic sense of life.
Ortega in particular, appealed to class conscious Latin
American liberals with his fundamental belief, like that of
Rodo, in the necessity of an intellectual elite to guide the
The
masses, whose inevitable growth degraded everything.
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existentialism, etc., were all studied.

Among the most

eminent and representative figures, we should cite:
From Argentina, Francisco Romero (1891-1960)

Astrada (1894-1970), Nimio Aquin

(b.

,

Carlos

1896); from

Brazil, Jackson de Figuereido (1891-1928) and Alceu

Amoroso Lima

(b.

1893)

;

from Peru, Jose Carlos

Mariategui (1894-1930); and from Mexico, Samuel Ramos
(1897-1959)

.

The Argentinean Francisco Romero, stands out as

one of the most prominent philosophers belonging to

this generation of normalcy.

In what he recognizes as

the "normalizing ideal", Romero explains:
Let us see what we understand as
philosophical normalcy in this case. First
of all, the exercise of philosophy is an
ordinary function of culture, alongside the
other preoccupations of human intelligence.
Not as the mediation or creation of a few
conscious minds on the surrounding
indifference; neither for the same reasons,
as the exclusive activity of a few men gifted
with a vocation, capable of maintaining
themselves undisturbed, despite everything
occurring around them. As any theoretical
discipline, philosophy permits and even would
go as far as to require the contribution of
not-so-extraordinary intellects; requiring
the indispensable faculty for underscoring
the real problems, seriousness, information,

influence of his Revista de Occidente and his reputation
among Latin Americans as a spiritual father of the Spanish
Republic gave Ortega great influence upon the liberal
historical, sociological, and legal thought of Latin
For an exhaustive study on his influence in
America.
contemporary Latin American philosophy refer to Jose Gaos
Sobre Ortega v Gasset (Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria
'

1957)
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and discipline, among other attributes
(Romero, 1984
68)
:

With these words Francisco Romero does not

contradict the possibility that in the course of time,
an original and exemplary philosophical discourse will

emerge in Latin America.

Nonetheless,

he believes that such a fortunate event will not follow
as a result of some miracle or by a mere "creatio ex

nihil"

(Romero, QEFL 69)

of things,

rather,

beyond the natural development

it will come about as the direct

consequence of what this entire generation labeled as
the "normalcy stage" in the maturation of philosophy in

Latin America.
concludes,
(Romero,

"This incipient philosophy", he

"still has to go much more to school"

1984: 71).

"Going to school" meant for this

generation, to integrate the European philosophical

tradition as

a

prerequisite for genuine philosophical

innovation
On that same point, and standing in sharp contrast

with Vasconcelos' romantic project (in addition to
other philosophers belonging to the founding
generation)

,

the Peruvian Marxist, Jose Carlos

Mariategui, who will play an important role in our

discussion below, writes:
It is right that America feels herself
predestined to be the home of future
It is right that she
civilization.
"through my race, the spirit will
proclaims:
It is also right that she estimates
talk".
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herself chosen to teach a new truth to the
world.
However, America should never presume
of being right on the eve of supplanting
Europe's philosophical influence; she should
not, by any means, declare Europe's
intellectual hegemony as totally expired or
displaced... what is actually concluding,
what is indeed deteriorating is the
historical cycle of capitalist civilization.
The new social form, the new political order,
is already generating right in Europe's
entrails...
Nobody dismisses... the
possibility that Europe will renovate and
transform once more.
In a historical
perspective, Europe is the continent of the
magnificent resurrections (Mariategui, 1984:
62 - 63

20
)

.

Nonetheless, persuaded of the relevance of the

European philosophical legacy and an accomplished

Marxist theoretician himself 21
"peruvianize" Marxist theory.

,

Mariategui tried to
He struggled with

20

It should be indicated that this article was
published for the first time in 1925, seven years after
World War I and eight years after the Bolshevik Revolution.
Naturally, for a Marxist and a "futurist" like Mariategui,
these two unparalleled historical events suggested the
concrete possibility of a superior society from the
material, intellectual, and moral point of view.
21

Jose Carlos Mariategui is one of the most important
twentieth century revolutionary leaders in the Americas.
The French writer Henri Barbusse once remarked, "Do you know
who Mariategui is? He is America's new luminary. The
prototype of the new person of that continent" (as quoted by
Jorge Del Prado in En los anos cumbres de Mariategui Lima:
Ediciones Unidad, 1983, p.179). Now, 59 years after his
untimely death, Mariategui' s contributions to revolutionary
Marxism, both in theory and practice, are finally being
acknowledged not only in his native Peru but throughout
Latin America as well. After the victory of Sandinismo in
Nicaragua, the democratic, anti-imperialist forces in Peru
have adopted "Mariateguismo" as their common reference
Mariateguismo now promises to be the symbol of the
point.
largest and most unified revolutionary Left in South America
during the 1990's.
.
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remarkable results to adapt the paradigm of Marxian
social theory to interpretation of Peruvian socio-

historical and political reality.

He attached the

problem of how the perplexing presence of the
indigenous social element in this distinctive community
could situate itself effectively

national strategy.

With such

a

in a revolutionary

strategy, he

transcribed Marxism to an original and accurate

representation of his national reality than could those
who followed orthodox schemes of "pure doctrine" 22

The Technical Generation

1.4.3

In the 1940's,
a

at the conclusion of World War II,

third philosophical generation emerged.

This one,

has been designated by the Mexican philosopher

Francisco Miro Quesada the "technical generation".

The

members of this generation were born approximately in

Although Marxist in its historical determinism,
Mariategui's thought differs unmistakably from orthodox
He argues, for example, that Spanish colonialism
Marxism.
did not bring capitalism to the New World, but merely
interrupted the pre-Conquest indigenous economic
development. This effect of the Conquest was the source, he
insisted, of Peru's later problems, and the only remedy was
to renew the lines of the pre-Conquest economic and
political development. This analysis which is offered in
one of his cardinal works, Seven Essays of In terpretation of
Peruvian Reality (1926), is by far much more revolutionary,
and he is in a certain way, a proto-critical theorist when
For a
he advances his unique notion of a realist Utopia.
more detailed discussion of his thought and his
contributions to revolutionary theory, please refer to our
last sections.
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the second decade of the present century.

They took

over and carried on the preceding generation's

philosophical project but with the fortunate benefit
that philosophy in Latin

America had already attained

the first level of maturity of any normalized

discipline, on which basis, the foundation of an

authentic philosophy could then be conceived

.

The quest for a kind of philosophical

authenticity, although along dissimilar paths, became
an obsession for the technical generation.

The

designation of "technical generation" is justified by
the far-ranging knowledge that these philosophers

acquired within the various sub-disciplines of

philosophy and by the proficient use of newly available
and abundant bibliographical resources.

New methods

and techniques of conceptual analysis enabled them to

produce philosophically mature works, comparable in

quality to those produced in Europe and United States.
Their high level of formal intellectual achievement
should be contrasted with the almost natural tendency

toward improvisation of the earlier generations.

The

spectrum of influences that fall upon this group, is
now total; that is, it actually comprehends all the

multiplicity of schools and tendencies in European and
Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

Regardless, the assimilation

of these influences and the creative impetus that they

eventually animate, consolidates the personality and
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originality that characterizes and makes them
unique.
It must be remarked that this generation
constituted
itself,

substantiated by

a

certainly prolific

intellectual production, as the patrons of Latin

American intelligentsia in the 1940's.
Bearing the expression of "authenticity" nearly as
battle cry in a century long and sometimes embittered
controversy, Miro Quesada along with another major

Mexican philosopher, Leopoldo Zea

(b.

1912)

them active voices in the still on-going

,

both of

dispute,

explain what they understand and define as "authentic
philosophy"
Zea as much as I, wanted to do authentic
philosophy (their emphasis)..., that is, to
produce a philosophy that would not be a
poorly duplicated copy of the imported
philosophies; but one that would constitute
an expression of a living thought, that would
emerge from our Latin American circumstance,
utilizing to its maximum all the procurable
resources...
it was not a question of an
absurd compulsion for originilaty at all
costs, neither a furor for becoming "great
philosophers"...
Desiring to be authentic
meant (their emphasis) the premeditated
formulation of a project on the way to become
what we meant to be and this project
influenced decisively all the manifestations
of our philosophizing.
The European
philosophers had never experienced this
manner of approaching philosophy. They had
philosophized in a "candid" way, assuming
with absolute assurance that they were
actually doing philosophy, what is more, that
they were doing the philosophy (their
emphasis) ... We had the tormented conscience
that our philosophical activity had been a
mere reflection (their emphasis) of European
philosophy and we wanted to cease being just
that in order to transform it in our own
.

.
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philosophical irradiation (Miro Quesada 9-10,
1974)

.

Authenticity meant, for this generation, the
immediate and compulsory necessity to transcend their

prevailing level of philosophical creation, abstaining
from both

a

"triumphalistic" attitude (i.e. a "you've—

never-had-it-so-good" ambience) and abstaining from an

inferiority complex.

Beyond normalcy, they struggled

to shape their own philosophical expression, to

articulate their own philosophical voice.

The problem

to contend with was, what path to follow.

Ultimately,

this problem was presented in terms of the question of

themes

:

Can we claim as Latin Americans that we have

exceptional philosophical problems that are dissimilar
from the philosophical problems studied elsewhere in
the civilized world?

"regionalists"

,

"Universalists" and

as they designated and divided

themselves in this debate, held intense discussions at
international congresses, faculty meetings, and in
journals.

"Universalists" who were attempting to do

philosophy "in the strict sense" [filosofia "sin mas"]
assumed (without any intellectual disaffection or
feeling of subservience) the splendid European

philosophical tradition, but always acknowledged the
essential singularity of their Latin American
situation. The "regionalists", or "Americanists" as
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they also called themselves 23

,

insisted on the

fundamental originality of the Latin American

circumstance as

a

point of departure for the

articulation of an autochthonous Latin American
philosophical discourse.

For this group, particularity

was a sine qua non pre-condition of claiming any share
of eventual universality.

Both tendencies ended up by meeting in an

remarkably productive intellectual collaboration and
coexistence, without, as they used to say, con-fusina
themselves.

For they saw, after all, that both

projects, far from being mutually exclusive, were

compatible and even indispensable.

The philosophy "of

everything that came in the sphere of ["de lo
latinoamericano"

]

what is Latin America (e.g. Being,

history, language, anthropology, culture, etc.) and the

history of ideas in this continent, had in the
"technical generation" distinguished exponents and

considerable developments. The highest point in this
debate that underscored clearly the level of non-

communication between the two tendencies and reached

The reader will definitely encounter throughout our
essay and in some of the other texts cited, the use of
"America" and "Americans" in reference to Latin America and
Since many of the authors we are quoting
its inhabitants.
use this designation indistinctively and we are mainly
translating most of the original sources utilized in this
present work, we will render them literally with the same
lightness the author in question uses them.
23
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its most extreme point in the 1950's is adequately-

exemplified by Miro Quesada in the following terms:
Our conception of what Latin American
philosophy had to be, differed in an
irreconcilable manner. For him (Leopoldo
Zea)
the only way to do authentic philosophy
was by undertaking a penetrating appraisal of
the distinctive elements that constitute our
reality, seeking through this procedure to
unravel the definite logic of our history,
the meaning of our existential project as a
collectivity.
For me, the only way to do
authentic philosophy was by centering our
thoughts on the great themes of classical and
recent philosophy, trying to confer, from our
specific determinations, interesting and
original solutions or approaches on the
corresponding problems. For instance, he
(Zea) was more interested in the history of
logic, while I was interested in the theories
of logic 24 he was concerned with the
history of positivism in our continent 25 and
I was absorbed in trying to know all about
positivism and occupied myself in the
analysis of whether positivism was or was not
a valid doctrine to follow.
Evidently,
there were not any possible points of
communication (Miro Quesada, 1974: 8).
,

;

.

Among the "regionalists"

,

.

there were the members and

participants of the Mexican philosophical group
"Hiperion":

Salvador Reyes Nevarez, Joaquin McGregor,

Some of Miro Quesada s works and articles specialized
in logic, philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics,
philosophy of language and other related topics we can refer
Loqica (1946), "Algunas reflexiones
to the reader are:
traducibilidad" (1973), "Kant y el
de
concepto
sobre el
problema de la verdad matematica" (1973), "Lenguaje, razon y
teoria explicativa" (1972), among many others.
24

'

No one has studied the history of positivism in
Latin America more thoroughly than Leopoldo Zea. The
publication of his first major work, El posi tivismo en
Mexico in 1943, has been followed by a steady stream of
volumes and articles dealing with the history of ideas, not
only in Mexico but throughout Latin America.
25

,
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Ricardo Guerra, Fausto Vega, Emilio Uranga, Jorge
Portilla

,

Luis Villoro 26

the "universalists"

,

,

led by Leopoldo Zea.

Among

besides Miro Quesada, there were

other figures like Eduardo Garcia Maquez, Francisco
Larroyo, Risieri Frondizi.

We believe that with them,

Latin America entered effectually in an active phase of

philosophical creation in the lengthy way that goes
from an awakening of a project to the actual project of
a

philosophical fulfillment.
It should be underlined with regard to the

"technical generation" that their possibilities for

development were exponentially advanced by the
remarkable intellectual production of the Spanish
exiles

(

"trasterrados"

)

,

who established themselves in

various countries of Latin America at the end of the
This beneficial ingress of new minds along

1930's.

with their respective philosophical influences, was
part of

a

massive flight of Spanish intelligentsia

forced out of Spain by the fascist insurrection

commanded by General Francisco Franco.

These exiles or

Years later, Luis Villoro abandoned the group
"Hiperion", and is considered actually an important figure
In
in the field of analytic philosophy in Latin America.
be
could
that
assessment
consonance with the problem of any
been
have
that
tendencies
offered of all the numerous
assembled under this unfortunate rubric by it its
that is "analytic philosophy", Villoro should
adversaries
be regarded as an analytic philosopher only in "lato sensu"
group he
Nonetheless, when he was still a member of Zea
Mexican
the
on
books
published various anthropological
Indians and other related topics.
26

,

'
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"trasterrados"

,

as they called themselves,

collaborated

with the philosophical project of the technical

generation in many capacities:

as translators of many

original works written in the European languages, and

introducing by this way recent European philosophy; and
as significant innovators alongside the Latin American

philosophers.

Among the Spanish "trasterrados" we can

Luis Recasens Siches, Eduardo Nicol, Jose Gaos,

find:

Joaquin Xirau, Juan David Garcia Bacca, Eugenio Imaz,
Manuel Granel, Jose Ferrate Mora, Maria Zambrano, etc.

The Generation of Articulation

1.4.4

A fourth generation of Latin American philosophers

instituted itself with
1960's.

a

distinctive agenda in the

The philosophers gathered under this new

cluster were born around the 1920's and the 1930

's

and

due to new political and social events of

transcendental consequences, they are inevitably
located in

a

unique political scenario.

The problems

that are now being addressed by this generation are not

dominated by the need to achieve

a

higher technical

level and mastery with respect to that of European

philosophy, for that ideal was already accomplished by
the preceding generation.

They are pursuing a Latin

American "being" which they believe

is

constituted by

their history and culture; but culture in this context
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i

'

understood in an elitist ssnss

Q

of the national bourgeoisie)

imminently popular

.

.

(

i

e

.

the culture

.

Their accent is now

The specific problem that concerns

this new group is how to articulate philosophy for the
real and every-day problems confronted dramatically bv
the popular masses

liberation 27

.

,

that is, in their struggles of

For this reason, we could name this

generation with sufficient basis, "generation of
liberation". However, for the sake of not confusing

this group with any particular tendency 28

,

we choose

to denominate them the "generation of articulation"
27

The affinity of this notion with Gramsci's theory of
an "organic" intellectual formation is rather evident,
namely, the idea that the intellectuals allied to the
oppressed classes of society would "lead" and be
"representative" insofar as they were to constitute an
expression of working-class social existence. "Theory" in
this sense of the word would eventually be integrated into
the entire social fabric of the popular masses life at the
workplace and in the community. Only through the mediation
of such organic intellectuals could an authentic
revolutionary subjectivity be realized; they would provide
the dynamic connecting link between theory and practice, the
intellectual and the spontaneous, the political and the
The philosophy of praxis, which according to
social.
Gramsci is Marxism, can achieve its fullest meaning only
through the intervention of organic intellectuals (Gramsci,
"The Formation of Intellectuals" and "The Organisation of
Education and Culture" in The Modern Prince and other
Writings pp. 118-132)
,

For instance, contemporary Latin American
philosophers like the Argentinean Enrique D. Dussel (e.g.
Metodo para una filosofia de la liberacion Salamanca,
claim that their discourses should be considered as
1974)
"philosophies of liberation". On the other hand, some
po 1 it ico— re 1 igious groups that have incorporated ideas and
principles from socialism or Marxism to their Christian
beliefs and practices also called their new doctrines
philosophy of liberation or theology of liberation.
28

,

,
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following the Gramscian notion of organic

intellectuals 29

.

In Latin America, the 1960's were years in which

the idealized models of economic development borrowed

from the advanced capitalist countries were

encountering crisis.

In the context of a dramatically

acquired political consciousness, stimulated by this
political and economic deadlock, the new Latin American
sociology has established that economic dependency is
an inescapable and concomitant to the political fact of

imperialist exploitation and domination.

During the

long years of this unequal and derogatory relationship

with the advanced capitalist countries, an original

theology of liberation emerges, providing to the

exploited masses

a

new discourse of hope and

emancipation which speaks directly to their level of
religious consciousness and material necessities.

The

Latin American theology of liberation can be viewed as
a

phase or step in the way of Christians toward their

reconciliation with the world and history, along with
29

To call this generation "period of maturity" as
Gracia does it in his introductory essay to the issue of
Philosophical Forum devoted to Latin American philosophy
(Volume XX, No. 1-2, Fall-Winter 19SS-89) is the closest one
With this label, Gracia is implying
can get to a witticism.
deviously that philosophy in Latin America has reached a
point of zero intellectual growth; that the rest to be
expected is a stage of intellectual senility, and
Naturally, this is far from what is
eventually, death.
actually happening in Latin American intellectual life in
general and its philosophical activity in particular.
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all its faults and its possible critique.

From this

new point of view, to be a Christian presupposes the

will to bear witness on

a

tradition of conquest and

exploitation in America, progressing toward an
authentic revolutionary commitment.

This theology

exposes a conspicuous effort to re-evaluate human
history, that is, the "kingdom of this world", the only

place where "the city of God" (Civitas Dei) can

possibly be constructed.
In its turn, this new phenomenon inspired the

well-known Latin American Episcopal Conference
[Conferencia Episcopal Latinoamericana] held

successfully in Medellin, Colombia in 1968 30

.

This

event gave a formal impetus to this politico-religious

movement of theology of liberation pervading in

a

noticeable way the Latin American political scenario,

In August 1968 about 130 Catholic bishops
(representing more than 600 in Latin America) met in
Medellin, Colombia, for the task of applying the resolutions
from the Second Vatican Council. The Vatican II, as it was
also called, encouraged church people to enter into dialogue
with the "world". Viewed optimistically from Europe, that
world seemed to be one of rapid technological and social
But a Third World angle of vision revealed a world
change.
of vast poverty and oppression that seemed to call for
Several documents that came out after that
revolution.
30

council
reinforced that impression (e.g. Pope Paul Vi's 1967
encyclical Pooulorum Prooressio /On the Progress of Peoples)

50

particularly within the Left, despite the predominantly

Marxist-atheistic discourse of this sector 31
Likewise,

.

in a distinct and extra-academic space

this new emancipatory emphasis in Latin American

philosophical activity was also encouraged by the
alternate models of Marxism embodied in the Cuban

revolution and later on, the Chinese Cultural
revolution 32

.

In this original scenario, Marxism

transcends the natural limits of academic circles to
inform various working class and peasant mass
31

In Latin America, one of the sources of the new
militancy during the 1970's was the church's pastoral work
At the village level these communities
in base communities.
were often a fruitful starting point for the new popular
organizations. Church leaders played an important role in
defending human rights, especially Archbishop Oscar Romero
of El Salvador, who became known as the "voice of the
Theologically speaking, the most novel
voiceless".
situation was that of Nicaragua. In contrast with the Cuban
experience, Christians had played important roles in the
anti-dictatorial struggle. The whole movement of theology
of liberation posed fundamental questions to Latin American
Christians such as, what should their be in a revolutionary
process?

"Philosophy of Liberation" is not, under any
circumstance, a new cultural phenomenon in Latin America,
for discourses of liberation in the interior of apparently
"apolitical" philosophical doctrines have always been a
recurrent leitmotif in Latin American philosophy since the
Wars of Independence. This is the case of the political
reception and adaptation of positivism. As Zea has remarked
in El oositivismo en Mexico (1943), aside from the
scholasticism of the colonial period, "no other
philosophical movement has gained the importance that
positivism has had in Hispanic America". It shone out as a
redeeming doctrine, and Spanish Americans (giving a
different emphasis than the Brazilians) saw it as "suitable
for imposing a new intellectual order which would replace
and
the one destroyed, thus ending a long era of violence
political and social anarchy".
32
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organizations, and popular movements.

Naturally, this

includes the cases of rural and urban guerrilla

movements throughout the continent.

In such

circumstances, Latin American philosophy questions the

position that it has been carrying out in the everyday
life of Latin American society.

It is very difficult

to define as a homogeneous group this fourth generation
of philosophers.

What should be clear is that beyond

any ideal of authenticity, what was being sought, as a

response to new political and socio-economic
challenges, was the appropriate and effectual

articulation of philosophy in the complex processes of
social change that the whole continent was going
through.

One of the key figures that initiated this

new shift of orientation in Latin American philosophy

was the ill-fated Peruvian philosopher Augusto Salazar
Bondy (1927-1974).

His critical assessment of what he

thought was the meaning and problem of Latin American
thought can be well summarized in the following passage
from his essay "Can There Be a Latin American

Philosophy"
But philosophy can be unauthentic, as we have
How does this happen?... A philosophy
seen.
can be this illusory image of itself, the
mystified representation of a community, through which the community "gets ideas"
real ideas - about itself and loses itself as
This happens when
a truthful conscience.
as an imitated
constructed
is
philosophy
and episodic
superficial
thought, as a
principles
and
ideas
of
transference
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motivated by the existential projects of
other men, by attitudes toward the world that
cannot be repeated or shared.
This
anthropological illusion has, nevertheless, a
truthful side. The man of mystified
conscience expresses through this conscience
his own defects and deficiencies.
If a
community adopts foreign ideas and values, if
it cannot give them life and empower them,
but instead imitates them in their foreign
character, it is because alienating and
deficient elements prevail in its being.
Hispanic American philosophic thought - and
all other thought of similar explanatory
purposes - offers that stamp of negativity to
which we have been referring in speaking of
philosophies as illusory self-conscience
(Salazar Bondy 236-237).
.

.

.

The text cited extensively above summarizes, with
all its internal tensions and possible contradictions,

the new atmosphere in which Latin American

philosophical activity has been operating recently.
The most relevant figures in recent Latin American

philosophy who can be mentioned are:
(Mexico)

,

(although generationally he would seem to

belong to an earlier cluster)
(Peru)

,

Leopoldo Zea

;

Augusto Salazar Bondy

Arturo Andres Roig (Argentina)

(Argentina)

,

,

Rodolfo Kusch

Juan Carlos Scannone (Argentina)

Dussel (Argentina)
(Argentina)

,

Hugo

,

E.

,

Enrique

Horacio Cerutti Guldberg
Blagini (Argentina)

;

from Mexico,

along with Zea, Abelardo Villegas, Luis Villoro, and

many others.
In general terms, many of these authors maintain

that philosophy in Latin America has the possibility of

becoming an authentic philosophical discourse in the
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midst of the inauthenticity that surrounds it and
consumes it.

They believe that this would be feasible

on the sole condition that Latin American philosophy,
as a "self -conscious entity", converts itself from the

lucid awareness of its condition as alienated thought
into a ("recuperated") thought capable of unleashing
the unequivocal process that will eventually overcome
it.

They claim, that this process should be comprised

in terms of an initial reflection on our

anthropological condition and fundamentally, from our
own negative status, with a perspective toward its

decisive cancellation.

Consequently, Latin American

philosophy has before itself, as

a

possibility of its

own recuperation, a destructive task that, in the long
run will constitute the final eradication (negation) of
its current estranged form.

This group believes that

the type of attitude required by the actual situation
of Latin American philosophy,

is that of a state of

awareness that without delay will cancel prejudice,
myths,

idols; an understanding that would rouse every

Latin American from his or her subjection.

In

consequence, this is meant to be an acknowledgment that

would eventually liberate us from the obstacles that
impede our anthropological expansion, which is,

according to this generation, also the anthropological

expansion of the world.

They add, that it must also be
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a

critical and analytical realization of the

potentialities and demands of our affirmation as

humanity (Salazar Bondy 243)
This generation understood that to attain these

goals

,

a

philosophy was required that from the

beginning of its formulation would have cast aside
every deceptive illusion, allowing reflection to delve
into the historical substance of their Latin American

community.

This presupposed

a

search for the qualities

and values that would express this "historical

substance" in positive terms.

These qualities and

values had to be precisely those capable of finding

resonance in the entirety of Latin America, and, along
with other convergent forces, of unleashing

a

progressive movement that will ultimately eliminate

underdevelopment and domination.
The intellectual dialogue between the two

philosophical generations coexisting currently in Latin

America (i.e. "the technical generation" and "the

generation of articulation") has constituted
philosophical project that operates in
direction.

a

a

double

The technical generation, on one hand, has

sanctioned in indisputable terms the liberating
capacity of philosophy in the Latin American context.
Accordingly, the generation of articulation has also

appropriated the technical generation's ideal of
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creative authenticity

textually accorded in

This agreement was clearly and

.

a

document known as Declaraci on

de More lia; Filosofia e independence [Declaration of

Morelia: Philosophy and Independence] celebrated in the

Mexican city of Morelia in

19 7 8 33

.

Among other

essential points concerning the connection between the
role of philosophy and the process of liberation, they

acknowledged that the Latin American experience they
refer to in their dialogues is not the only one among
the group of nations that endure the dependency of the

various forms of economic and cultural imperialism.

In

Africa and in Asia, in the framework of significant
intellectual movements politically associated with
their respective struggles for liberation, they also
have determined, in their own terms, the problem of

their own individual cultures and independence.

They

have comprised forms of philosophies of liberation that

have much to teach to Latin Americans and which

knowledge will facilitate the constitution of
universal philosophy of liberation.

a

For this reason

the intellectual exchange between Africans, Asians, and

Latin Americans that would take place for the first

33

This document was co-written and co-signed by the
Latin American philosophers Enrique Dussel, Francisco Miro
Quesada, Arturo Andres Roig, Abelardo Villegas, and Leopoldo
It was published in Arturo Andres Roig's, Filosofia
Zea.
universidad v filosofos [Philosophy, University, and
Philosophers] (UNAM: Mexico, 1981, pp. 95-101).
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time upon the questions suggested by this
subject will
be of major importance and will open,

according to this

document, the access for the indispensable organic

integration of the multiplicity of philosophical
efforts applied by all the nations that suffer economic
and cultural dependency.

They believe that the

possible undertaking of creating a "philosophical
united front

of such nature

,

would be an innovative

milestone in the history of philosophy
100

1.5

)

(

Morelia 99-

.

Toward the Philosophical Formulation of the
Problem of Authenticity
The philosophical positions discussed above allow

us to discern that the debate on the question of the

existence, possibility, and meaning of a Latin American

philosophy has not yet reached its final resolution.
Because of this prevailing condition, we have avoided
any hasty anticipation of a "convenient" settlement of
the whole question.

Hence, we have chosen to conclude

this chapter with some personal considerations.

In the

first place, we would like to indicate that for us,

philosophy is an essentially human endeavor.

Clearly,

this sounds like a ludicrously evident statement; but,

what we are suggesting is that philosophy is not only
the activity inherent to human beings by which they

legitimately reflect on everything that pertains to
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legitimately reflect on everything that pertains to
their condition as human condition, particularly on
that which befalls upon them, be it con-venient or inconvenient, preeminently, what is envisioned or

intuited under the category of future [sobre todo lo
que le ad-viene, ya sea con-veniente o in-conveniente
y sobre todo lo que vislumbra o intuye bajo la

categoria de por-venir]

From the viewpoint of the

.

specific appraisal we are giving to philosophical

activity in the context of Latin America, we cannot,
however, disregard that to philosophize

,

insofar as it

is a human enterprise that corroborates the future as a

critical category, presupposes

a

historical dimension

that co-determines its forms of manifestations and

therefore its forms of textual representation.

That

fundamental "intelligence" that constitutes philosophy
as an inherent correlate to the human condition, that

actually lives from (and because of) its humanity

is,

certainly, a human act enacted by concrete men in

historical situations identically concrete.

This claim

allows us to acknowledge philosophy, once again, as

situated activity, as
human,

a

a

thought that, being essentially

is always articulated in a historical situation.

By this claim we do not mean, however, that philosophy

defined as

a

situated undertaking, must be comprehended

in the sense of reducing and dissipating itself in the
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"situation".

The philosophical reflection is effected

in situation,

but not as an exclusive

of.

the situation

or about the situation [de la situacion o sobre la

situacion]

,

for that to which we are posing the

fundamental question is not the actual situation as
such, but that which precisely is the designated agent
in the situation; namely, the human being itself and

everything which pertains to its disposition.

Hence,

trying to demarcate the field, the content and the
function of philosophical activity from the socio-

historical conditions and situation of

a

definite human

collectivity, would be equivalent to depriving

philosophy of the dimension that constitutes its
essence:

to be the central question for that which is

essentially human and all its entailed possibilities.
If such is the nature of philosophy,

its appearance

should occur in every time and space in the form of the

question of what is essential to humankind.

That is,

under any condition or situation in which philosophical

reflection is being performed, it will inquire for the
ultimate depth that underlies every historical
situation, including the danger that this reflection

may bring upon itself and consequently upon its

protagonists; in other words, the wav of b eing human.
We want to postulate the idea that philosophy in

Latin America, if it wants to be truthful to itself and
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to its fundamental human purpose,

should forsake the

determination of the so-called Latin American
specificity to those human sciences that have
incorporated
task.

the appropriate instruments for such a

Philosophy should then exercise its intervention

from the essential and universal perspective to which
it belongs,

that is, as living interrogation for what

is brought into play in every time and place.

Questioning the Latin American situation on its
circumstantially mediated nature will necessarily
impose on any philosophical endeavor launched from this

capacity (i.e. the Latin American context) the
equitable and

delimited horizon necessary for any

successful dialogue with any other pertinent

philosophical tradition.
The philosophy that Latin America ought to be

formulating cannot be

a

philosophy confined to the

limits of the Latin American socio-political world.
Its genuine individuality cannot be built on the

grounds of an exclusive philosophy of Latin America and
for Latin America [como una filosofia exclusiva de

Latinoamerica y para Latinoamerica]

.

From the viewpoint we are outlining in the last

section of this chapter, we allow ourselves to propose
or invite a re— statement of the problem of the

authenticity of the Latin American philosophical
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thought.

In fact, we should ask ourselves if the

inauthenticity which Latin American philosophy is being

reproached for, does not find its ultimate explication
in what we will appoint as the ontological prejudice of

the Latin American.

The conseguence or conceivably,

the source of this ideological misrecognition of our

rightful ontological situation may be clarified if we
take in account the "ontological demarcations"

furnished by the ideologues and theologians committed
to the colonization and psychological prostration of

the Latin American Indians.

This process left as its

scar the mistaken belief that the nature of the Latin

American man is characterized by

a

total lack of

historicity, either because he has never owned it, or

because he has just lost it.

In turn,

this ideological

ambush definitely persists in our "impious" nature,

consequence of

a

"fall from grace".

We must indicate

that the topic of an "original sin" has, in the context
of the theories of the Latin American ontological

nature, a long documented history.

For instance, to

Sahagun, a Spanish theologian and ideologue during the

earlier periods of the Conquest, who professed that the
Indians were victims of

a

moral and intellectual

weakness, a consequence of the "original sin" which had
not been washed away by proper Catholic christening
(Villegas,

1966:

29-32).
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We believe that this prejudice persuades the

Latin American individual to estimate himself as an
entity exiled to an ontological limbo by the blunt
force of an irreconcilable difference with regard to
the rest of the global community.

Naturally, this

frustrates his effective integration into human

universality and, in the concrete case of philosophical
activity,
a

it hinders his access to the understanding of

supposedly "alien

11

thought which shares by virtue of

its nature a common content, namely, that which is

essentially reflected by this thought.
In order to provide the reader with a concrete

case taken from the history of Latin American

philosophy that would illustrate our position we could

mention the debates related to the philosophical
discipline of axiology or better known as theory of
value in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition
(Frondizi and Gracia 187) 34

.

Anyone who examines more

attentively this tradition and the way it has developed
in our specific circumstance

will notice straightaway

that the Latin American axiological reflection not only
Phi losophers such as Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler,
Nicolai Hartmann, and Ralph Barton Perry have influenced
profoundly the philosophical production of all the Latin
American philosophers engaged in theory of value. To have a
rigorous and detailed exposition of this tradition we can
refer the reader to the valuable work edited by Risieri
Frondizi and Jorge J. E. Gracia's El hombre v los valores,_
en la filosofia latino-americana actual (Mexico: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1975)
34
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takes its departing point from the conceptions proposed
by European philosophy, but also evolves within and

beyond that conceptual framework, including its most

extreme formulations (axiological subjectivism and
axiological objectivism)

.

None of the Latin American

philosophers associated with this discipline (e.g.

Alejandro Korn, Antonio Caso, Jose Vasconcelos, Samuel
Ramos, Juan Llambias de Azevedo, Risieri Frondizi 35

)

has pretended to distance himself from the Western

philosophical tradition in order to develop an
independent Latin American axiology.

Rather, they have

remained within the perimeter of Western philosophical
tradition, attempting to

re-think it, with more or

less success, but always guided by an intense creative

devotion.

In this way,

the philosophical treatment of

the problem of values, which probably constitutes one
of the most central and constant preoccupations of

philosophical activity in Latin America, reveals in an

exemplary way the deep rootedness of Western philosophy
in this continent.

In other words, precisely in one of

the topics in which Latin American philosophy should

fairly express its peculiar character, what really

appears is its indisputable Western ascendancy.

^Representative essays dealing with theory of value
written by these authors have been included in Frondizi and
Gracia's (eds.) El hombre v los valores en la filosofia
latinoamer icana actual (1975), which we have mentioned
above
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It is far from our purpose to take this textual

evidence as

justification to devise against

a

philosophy in Latin America an imputation of
inauthenticity or in the worst case, of mimicry.

We

understand that philosophy in Latin America does well
in avoiding its guest for originality through the path

of a radical denial of its Western heritage, but

proceeding rather by authenticating and developing
itself creatively by starting within the interior of

this tradition.

It strives to "insert" itself

critically (i.e. consistently procuring its own
cultural identity) into the European philosophical

tradition and and in so doing becoming definitively an
"organic" part of an extended account of the history of

philosophy.
We then concur with Mariategui's view briefly

cited above
americano?

)

(

,

;Existe un pensamiento hispanonamely, that the possibility of

authenticity of Latin American philosophy will not
consist in the obliteration of

a

philosophical past

just because its source is supposedly foreign and

therefore adverse to our own interests; neither in the
actual surpassing of European and Anglo-Saxon

philosophy by the creation of "sui generis"
philosophical discourse.
will make possible

a

The necessary conditions that

Latin American philosophy will
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rely firstly, on the outcome of a return of the Latin

American individual to what culturally and historically
concerns him; secondly on towering above what marks him
as difference (i.e. as a Latin American).

Finally,

from these explicitly delimited cultural "zones", the

Latin American philosopher will locate those supposedly
alien philosophical discourses that also interpellate

their own problematic.

Essentially, this must be the

itinerary on which the Latin American philosophical

endeavor incorporates itself in order to safeguard its
rightful, communal and cultural "territory".

Through

this strategic "return", the authentic historical

questions that concern philosophy in

a

genuinely global

perspective would be unequivocally disclosed.
Furthermore, such strategy should mobilize a

cooperative and equalitarian consolidation of the

philosophical activity, now conceived as an ecumenic

movement that would not abandon itself in ostentatious
goals thereby forsaking its integrity as an ordinary
and essentially human affair.

CHAPTER

2

THE PROBLEM OF "LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY" AS A
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM
2*1

The Problem and Some of Its Implications:
Pertinence of the Poet’s Vision

The

The question of the possibilities and prevailing

conditions that render feasible the claim for the existence
of a Latin American philosophy is intricate.

We decided to

first implement an interpretive approach regarding textual

testimony, an approach presented in the 1st Chapter,

according to which only the texts that historically have
alluded to the problem of authenticity and philosophical
identity were examined.

We are opting for a discriminating

re-collection and re-construction of the essential arguments
presented by most of the participants in this theoretical
dialogue that incidentally has spanned more than a century.
This means that our strategy is comparable to

a

hermeneutical procedure that takes into account all the

accessible sources instead of a merely exegetical commentary
or lineal classification of the arguments contained in the

texts
We are attempting to integrate both explanation and

understanding in the reading of these sources as the
recovery of their sense and meaning concerning the specific

problem we are examining.

As part of what we regard as real

understanding of these texts, we recover the concepts that
were meaningful in our historical past, which, as recovered,

constitute concepts that include our own.

We have argued
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the issue by questioning some of the explicit utilizations
of the term "Latin American philosophy", as such,

history of Latin American culture.

in the

We have traced its

emergence in the context of our philosophical and literary

tradition right from the middle of the nineteenth century.

According to our comprehensive procedure, this presupposed
that in extension to the analysis of a philosophy in, about
and even for Latin America, there also exists

a

,

philosophy

that is designated Latin American because it is

significantly qualified by this particular historicocultural circumstance.

The latter will constitute the

center of the following discussion.
From our new perspective the expression "Latin American

philosophy" becomes

a

philosophical problem.

task of showing, even in

This is the

merely programmatic sense, the

a

possibility of a concrete form of philosophy that identifies
and differentiates itself in virtue of the very sources of
its own cultural tradition.

This challenges us with the

problematic undertaking of re-defining and re-situating
philosophical activity in

a

new context.

This alternative

outlook restrains us from practicing academic philosophy or
"pure" philosophy [filosofia "sin mas" o filosofia "pura"],

which is the expression traditionally used in most of the

Spanish speaking countries.

What is being pursued is

deliberately the "contextualization" [contextualizacion] and
"inculturation"

[

inculturacion] of philosophical reflection.
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Essentially, what is being proposed with the

expressions "contextualization" and
with the expression or program for

"

a

inculturation" is that
"Latin American

philosophy" the universality of philosophy characteristic of
the official (i.e. Eurocentric) tradition is placed under

skeptical examination.

a

The pretended "universality" of the

philosophical conventions sanctioned by Western traditional
thought is questioned by its confrontation with the Latin

American context.

From such a supposition, this program

prescribes that the philosopher commit himself to do "Latin
American" philosophy, and in doing so assume

a

critical

distance with regard to other misinterpretations of the

Western philosophical tradition.
development of such

a

At an initial stage, the

philosophical program forcefully

requires that the individual adopt

a

critical stance with

regard to the way of doing philosophy he has acquired.
Moreover, this critical restraint insists on the necessity
of finding a new course for the exercise of philosophy,

which reason, it is unmistakable that such

a

for

conception of

philosophy assigns to itself the right to determine all over
again the essence, meaning, and purpose of what philosophy
should be

.

A program for a "Latin American philosophy" must

be confronted with a strategy with an internal organization

exposing the actual critique of the traditional conception
(hypostisized as universal) of philosophy.
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Clearly, such an undertaking implies

philosophical problem.

a

major

As we were suggested before, this

program essentially entails an entire process of
"contextualization" and

"

inculturation"

.

Just to envision

the base or foundation for its possible realization hints at
the prospect for a new and distinct perspective in

philosophy as one of its outcomes,

a

perspective that

derives neither from the history of philosophy endorsed as

universal nor from the cultural standards (explicit or
implicit) that have determined nearly with absolute

predominance the direction of the history of philosophy.
Rather,

it originates from a distinctive cultural horizon,

from a somewhat marginal culture and therefore, without any

bearing on the "official" history of philosophy

.

From the

margins, that is, from the "outside" or "otherness" that

generates this culture disengaged from the traditional
centers of philosophical production is then accomplished

a

perspective that allows us an entry to what we could
designate as the reverse of the official history of
philosophy.

It situates itself as an opposite to the

Western philosophical main stream, surveying and reinterpreting the latter as

a form of

reflection whose

categories, concepts, and rationality, in sum, are not

incorporeal entities [entidades descarnadas]

,

material elements essential for its exercise.

but rather
We contend

that such conceptual frameworks must be "translated" into

a
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determined cultural life form.

Consequently, its

universality is in the best of cases,
universality and perhaps regional to

a
a

culturally located
certain amount.

From

the perspective of the marginal cultures, the totality of
the dominant culture at the level of philosophy suffers a

"de-totalization".

It gets disjointed in its centrifugal

dialectics and re-locates itself as

a

mere moment of the

universal because it has experienced the abrupt force and
immediacy of its "philosophical Other" that shows that its

existence is not necessarily the embodiment of the

universal

.

The discovery or opening of this new and distinct

perspective presupposes and demands the re-encounter of the
Latin American philosopher with his own cultural heritage.
This re-encounter within the boundaries suggested by such

perspective should operate as

a

criterion for the

discernment of an intelligible meaning of philosophy in
Latin America.

Furthermore:

this unique perspective would

inescapably disclose itself as an insubstitutible "materia
prima", providing the unique historical and cultural
be
experience of all the Latin American peoples which would

bestowing meaning on
discourse.

a

truly representative philosophical

Without the experience or acknowledgment of the

in his
value and meaning of his own cultural foundation

philosopher would
philosophical endeavor, the Latin American
with regard to
not be able to establish a critical distance
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the "inherited"

tradition.

(European and/or Anglo-Saxon) philosophical

The fundamental groundwork that the Latin

American philosopher obtains from his cultural milieu is
precisely what allows him to philosophize distinctively and
perceive philosophy with

a

different outlook.

In the

encounter with Western philosophy his/her own culture
becomes an indispensable decisive platform.

From this point

of departure follows the possibility of de-centering

philosophy from the particular cultural milieu in which it
emerged originally (i.e. Europe).

And consequently, the

initial and inherent limits to Western philosophy are

exposed in the radical human experiences of other cultures.
A program for "Latin American philosophy" suggests the

simultaneous and vital unveiling of Eurocentrism in the

received philosophical tradition.
constitutes

a

Such an "unmasking"

radical critique of the hegemonic process by

which philosophical reflection has revolved, centered and

entangled in the particular "intellectual geography" of the
European cultural metropolises.
On this basis, just as Heidegger visualized in the

destruction of the history of ontology a heartening
possibility for the relief of what he disconsolately
contemplated as the catastrophe of the "forgetfulness of
Being", the philosopher who strives for a "Latin American

philosophy" must conceive as an inescapable necessity the
it
enterprise of demolishing the history of philosophy as

is
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conceived from an Eurocentric perspective

1

.

The surpassing

of Eurocentrism, particularly with regard
to the

determination of where the potentialities of philosophical
rationality are supposedly self-ordained and located,
becomes necessary for the solidary recognition
[

reconocimiento solidario] of the philosophical dignity and

presence of other cultures.

The destruction of the history

of philosophy written in an Eurocentric sense is thus an

appeal so that the non-European cultures would not be merely

subsumed as casual addenda or inconsequential footnotes in
the history of Western philosophy.
i-

s

The ultimate aspiration

to incorporate the Latin American philosophical tradition

as a vital moment in the symphonic cadence of the general

movement of philosophical reflection.
The destruction, or in more appropriate terms, the

culturally decentralized revision of the "official" history
envisioned in the program for

a

"Latin American philosophy"

should not be misconceived, under any circumstance, as an

anti-European reaction to the latter's philosophical legacy.
There is no intention of replacing the center of

philosophical activity from Europe to Latin America.
must not be understood as

a

It

conventional displacement of

^his parallelism between Heidegger's notion of
forgetfulness of being and the fulfillment of an authentic
Latin American philosophical discourse, has been thoroughly
examined in Osvaldo Ardiles's essay, "Bases para una destruccion de la historia de la filosofia en America Indoiberica" (1973) [Foundations for a des-truction of the
history of philosophy in Indo-Hispanic America].
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that center (i.e. Europe).

it is a critique,

along with all

its radical consequences, of the formations of
centers

subsequently self-appoin t

t h emselves as ubiquitous

fo r any form of philo sop hical reflection

.

i-h*t

paradigm

it is learning to

see that philosophical activity, precisely for the
human

radicality characterizing this endeavor, in its movement
toward

a

conclusive knowledge of things, usually finds

itself with such problems and questions that because of

their resistance to be unequivocally clarified, overwhelm
the possibilities of a resolution that the context given by

any particular culture might offer.
It seems indisputable that every culture tends to

conceive itself as describing

world and man.

a

total and coherent view of

Precisely in this tendency of centering

around itself, the essential inadequacy in which every

culture lives without being able to rectify it from its
interior is exposed.

This "natural" disposition for

centralization could well be explained as the subtle attempt
to conceal its inherent weaknesses.

Anyhow, at this point,

the recognition of the insufficient and disconnected

character of every culture coincidentally marks the moment
in which a culture can de-center and recognize itself as a

mere fragment.

By this process,

it heals itself from the

European pretension of wanting to appear as the totality of
humankind.

This mistake will not be repeated in Latin

American philosophy.
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From the background of this experience, clearly

expedited by the peripheric position to which Latin American
culture has been dislodged by the process of the European
cultural expansion, the Latin American philosopher evaluates
Eurocentrism.

The criticism is not raised to re-

authenticate other centers.

Rather,

its purpose is to

establish the conditions for an inter-cultural dialogue in

which every cultural location stays relativized with regard
to itself, admitting that in its center there are still

unsettled questions that it cannot be elucidated by
themselves
The Latin American project for re-defining

philosophical activity from the specific context of cultural

tradition and its resulting critique of Eurocentrism does
not correspond to the ignorant and arrogant provincialism
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that Jose Marti

2

criticized in his ground-breaking article

"Nuestra America" ("Our America")
The conceited villager believes the entire world
to be his village...
What remains of the village
in America must rouse itself.
These are not the
times for sleeping in a nightcap, but with weapons
for a pillow.
weapons of the mind, which
conquer all others.
Barricades of ideas are worth
more than barricades of stone (Marti, 1977: 84).
.

.

it should be clear that what we are eluding at all

Thus,

costs is a cultural seclusion, and most of all, any kind of

"philosophical xenophobia".

The ultimate purpose is the

vindication of the "right" to be "counted" on equal terms,
without forsaking the right to resist any conceivable
2

Most of the short life of the Cuban revolutionary
intellectual, Jose Marti was spent in exile, much of it in
the United States, and was devoted to achieving Cuban
independence.
He was convinced that the Cuban movement was
the beginning of a new and broader revolutionary movement.
During his fourteen-year stay in the United States, he
assimilated the ideas of Henry George and other North
Americans, including labor leaders sympathetic to Marxist
ideas.
Some Cubans have tried to stamp him with the mark of
materialist-socialist doctrine (Castro, 1959: 70). Others
have emphasized his individualism and devotion to
Such
democratic-liberal ideas (Santovenia y Echaide, 1948)
possible reading of Marti may have made possible that the
opponents of Cuba's socialist regime have utilized Marti as
But Jose Marti defies
their intellectual mentor.
categorization. Marti is probably best understood as
expressing these frequently contradictory emotions and
anxieties of Cuba and Latin America at the end of the
nineteenth, rather than the exponent of any particular
The recurrent emphasis in
ideology (Martinez Bello, 1941)
his speeches and in his writings (e.g. Marti, 1977) is a
rejection of determinism, whether Marxist or positivist, and
an insistence upon the possibility of change by revolution.
In this respect we regard him as a precursor of the
inquietude and philosophical originality of Latin America
that finds expression once again and in many different ways
in the twentieth century revolutionary thinker, the Peruvian
Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui (1895-1930).
.

.
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attempt to be unilaterally absorbed into the philosophical

production of

a

supposedly "more advanced" culture.

On the

other hand, what is also being pursued is to incorporate in
the philosophical production what genuinely belongs to the

Latin American cultural domain, without sequestering it into
a

deceptively self-sufficient "difference".

aspiration is

a

The definitive

dialogue that would authenticate Latin

American philosophical and cultural identity in the act of

communication and communion with other cultures.

An

authentic Latin American philosophical discourse must become
in its formation and development in solidarity with others,

not solitary in spite of the others:

solidarity in

universality and solidary universality.

Such is the ensign

of the project for a legitimate Latin American philosophy.
In a strict philosophical sense,

it expresses the end of an

era in which a hegemonic culture dictated in unyielding

terms to other presumably subordinated cultures, all the

possible forms of philosophical logos that had to be

exercised
On the other hand, the critique of Eurocentrism informs
us of yet another implication of central importance for the

constitution of the project for
philosophy":

a

"Latin American

namely, the search and explication of the

appropriate space for the authentic realization of such
program.

a

This question is, naturally, of foremost

consequence.

The reason is rather evident:

the sense or
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non-sense of the question itself of

a

"Latin American

philosophy" is decided beforehand depending on the

intellectual horizon from which the question is formulated.
For instance, if the "from where" of this question is

constituted by an Eurocentric horizon, it would be logical
that the question degenerates into some kind of violent

provocation

.

For if the European model is assumed as the

universal paradigm for philosophical activity, it is

certainly concluded that without an adequate correspondence
with that ideal, there would not be philosophy

.

The

excessively disjunctive consequence of this position is
clearly nonsense:

either philosophy in Latin America

follows the dictated precepts sanctioned by the European
model, or else,

it is not philosophy

.

The critique of Eurocentrism is oriented at this level,
at the level of the task of securing an appropriate "from

where".

That "space" would operate as the basis from which

the question for a "Latin American philosophy" will be

articulated in terms that would allow definite access to
what can be discarded.
Initially, the European horizon has to be discarded for an

analysis of a possible "exteriority" to the latter's

categorial system, that is,
by its concepts.

a

space that will not be defined

A conceptual territory in which the

meaning of things could be represented in alternate forms,
otherwise unknown and even oppressed in the dominating
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P^^sdigin s categorial world.

This "from where" that exists

beyond the horizon specified by the European— prototype

rationality is certainly the extraneous, "the Other" of that
reason, or the "barbaric" 3

Enrique Dussel
Zea

(

(

as designated for instance,

,

by

Philosophy of Liberation 1985) and Leopoldo

Discurso desde la marcrinacion /Discoursp. from

Marginality 1988).

Definitely, this constitutes the

perspective of any Eurocentric observer.

American individual that is his world.

But,

for the Latin

This ineffable

and

even intangible territory (i.e. to the eyes of the

Eurocentric observer) stages his own interpretive horizon,
the

"

inter iority" from which he has to project his inquest

in order to authentically explore the definitive meaning,

and ultimately, the limits of its own cultural horizon.

Just by descending to the actual core of Latin American

cultural experience and its historically 4

,

and

3

This particular interpretation also meets with the one
that characterizes our research and the allegory insinuated
namely, Mariategui's writings as a cultural
in the title:
and political victory against the encroachment of a
supposedly "superior" philosophy over an "under-developed"
indigenous form of thought. A metaphorical repetition of a
politically signified "mise en scene" of the Shakespearean
classic confrontation (i.e. The Tempest of the civilized
European incarnated in "Prospero" versus "Caliban", the
barbaric and speechless creature.
)

The historical ity of the problem and the "effectivehistorical consciousness" wirkungsgeshichtichliches
of Latin American intellectuals of the quest
Bewusstsein]
of Latin America for a distinct cultural (and philosophical)
identity refers to its ontological aspect in a definite
It is in the first place, the recognition
Gadamerian sense.
of the process of change and becoming underlying every
cultural phenomena, and secondly, the assumption of cultural
4

[

,
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articulating it against the European tradition, one would be
capable of experiencing its concrete limits.
It can be noted, however,

that with this reflection we

inevitably return to the question of the relation between

expression intrinsic to human experience as a fundamental
endeavor responsible for its future and the inevitable (and
constitutive) cultural encounter with other cultural
traditions.
Gadamer affirms that "only through others do we
gain true knowledge of ourselves. Yet this implies that
historical knowledge does not necessarily lead to the
dissolution of the tradition in which we live; it can also
enrich this tradition, confirm or alter - in short,
contribute to the discovery of our own identity" (Gadamer,
1979: 107).
We believe that the relevance of Gadamer's
above mentioned concepts to the discussion is definitely
self-explanatory in the following excerpt from his "opus
magnum", Truth and Method (1965, 1976b).
When our historical consciousness places itself
within historical horizons, this does not entail
passing into alien worlds unconnected in any wav
with our own (our emphasis) but together they
constitute the one great horizon that moves from
within and, beyond frontiers of the present,
embraces the historical depths of our own selfconsciousness.
It is, in fact, a single horizon
that embraces everything contained in historical
consciousness. Our own past, and that other pasts
towards which our historical consciousness is
directed (our emphasis)
help to shape this moving
horizon out of which human life always lives, and
which determines it as tradition (Gadamer, 1976b:
,

,

271)

.

Although we are convinced that such is not the case of
Gadamer's assigned significance to "tradition" in his
philosophical hermeneutics, it must be nonetheless
underscored, that we are not assuming and identifying
"tradition" with a romantic infatuation with a past that is
frequently an imaginative construction of our own present
concerns; or with the Eurocentric bigoted vision of a
fascinated "New world" aborigine with the imperialist
oppressor's cultural heritage. We understand that a
tradition is only alive when it is freely appropriated
That is, our perception of "tradition" is that it is
unequivocally endowed with an anticipatory or futureoriented dimension.
.
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philosophy and culture in Latin America.

It is quite

discernible that this "from where", that is, the appropriate
space where the question for a "Latin American philosophy"
can be adequately represented cannot be other than the space

opened by Latin American cultural phenomenon.
indeed, the

"

It is,

interiority " from which this question emerges

as a legitimate consideration, compelling and urgent

other words
^-i scover

'

s

—

.

In

the Question for a "Latin American philosophy"

,

t s transcendent context in the Question of Latin
.

American culture itself

.

From what has been exposed above, we argue that the

quest for a "Latin American philosophy" is closely

associated with the unending inquietude for the cultural

autochthony and autonomy of our continent (and not just by
the immediate consequences of its critique of Eurocentrism)
In this sense this philosophical project represents an

attempt crucially registered in the general intellectual

movement for

a

search of an legitimate Latin American

cultural expression since its rise as

politically modern nations.

a

conglomerate of

It belongs to that diversity of

efforts to prevail over a visible sentiment of

insignificance that the Cuban poet Jose Lezama Lima has
called "the germ of the terrible (inferiority) complex of
the American"

(Lezama Lima

1977,

290),

and that in his own

words consists in:
to think that his own expression is not an
accomplished form, but instead a problematism
"

.

.
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something to be resolved.
Sweaty and inhibited by such
presumptuous obsessions, he expects to find in
autochthony the comfort that was being denied to him,
and trapped between such triviality and the mirage of
the European realizations, revises his facts, but has
forgotten what is essential, that the plasma of his
autochthony, namely, that (America) is land equal to
Europe [our emphasis] (Lezama Lima, 1977: 290) 5
,

.

Since the constitution of a legitimate

autochthonous thought assumes

a

return to its

independent cultural sources, the materiality of

a

"Latin American philosophy" would be the concrete and

confirmed proof that the Latin American individual has

restored his forgetfulness of the essential.

In this

way, he conquers "the American difficulty of deriving

substance from his own circumstances" (Lezama Lima,
290), hence creating culture and philosophical

1977:

It must be indicated that Lezama 's writing is all of a
His poetry, novels, tales, and what one hesitates to
piece.
call his critical writings, all are written in the
metaphorical, vertiginously allusive style that is
consistent with his faith in the paradoxical illuminating
Critics generally accept Lezama 's
power of hermeticism.
claim that he evolved a poetic system, and attempts have
been made to codify his terminology (e.g. Fazzolari, 1979)
Any such codification, however, is rendered difficult (if
not ultimately impossible) because there is much more poetic
insight than critical systematization in Lezama' s literary
In this sense, the Cuban writer cannot be compared
system.
to European writers like Proust and Joyce who have
consistent critical frameworks to which their works can be
It is impossible to imagine a book
reduced by critics.
about Lezama akin to J. P. Dalton's and C. Hart's A Skeleto n
There is no "skeleton key" to
Kev to "Finnegans Wake ".
Paradiso or to Qppiano Licario they unconditionally require
himself
Julio Cortazar Hopscotch
new habits of reading
the
perceived
a champion reformer of reading habits,
particular challenge of a text such as Lezama Lima's
Paradiso (Cortazar, 1974).
5

.

;

.

(

)

,
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thought in direct confrontation with his context^

1

.

As

we have seen, this places this philosophical enterprise
in a conflictive position with regard to a particular

philosophical tradition.

However, this conflict should

not be dramatized excessively, visualized in terms of a

definitive cessation of

a

philosophical dialogue.

Why

not regard it as a sign that the time in which the

subject-matter of philosophy was exclusively enunciated
in Eurocentric categories has come definitively to an

end?

This affirmation can be construed as the outset,

and perhaps, the groundwork for a new era of a solidary
and truly ecumenical "universality", structured in an

inter-trans-cultural logos.

2.2

Approximation to the Historicality of the Problem
Certainly, the problem implied in the question of

the existence or the non-existence of a "Latin American

6

Jose Lezama Lima and, as we are going to examine later
Jose Carlos Mariategui, are very much comparable to Jose
Marti, if regarded as Latin American "cultural paradigms":
they positively constitute the quintessence of Latin
American intelligentsia
They are masters of creative
Beyond its strictly creative function,
assimilation
creative assimilation is endowed by these writers with an
ethnic dimension; it is the essential cultural trait that
They maintain that it is a
defines "Americanness"
particular characteristic of American writers, an outgrowth
As
of the historical experience of colonialism.
the
through
culture
only
European
participants of
writers
American
colonization,
of
inheritance
illegitimate
/The
americana"
expresion
("La
Lezama
Lima
are, according to
cultural
any
of
partake
to
free
American Expression, 1977),
tradition that attracts them without committing themselves.
on,

.

.

.
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philosophy", at least in the terms that we have tried
to characterize above,
1973,

1976; Biagini,

Quesada,

1974,

is relatively recent

1988; Kempff Mercado,

1976; Salazar Bondy,

1968,

(Ardao,

1974; Miro

1969a,

1969b;

Villegas, ed. 1964; Villoro, 1987; Zea, 1974, 1976,
1988)
a
"

This explicit form of the guestion expressedas

.

problem of the "contextualization" and
inculturation" of philosophy constituted the critical

center of the numerous discussions opened by the first

contributions of the philosophico-political movement
known as "philosophy of liberation" toward the end of
the 1960's 7

On the other hand, Cerutti-Guldberg,

.

characterizes this "movement" in the following terms:
the so-called Latin American philosophy
of liberation arose in Argentina in the
1970's as an expression o the efforts of
university groups that were "getting in tune
with" the agonizing political reality of the
country.
It is a philosophy that tries to
exceed the narrow margins of the academic
task.
What has become known as the
philosophy of liberation constituted a
healthy aggregate of efforts to establish a
series of attitudes, principles, themes, and
ways of presenting in university
philosophical activities. Undoubtedly these
have left their mark in works, disciples, and
polemics (Cerutti-Guldberg, 1988-89: 43).
.

.

.

.

.

7

The Argentinean philosopher, theologian, and
historian Enrique Dussel, one of the most prominent
ideologues of the movement of "philosophy of liberation" and
"theology of liberation" succinctly defines philosophy of
liberation as a "postmodern, popular (of the people, with
It is philosophy
profeminine philosophy.
the people)
expressed by ('pressed out from') the youth of the world,
the oppressed of the earth, the condemned of worlds history"
Philosophy of Liberation Preface, 1985)
,

(

,
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Notwithstanding this fact, we would be misrepresenting
Latin American intellectual history by forcing the
reader to believe that the problem of intellectual

authenticity has not emerged and debated until such a
recent date.

Although not always in an explicit and

systematic form, this guestion has been the object of

preoccupation since the very beginning of Latin
American intellectual consciousness.
Given the case that this section is merely an

approximation to the historicality of the problem and
not an exhaustive cultural history of Latin America, we

will attempt to provide just

a

series of representative

clues and reflections to justify our approach 8
a

.

From

very general perspective, the first point that we

would have to underscore is the historically documented
fact (e.g. Zea, The Latin-American Mind 1963)

,

that in

the America of the XVIIth and XIX centuries (still

under the Spanish influence)

,

the enterprise of its

political independence is conceived as

a

task that

necessarily had to be complemented and reinforced with
"mental emancipation". It is meaningful and exemplary

that the testimony of Simon Rodriguez (Simon Bolivar's

8

The main purpose of our first chapter was exactly the
historical (if not sequential) presentation of the most
representative authors/philosophers ("interlocutors" as we
prefer to call them) that have engaged many of their works
with the struggle to clarify and define the question of the
Latin American cultural and philosophical identity.
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tutor)

followed that reasoning since that foundational

historical period, the importance of Spanish-speaking
America becoming intellectually original
virtudes—sociales

,

1964)

(

Luces v

is a pressing necessity.

This

is exactly the course established in Latin America as

the expression of a genuine form of thought and

cultural development.

It is the path definitely shaped

by the exigencies of the precursors of Hispanic

American cultural autonomy.
One of the most prominent originators and

promoters of the idea for

a

Latin American cultural

autonomy is indisputably Andres Bello

(

1781-1865)

9
.

In 1848, Andres Bello had already insisted on the

necessity that America should struggle for
"independence of thought", so that nobody would

reproach her by saying that "her civilization is an
exotic plant that has not yet absorbed the substances
from the soil that sustains her" (Bello, 1966: 49).
9

Andres Bello was born in Caracas, Venezuela. His
parents were of moderate means but devoted to music and
learning.
The education he received from them and from the
schools of Caracas is evidence of the high state of culture
there in the late eighteenth century. Rafael Escalona, one
of the notable teachers of his time, was his instructor in
philosophy. Later, from 1810 to 1829, while representing
the Spanish American revolutionary movements in London,
Bello extended his studies in the British Museum and made
the acquaintance of such British intellectuals as Jeremy
Bentham and James Mill. His readings in the British Museum
prepared him for the demanding tasks later of preparing the
Chilean code and advising the Chilean government on
international law, as well as for his subsequent studies of
Spanish grammar and poetry (Davis 81-82)
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Bello understood that although the revolution
for

independence was over, the war against the powerful
spirit which the colonial system had inspired was
just
beginning.

This process of "political emancipation",

according to Bello, had to be developed toward

profound level.

a

more

He believed that the second phase of

political independence, that of intellectual
emancipation, would have to be the work of the American

people
We have the alternative of taking advantage
of the first opportunity or of prolonging our
servitude for centuries... We could no
longer expect from Spain the education that
prepares one to enjoy liberty... We should
educate ourselves now matter how costly the
effort (Bello, 1945: 200-201).

Along with this line of thought, we should now
consider the thought of the Cuban revolutionary and
poet Jose Marti (1853-1895), surely, one of the leading

figures of Latin America's intellectual history.

With

his characteristic genius for synthesis, he "diagnosed"
the cultural and political situation of America with

the following concise statement:

independence did not lie in

a

"The problem of

change of forms but in a

change of spirit" (Marti, 1977: 90).

For Marti such

"change of spirit" entailed the progression from an

impressionable attitude eager to imitate Europe, to

a

critical outlook with regard to that "other" cultural
reality.

For this reason, after claiming that "neither
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the European nor the Yankee could provide the key to
the Spanish American riddle" (Marti, 1977: 91), he

advised the new generations of what he regarded as "our
America" to "realize that there is too much imitation,
and that creation holds the key to salvation" (Marti,
1977:

According to Marti, to "'create' is the

92).

password of this generation" (Marti, 1977: 92).

This

"imperative", a direct consequence of attaining

political independence, required from the new

generations of Latin Americans the commitment to create
an authentic American expression by extracting its

substance from its own soil and history.
However, the contributions of Bello and Marti are
not the only ones that can illustrate this constant

search for identity that spans the entire intellectual
With equal right, we could

history of Latin America.

cite thinkers such as Luz y Caballero (Cuba, 18101862), Hostos (Puerto Rico,
(Peru,

1848-1918)

1884-1946)
(Mexico,

,

,

1839-1903), Gonzalez Prada

Henriquez Urena (Dominican Republic,

Mariategui (Peru, 1895-1930)

1881-1959)

;

,

Vasconcelos

and many others whose work stands

as an irrefutable testimony in behalf of this struggle

for cultural identity 10

.

Supported by such a

We could also point out that in many ways their own
theoretical (writing) practices represent the concrete
models (with their obvious individual differences) of a
genuine Latin American cultural (and philosophical)
expression which they were ardently pursuing. That is the
10
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remarkable tradition Alfonso Reyes

(

1889-1959

11

was

not just launching a mindless "boutade" when he

asserted before the European participants of the VII
Conv ersacion del Instituto Internacional de Cooperacion

Intelectual [Vllth Congress of the International

Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, Buenos Aires,
1936] that:
It has been a long time that between Spain
and us there is a feeling of harmony and
equality.
I say now before the tribunal of
international thinkers within reach of my
voice:
we recognize the right to universal
citizenship which we have rightly won. We
have arrived at our majority of age. Very
soon you will become used to acknowledge our
presence (Reyes 90)

purpose of "isolating" the case of Mariategui for
analysis

a

closer

^Alfonso Reyes was a Mexican poet, short story writer,
He began his literary career in 1906 by
and essayist.
poems
under
the influence of the French
writing
(i.e.
Stephan Mallarme and the group of poets
"parnassians"
However, Goethe (whom he
poetica")
his
"ars
who emulated
Gongora
(1561-1627), along
Spanish
poet
the
wrote about),
to his artistic
contributed
all
with Mallarme (1842-1898),
Henriquez
Pedro
with
Reyes,
along
1910
development.
In
Jose
Caso
(1883-1946),
Antonio
Urena (1884-1946),
Vasconcelos (1881-1959), and others, began to pave the way
In 1913 he obtained
for a literary renaissance in Mexico.
living first
diplomat,
was
a
he
1939
Until
his law degree.
He
Argentina.
and
Brazil
in
later
and
in France and Spain
College
[National
Mexico"
de
Nacional
"Colegio
founded the
The bulk of Reyes' work consists of short
of Mexico].
stories (e.g. El piano oblicuo 1920), chronicles (e.g. Las
visoeras de Esoafia 1937), and numerous critical studies and
essays (e.g. La experiencia literaria 1942; El deslinde,
Reyes is generally credited with having made a major
1944)
contribution of to the intellectual life of 20th century
Mexico
.

.

.

,

.
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In a footnote to his major collection of essays,

"Ultima Tule" (1960), he remarked to

a

fellow Latin

American intellectual on the great Latin American
talent for "synthesis" or "creative assimilation"
(Lezama Lima)

Neither he (i.e. the Spaniard philosopher
Francisco Romero) or me were understood by
our European colleagues, some of those
remained sadly convinced that we were trying
to reduce the function of the American mind
to the mere organizing of compendiums of
European culture. Above all, we would not
have recourse only to the European tradition,
but to the entire human heritage...
Lastly,
in this synthesis we do not envision a
compendium or resume just as hydrogen and
oxygen on combining in the form of water do
not produce a mere sum of the parts but a new
substance, possessing, as does any true
synthesis, new powers and qualities (Reyes,
1960:

88n)

This disconcerting search for an original cultural

expression, as the examples above demonstrate, has

shaped one of the essential characteristics of Latin

American intellectual history.

Similarly, this search

also informs the historical development of philosophy
in those countries.

In other words, the question for a

"Latin American philosophy" not only finds its pre-

history within the context of intellectual development
in general,

but also involves a specific tradition in

6the history of philosophy in Latin America.

However,

not considering specifically the intricate and

controversial topic of the transformations suffered by

Scholastic philosophy in the colonial universities of
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America,

it is beyond doubt that the political
movement

for independence left its indelible and
identifying

mark in Latin American philosophy 12
turned out to be

a

.

This movement

challenge that practically unsettled

the recently acquired philosophical habits.

it also

contributed to creating an appropriate disposition with
regard to the re-assessment of the role of philosophy
in societies intensely engaged in their socio-political

reorganization.

According to many cultural historians,

this was precisely the context that facilitated the

continental expansion of positivism (Lee Woodward, ed.
1971)

.

Nonetheless, not only the Latin American

philosophers influenced by Comtean positivism were

searching for

a

"positive" philosophy capable of

confronting effectively the concrete problems of the
continent.

As we are going to see, this fact is

supported by other remarkable examples in the history
12

According to the historian German Arciniegas in his
article "From Utilitarianism to Positivism" (1971: 1-7), the
downfall of Scholasticism in Latin America which coincided
with the second stage in the historical evolution envisaged
by Comte, implied the adoption of a philosophy that would
lay a strong ideological foundation for the new republics.
Although the Enlightenment and Romanticism favored liberal
ideas and progress, they lacked a philosophy that would
define their terms.
Several schools appeared in succession
to fill this vacuum:
first Saint-Simon's proto-socialist
ideas, then Bentham's Utilitarianism, Comte's positivism,
Spencer's individualistic evolutionism. To the youthful
Hispanic America, those names and schools formed a chain
that marked the way of the pathfinders of new thought.
Their systems of philosophy were politically oriented and
therefore useful in defining parties, combating "anarchy",
and guiding legislation.
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of Latin American philosophy.

For in those places that

positivism did never penetrate or was openly
questioned, the imperative necessity of doing a

'practical and useful" was explicitly acknowledged.
Such is the case, for instance, of the philosopher

Jose

C.

de la Luz y Caballero (1810-1862)

in Cuba.

According to Luz y Caballero's view of the nature of
philosophical reflection, Cuban reality was to be the

touchstone for any philosophy or ideology that sought
to take root in Cuba.

"situation" was

a

He professed that the Cuban

"reality" with its own rights and

destiny and that any philosophy or ideology that might
interfere in any way with these rights and this destiny
should be cast aside.

He claimed that there must first

be reality, and then ideologies.

faithful to this maxim.

Luz y Caballero was

He taught the Cuban youth of

his time nothing contrary to the demands of their
reality.

During

a stay in

Germany he had become

familiar with German Idealism as represented by Kant,
Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel; but in spite of the

knowledge of the works of these men, he never spoke of
them to his young disciples.

Here is an excerpt from

Luz y Caballero La polemica filosofica; Impugnacion a
las doctrinas filosoficas de Cousin (1839,

1947)

[The

Philosophical Polemic: A Reply to the Philosophical

Doctrines of Cousin] that epitomizes the way in which
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this Latin American (and Caribbean)
philosopher focuses
his attention on his national reality,
and accordingly,
resolves the continental positions toward
the concrete
demands that emerge from the former in the
orientation
and role of philosophy

:

No one better than I, could without danger
have gathered such an abundant harvest from
Germany, and even though I have gained some
recognition for having introduced into the
country the idealism of that country which I
adore, I have come to the conclusion in all
conscience that it could harm rather than
benefit our country (Luz y Caballero, 1947121 - 122 ).

Cuban reality was above any intellectual vanity or

dilettantism.

Luz y Caballero could accept no

philosophy which would in any way justify an authority
alien to his country's reality nor any idea of

conformity with any forms alien to

it.

He could not

say with Hegel, "If reality does not adapt itself to
ideas,

so much the worse for reality"; quite the

contrary:

so much the worse for ideas if they could

not be adapted to reality 13

13

.

In 1839 the influence of the eclectic philosopher
Victor Cousin began to be felt in Cuba. This influence
became more widespread as it won followers among Cuban
youth.
Luz y Caballero noted immediately the possibilities
and consequences that such a philosophy would have had in
the development of the new Cuban generations. He soon
realized the negative consequences of this philosophy
relative to that ideal which was acceptable to him:
intellectual independence, and, in the not far distant
future, the political independence of his country.
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This discriminating attitude with regard to
the

European influence upon the philosophical activity
in
Latin America represents a decisive change in the

definite elucidation of the problem being here
discussed.

In order to pursue such a stance to its

ultimate conclusion for the history of the Latin

American quest for philosophical identity, we have to
acknowledge that this change modifies the idea and
self-understanding that philosophy has of itself.

Philosophy must cease perceiving itself as pure
science, able to settle issues with absolute

sovereignty.

On the contrary, philosophy is now

envisioned as

a

practical reflection that progressively

acquires its unique and particular character through

dialogue with its given reality.

In this new

situation, it will not be indifferent to do philosophy
"in this or another way", for the reality that sustains
it never allowed it.

To illustrate in more explicit terms this turn

that our problem has followed, we have to go back and

comment once more on the relevance of Juan Bautista

Alberdi's (1810-1884) legacy.

As we mentioned before,

in spite of being a very brief text his Ideas para

presidir

a

la confeccion del curso de filosofia

contemporanea (1842), has proven to be definitely
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meaningful 14

.

With this document, the Argentinean

writer has certainly earned the merit of being the
first one to formulate in definite and unmistakable

terms the question for a "Latin American philosophy".
On this point, we agree with Augusto Salazar Bondy

'

claim that "perhaps, Juan Bautista Alberdi could be the
first Spanish American thinker that has explicitly

discussed the problem of our philosophy" (Salazar
Bondy,

1968:

45).

As we see it, Alberdi is the first

one who integrates the concept "philosophy" into the

historical reality called Latin America.

He then

introduced the term "American philosophy" to designate

precisely

a

possibility of providing philosophy with

new and concrete expression, that

is,

a

a

new form of

thought whose character and purpose would be determined
by (Latin) American reality.

In Ideas para presidir a

la confeccion del curso de filosofia contemporanea

,

one

of the central claims that definitely summarizes

Alberdi'

s

program for

a

constitution of an "American

philosophy" reads as follows:
We must formulate a philosophy based on our
And these needs, the problems which
needs.
they pose, are those relative to liberty and

u Although Alberdi' s relevance for defining the terms
for a Latin American philosophy has been examined in the
first chapter, is almost impossible to abstain from
returning to what we regard as one of the classics of Latin
American philosophy. We also believe that the discussion of
this piece of work is extremely pertinent for it still has a
lot to say in behalf of our endeavor.
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th© rights and privileges in the social and
political order. Therefore American
philosophy must be essentially political and
social in its objectives [our emphasis],
ardent and prophetic in its instincts,
synthetic and organic in method [our
emphasis], positive and realistic in its
procedures, republican in its spirit and
destiny... We have mentioned American
philosophy, and its imperative to demonstrate
that it can exist. A complete philosophy is
one which solves problems of interest to all
humanity.
A contemporary philosophy solves
problems of interest for the moment.
American philosophy will solve the problem of
American destiny (Alberdi, 1945: 308)
.

In this significant text we must first accentuate

an idea that permits us to clarify the importance of

the perspective opened by Alberdi with regard to the

question concerning the existence of
philosophy".
statement,
needs".

a "Latin

American

The idea is implied in his programmatic

"we must formulate a philosophy based on our

In the light of this idea it can be noticed

that Alberdi

'

foundation of

framework does not contemplate the

s

a

philosophy about America.

Rather, he

was searching for a philosophy that would have made

"Latin American problems" the ultimate criterion for
its own self-appointment as a philosophy; that is a

philosophy for America.

Such a philosophy would be an

"American philosophy", seeing that it will be defined
by the needs of America, and guided by an American

concept.

According to Alberdi, this "American concept"

was the practical conclusion of his major claim that
"there is no universal philosophy, because there is no
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universal solution to the problems which
form its
basis'*

(Alberdi

,

1945:

302).

He thought that all

philosophies have something of truth and something
of
falsehood.
it was necessary, he insisted, to resort
to
those which had something which the Latin
Americans
could use to confront their particular reality.
He

said

The rule of our time is not to be killed by
3JIY—system [our emphasis]
in philosophy
tolerance is the law of our time... Within
the possibility of being incomplete, for the
purpose of being useful, we shall concern
ourselves only with the philosophy of the
nineteenth century 15 and from this
philosophy itself we shall exclude everything
that is least contemporary and least
applicable to the social necessities of our
countries [our emphasis], whose means of
satisfaction must furnish us with the
materials of our philosophy (Alberdi: 1945*
;

,

303)

.

Consequently, the philosophy proposed by Alberdi is

a

"particular" philosophy characterized by the Latin

American circumstance.

In this sense, his "American

philosophy" is in

a

a

way

negation of what he

considered to be the abstract universality of European
philosophy.

15

He regarded the case of North America as

We should not overlook the fact this was a
programmatic document, fundamentally devised to inaugurate a
philosophy course on contemporary philosophy (1842). This
course was meant to be taught to the young Argentineans that
were bound to occupy the higher levels of political
responsibility of their country, hence its urgent and
overtly practical tone.
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an illuminating example of the
mode of philosophizing
and understanding of philosophy he
was contemplating:

Pure abstraction, metaphysics for
itself
alone, will not take root in America.
And
n ted St ates of North America
has
shown
r
i its
us that
is not true that a previous
philosophical development is indispensable
in
order to attain political and social
development... They have established a new
social order, and it did not arise from
metaphysics.
There is not a country less
metaphysical than the United States, and
there is not a country that has contributed
greater material for speculation to the
philosophical nations (i.e. Europe) with
their admirable practical advancement
(Alberdi 1945: 307)

^

,

Alberdi's effort to correlate the idea of

a

particular, national, and American philosophy with the

rejection of its supposedly inherent "universality" is

unquestionably established in the following statement:
There is no universal philosophy, because
there is no universal solution to the
problems which form its basis. Each country,
each epoch, each philosopher has had his own
individual philosophy, which has grown
more
or less, which has lasted more or less,
because each country, each epoch, and each
school has come forward with different
solutions to the problems of the human
spirit.
Hence we can speak of an Oriental,
Greek, Roman, German, French, or English
philosophy; it therefore follows that there
must be an American philosophy... Philosophy
becomes localized because of the
instantaneous and local character of the
problems which are of special interest to a
nation, and it gives the these problems the
form of its solutions... The philosophy of a
nation is the series of solutions which have
been given to the problems concerning its
general destiny. Our philosophy will be,
then, a series of solutions given to the
problems of interest to national destinies
,

(Alberdi,

1945:

302-309).
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We want to underscore the manner in
which Alberdi

speaks on behalf of an "American philosophy"
in the
text we are addressing.
Specifically, we are referring
to his determination to treat the subject
not
as an

already existing form of philosophy, but rather
as how
philosophy s hould and ought to be practiced in
Latin
America.
With regard to this matter, Alberdi
"prescribed" the following:
a philosophy which because of its brief and
concise teaching, will not waste the time
that might be more advantageously used in
studies of a more productive and useful
application, and which because of its basis
will serve only to introduce it into the
spirit and tendency which dominate the
development of institutions and government of
the century in which we live and, above all,
of the continent which we inhabit (Alberdi,

1945

:

3

09 )

16

.

These men, beset by the urgencies of the time and
with a multitude of problems to solve, could accept only a
"practical" philosophy, a philosophy that would attack the
problems which their reality posed. Historical relativism
(i.e. historicism) became clearly evident as a natural
consequence of their desire for intellectual independence.
This relativism was to lead them, to the acceptance of
positivism.
However, Latin American countries interpreted
positivism in various ways, always in keeping with the most
urgent problems which they were attempting to solve. The
interpretations were in direct relation to these urgencies
and always depended upon the series of historical
circumstances surrounding the problems they were trying to
elucidate.
Although certain similarities can be found among
the different interpretations, their most prominent common
characteristic is their great diversity. One can say that
there is a Latin American positivism, but it is just as
accurate to say that there is also a Mexican, Argentinean,
Uruguayan, Chilean, Peruvian, Bolivian, or Cuban positivism.
In each interpretation there was always the core of problems
peculiar to those who made the interpretations. Excluding
the Brazilians, all of these interpretations rejected the
Comtian religion of humanity. In the rest of the Latin
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The purpose is not to emphasize these statements
in view of their programmatic intentions.

Our main

concern is to stress the fact that Alberdi's

reflections suggest

a

perceptive judgment of the

philosophy that was commonly in use in those countries,
judgment that is

a

undoubtedly an evidence of our

distinct and well-defined philosophical past.
Alberdi

1

s

program is at the same time an exposure

of the inadequacies that our way of doing philosophy

suffered during that historical period.

In this sense,

his program rates the (Latin American) philosophy of
his time as a philosophy that does not correspond to
the real necessities of its epoch.

Its fundamental

weakness was its dissociation from the historical
context in which it was supposed to operate.

We notice

here another element provided by our philosophical
tradition.

It definitely reflects the underlying

problem of our cultural history that informs the actual
questions of the "contextualization" and
"inculturation" and its urgency regarding the project
for a "Latin American philosophy".

Upon the background

proposed by Alberdi's philosophical agenda, it is

understandable that positivism had been the first

American countries the humanitarian religion was definitely
rejected; and in Cuba, Comtism was completely repudiated
because of the negative implications which the humanitarian
religion might have had for the revolution of independence
(Woodward ed., 1971).
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philosophical discourse capable of complying with the

requirements of

a

its procedures"

(Alberdi,

philosophy "positive and realistic in
1945:

307).

Although it may

sound unacceptable, the positivistic movement in Latin

America also falls under the question of

American philosophy".

a

"Latin

For the major representatives of

this movement, such as Ingenieros and Varona 17
out of their respective national realities

,

made

a

substantive guiding line for their philosophical
reflections.

They were never satisfied with merely

receiving or adapting European positivism; they were
always aware and knew how to imprint onto this European

philosophical discourse, original features dictated by

17

Jose Ingenieros (1877-1925): Basically, Ingenieros
expresses the evolutionary social thought of Herbert
Spencer.
But Ingeniero's social thought also shows a
considerable influence from the social determinism and
psychologism of Gabriel Tarde. It has a strongly moralistic
basis and contains more than a little Marxism derived from
his early associations with the Argentinean Socialist party
and its leaders.
Occasional tones of a stoical idealism
like that of Jose Rodo also appear (Davis, 1972: 160).

Enrique Jose Varona (1849-1933): Varona is credited with
having introduced positivism into Cuba and with being one of
True
its great exemplars in the whole of Latin America.
enough, he did admire many things about Comtism; he did
distrust metaphysiscs and believe that Latin America had
sufferd from excess of theology and "literature". He called
for the development of the scientific spirit and for
But although his thought was orderly, he was
investigation.
not seduced by systems, and was enough the independent
thinker to reject parts of Comte's teachinmg and to follow
Spencer, Schaffle, Lilienfeld, Ward,
other guides as well:
Giddings, Gabriel Tarde, Durkheim (Crawford, 1966: 220-221).
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the historico— cultural context in which they were

working
Marxism represents, perhaps with more intensity,
an exemplary case of the adoption and adaptation of an

European philosophical discourse to Latin American

socio-political conditions 18

.

In spite of the fact

that the current version of Marxism implemented in

Latin America was unequivocally Eurocentric,

project

a

for an "autochthonous" Marxism was being forged in the

1920s and 1930s.

Haya de la Torre 19 called it

a

"vernacular Marxism"; Mariategui preferred to call it
an "Indo-American and national Marxism" (Teran,

1980)

.

Not until the 1940s will a philosophical movement

emerge whose approach to reflection and research

18

No school of thought, except perhaps positivism (as
we have commented above)
has been more pervasive among
intellectuals in Latin America than Marxism. The area's
social, political, and economic problems have not been
solved under capitalism, nor have the techniques of its
positivist thinkers yielded a program for thorough reform.
Thus Marxism's utopian promise, its scientific means of
comprehending in order to improve social conditions, holds
considerable appeal for many Latin America's intellectuals
who have little faith in the existing system (Liss 1984,
Sanchez Vazquez 1988-89, Schweickart 1986).
,

Victor Raul Haya de la Torre (1895-): By the 1920s
thinkers like Peru's Haya de la Torre, influenced by Marxist
doctrines but not a Marxist, concurred with the antiimperialism of Rodo and Dario and added to it ideas on
"Indianismo" solidarity of the oppressed peoples of the
However,
world, and nationalization of land and industry.
Haya de la Torre and his APRA (Popular Alliance for American
Revolution) rejected the universalism and the labor-class
consciousness of European socialism in favor of concepts
derived from Latin American historical experience.
19

,
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converges, although not influenced directly by it,
with

Alberdi's philosophical project.
as "Grupo Filosofico Hiperion"

Hiperion]

[Philosophical Group

It was founded in Mexico by the philosopher

.

Leopoldo Zea around 1948.

elaborate

This group was known

a

Its essential task was to

"Mexican" philosophy (i.e.

a

philosophy

pertaining the Mexican situation)
To have a better understanding of the importance
of this philosophical group and its commitment to the

question of

"Latin American philosophy" we would have

a

to consider the decisive influence of its mentor,

Leopoldo Zea 20

.

The search for philosophical

authenticity in Latin America shaped itself in a

renovated effort to study the history of the
philosophical ideas in Latin America from
20

a

different

Zea was one of the first Latin American thinkers
explicitly concerned with the search for a philosophical
identity.
He has chosen to call his philosophical position
a "new Latin American humanism"
Latinoamerica un nuevo
humanismo 1982).
In his reflection on the cultural
identity of the Latin American peoples, Zea considers that
the authenticity cannot be sought in each of the isolated
primary cultures, be them indigenous or European and other
socio-cultural legacies. Rather, it is the resulting
assimilation of the diverse converging cultures, of which
integrating spiritual strength conforms a new world; "a new
type of Man", who is not indigenous nor European, but "Latin
American". According to Gracia (1986), Zea's position which
is based in a "culturalist point of view, categorically
affirms the existence of a Latin American philosophy"
(Gracia, 1986: 217).
Zea believes that every form of
thought emerging in Latin America is Latin American
philosophy, even when lacking originality. The reason is
that Latin American thought and philosophy arise from
specifically historical Latin American circumstances (see
our bibliography for references on Zea's works).
•

(

.

,
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perspective.

Before theorizing and debating in the

abstract the guestion of existence or inexistence of

a

Latin American philosophy, the inescapable task was to
and revise Latin American intellectual history.
It had to be seen retrospectively how philosophy had

been done in the past in these countries
a

history of ideas, which we perceive as

By means of

.

a

process of

repossession of ideas that have become our own, the way
toward authenticity would be obtained.

For any

examination of the history of ideas conducted in the
Latin American context, would have to respond to the

questions of why

,

how

.

and for what

,

some particular

ideas where adapted to Latin American reality 21

.

We

believe that the adequate responses to these questions,
will yield an intelligible definition of an authentic

Latin American philosophical discourse.

Another important chapter in the history of this

problem is constituted undoubtedly, firstly, by the
Tercer Conqreso Interamericano de Filosofia [Third

Interamerican Congress of Philosophy]

,

held in 1950

Philosophy Congresses Statutes, 1950)

(see:

;

and

secondly, by the Conversaciones Filosoficas

Interamericanas

(a

tribute to the centennial

The reading and analysis we are proposing of
Mariategui's writings, in the following sections are aimed
to answer these questions with regard to Marxism in Latin
America in general, and Peru in particular.
21
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anniversary of Jose Marti)

[Inter American

Philosophical Discussions], held in 1953, Havana (see:

Philosophy Congresses Statutes, 1953)

In both events,

.

sections were dedicated to dealing with the problem of
a

"Latin American philosophy".

By emphasizing the

continental character of both congresses, the problem
was taken into consideration in
dimension.

a

truly continental

In other words, with the special sections

devoted to this subject, it is clear that this issue
was not a "private" issue only concerning some

particular groups.

It became conceived as a problem

that pertains to the future of philosophy in the entire
continent.

This special debate in "Conversaciones

Filosoficas" in Havana the documents produced by this

congress clearly show, resulted in the emergence of two

distinct philosophical "fronts".
"front" of the universalists

,

The first is the

who categorically reject

the idea and possibility of a "Latin American

philosophy", regarding it as an absurdity.

They

retained the notion that the true authenticity of the
Latin American philosopher consists in

a

serious effort

to think in "universal" dimensions the great problems
of humanity (i.e. truth, knowledge, beauty, ethics,

etc.).

The other "front", known as the "regionalists"

supported the necessity of

a

philosophical project that

would respond to the specific circumstances that
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differentiate their continent (i.e. the geographical,
geo-political, social, historical, and cultural
aspects)

from other cultural centers.

vindicated

a

That is, they

"Latin American philosophy" as the only

possible way of doing an authentic philosophy in Latin

America
The fact that this problem continues to influence

Latin American philosophical activity, has been fully

documented in congresses such as the IX Conaresn
-^rcteramer icano de Filosofla:

La filosofla en America

[IX Inter American Congress of Philosophy: Philosophy

in America], held in Caracas (Venezuela)

Philosophy Congresses Statutes, 1979),

in 1979

(see:

and the most

recent Congreso Internacional Extraordinario de
Filosofla [Extraordinary International Congress of
Philosophy] organized in Cordoba, Argentina in 1987
(see:

Philosophy Congresses Statutes, 1988)

.

In these

two conclaves the positions of both the critics and the

defenders of "Latin American philosophy" were debated.

Anyone who examines the arguments presented in these
congresses will notice that something has changed

substantially in the treatment of the problem.

It is

true that the terminology proposed by Miro Quesada
(1974:

7-21)

of "regionalism" and "universalism" has

not been essentially modified.

Nonetheless, the fact

is that in these conclaves positions are now argued
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against

a

distinctly new background.

At this point,

the subject is not the possibility or expediency of an

authentic philosophical project in Latin America.
what is being claimed is that such

a

Now,

project is already

at least partly a concrete reality.

The new element that decisively transform the

whole scenario and the eventual development of this
debate (and incidentally the course that the discussion
will follow in this dissertation) is constituted by

a

"new" tendency in Latin American philosophy.

Historically, the emergence of this phenomenon can be

situated during the late 1950s.

There are many extra-

philosophical considerations that inform this "new"

tendency in the Latin American philosophical activity.
In the first place one finds allusions to the Cuban

Revolution (1959).

Needless to say, this is an event

of major importance in Latin American contemporary

history.

Regardless of the arguable political

valuation to which it was and is submitted it
constitutes a landmark in the formation of political
and social consciousness in Latin America.

The Cuban

Revolution suddenly opened new perspectives in the
interpretation of the reality of the continent:

for

the emergence of a "philosophy of liberation" the Cuban

Revolution's impact on the social sciences was

particularly important.

Also, we have to point out the
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increasing organization of popular resistance movements
as a response to the military dictatorships and their

repressive policies.

These movements extended

throughout the entire continent at the end of the
1960s.

They not only foretold the awakening of the

popular masses as subjects/agents of their own history,
but also paved the way for the essential experience of

political praxis as the pivot for

a

liberating

philosophical reflection.
In the scientific and cultural field there are

logically, a diversity of new factors.

After the

Second World War, the prevailing social science in
Latin America derived from North American functionalist
sociology.

Functionalism tended to regard the under-

development as

a

"phase" or "natural stage" in the

history of nations.

From that assumption,

it was

understood that the problem of under-development had to
be understood as the problem of the transition from an

undeveloped society to
society.

a

modern or industrialized

This "transition" would take place, without

any difficulties, if a process of industrialization was
set into action immediately.

This interpretive model

culminated at the theoretical level in the so-called
"Take-Off Theory" (i.e. Rostow, 1963), and at the

practical level in the famous but ineffective "Alianza
para el progreso" [Alliance for Progress]
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The new Latin American social science reacts precisely

against that model.

In spite of all the development

efforts the situation of underdevelopment in Latin

America has worsened.

This condition induced Latin

American intellectuals to question the traditional
vision.

That is, underdevelopment is now perceived,

not as a "natural" state, but as

a

result of a long

historical process marked by colonial domination.

This

is the basic thought that inspires the new

consciousness that begins to evolve in Latin America

concerning the reality of the continent.
concrete field of

a

Within the

new social science, it is being

developed in the so-called "theory of dependence".
It has to be remarked that with the formulation of

the "theory of dependence" the

new Latin American

social science is provoking an "epistemological break"
in the history of the reality of the continent.

Its

dominant interpretive category (i.e. dependence) will
substitute with the innovative contrast:
"dependence/ liberation" for the traditional contrast

"underdevelopment" /development"

.

This methodological

statement points toward the opening of

a

new horizon of

understanding in which the alternative of liberation
emerges rightfully as the adequate response to the

situation of underdevelopment in Latin America (Fornet-
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Betancourt,
1968)

1987:

128-131; Salazar Bondy,

1969b:

27-57,

.

This new context is what informs the appearance of
a

significant group of philosophers who designate

themselves as "philosophers of liberation" in the
political arena (e.g. Salazar Bondy 1968, 1969, 198889; Cerutti Guldberg 1983,

1973b,

1978,

1985).

1988-89; Dussel 1973a,

Their position is defined by the

supposition that the constitution of

a

philosophy of

liberation is the only authentic way of doing "Latin

American philosophy".

This is precisely the decisive

difference, the definitive turn that the problem of the
"Latin American philosophy" has experienced recently.
A genuine Latin American philosophy is beginning to
emerge.

At present it is conceived as

a

thought

eminently conscious of its cultural identity and as

reflection

22

a

explicitly devoted to the liberation 22 of

As explained by Dussel (1985), perhaps one of the
representative of this movement,
influential
most
to be treated as notion critically
is
going
"liberation"
According to his
multiplicity
of meanings.
transfixed by a
systematic approach, "liberation" will even comprise its
"liberation is not a
metaphysical ramifications:
phenomenal, intrasystemic action; liberation is the praxis
that subverts the phenomenological order and pierces it to
let in a metaphysical transcendence, which is the plenary
critique of the established, fixed, normalized,
crystallized, dead" (Dussel, 1985: 58-59); along with other
economic
That would include:
levels of reality.
from imperialism
liberation
liberation,
liberation, erotic
oppressed
the
of
liberation
and national liberation,
popular
and
culture
popular
of
classes, revindication
aesthetics, etc.
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the Latin American

peoples.

This is the actual level

of the discussion of the problem of a "Latin American

philosophy".

Some of its manifestations have recently

found an explicitly systematic expression (e.g. Dussel
1973,

1985; Biagini 1988).

The shift we have alluded

to which emerged in the two congresses we have

mentioned is testimony to the level of consciousness
achieved in the debate regarding the philosophy of
liberation as the authentic form of

a

Latin American

way of doing philosophy.
We are closing this panoramic assessment of the history
of the problem of the existence of a "Latin American

philosophy" with the thought of yet another author whom
we regard as a representative member of the "philosophy
of liberation" movement.

Unlike other historical

analyses of this movement that have placed

a

greater

significance on the writings the Argentinean Enrique

D.

Dussel (Cerutti Guldberg 1983, 25-67), as somewhat the

"initiator" of this "liberationist" tendency in Latin

American philosophy, we are arguing that this turn in
Latin American philosophy can already be perceived in
the works of the Peruvian Augusto Salazar Bondy (e.g.
1968,

1969).

Some of his theses situate him as the

"legitimate" founding figure of this line of thought.
We believe that the reference to Salazar Bondy will

help us clarify the close relationship that undoubtedly
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exists between philosophy and culture in the issue of
"Latin American philosophy".
We think that the service of Salazar Bondy was the

breakthrough insight that Latin American philosophy had
to be elucidated in a broader context than that of a

strict ly philosophical context

.

He is precisely the

thinker who points out that the appropriate context of
this debate is Latin American culture in general 23

.

He declares that the state or situation of philosophy
in Latin America is a phenomenon that does not refer

directly to philosophy as
particular.

a

cultural dimension in

Latin American philosophy, he argues, is

an affair firmly rooted in the culture in which it

evolves and expresses itself.

In this sense, the

Peruvian offers the following diagnosis:
The insufficiencies and weaknesses of our
philosophy are not negative attributes of
such philosophy taken separately, they are
rather a result of a much deeper and
fundamental problem that affects our culture
all together (Salazar Bondy, 1969a: 60).
To understand this "diagnosis" in its most essential

implications it is necessary to realize that Salazar
Bondy

1

s

product.

perceives Latin American culture as an aborted
He claims that it is an alienated, defective

and mystified culture.

It is,

according to him, a

At the philosophical level Salazar Bondy echoes
Marti's (1977) and Lezama Lima's (1977) views regarding the
authenticity and originality of Latin American literature
and art.
23

Ill

culture that reproduces inauthenticity because it has
been nourished by ideological paradigms that are alien
and sometimes hostile to the national communities that

"officially" or for "by reasons of State" rule and live
by them.

This idea is explicitly articulated in the

following passage:
In Hispanic America a defect of culture may
be observed.
Hispanic American philosophic
thought - and all other thought of similar
explanatory purposes - offers that stamp of
negativity to which we have been referring in
speaking of philosophies as illusory selfconscience.
Because of its imitative nature
across the centuries, until today it has been
and alienated and alienating conscience that
has given a superficial image of the world
and life to man in our national communities.
It has not truly responded to motivations
felt by this man, but rather has responded to
the goals and vital interests of other men.
It has been a plagiarized novel and not
truthful chronicle of our human adventure
(Salazar Bondy, 1969c: 14) 24

What we consider characteristic of the peculiar

approach of Salazar Bondy is the connection that he

establishes between culture's inauthenticity and the

socio-political reality of the Latin American
countries.

According to his analysis, the correlation

that exists entails that the source of cultural

inauthenticity is economic underdevelopment:

We believe that this position advanced by Salazar
Bondy suggests the possibility of the historic articulation
of an alternative history of Latin American philosophy.
That is, a "chronicle" (a "narrative of alterities"?) that
would stand in opposition to the "official", alienated, and
Eurocentric interpretation of this tradition.
24
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Where is the cause, the determining complex
this of condition Hispanic America as an
entity and also of each of its constituent
nations? If we are aware that this condition
is not peculiar to Hispanic American
countries, but is largely similar to that of
to other communities and regional groups of
nations, belonging to what today is called
the Third World, then it is clear that, to
explain it, we must utilize the concept of
under-development, which is the correlative
concept of domination.
In fact,
underdeveloped countries present an aggregate
of basically negative characteristics which,
one way or the other, are related to
dependent bonds with other centers of
economic and political power. These centers
of power...
are situated in the developed
nations, in the mother countries or in great
industrial powers. And these negative
characteristics correspond to factors which
easily the phenomena of culture like that of
Hispanic America (Salazar Bondy, 1969c: 1718)

.

From this perspective, Salazar Bondy argues that
Latin American culture should be defined as a culture
of domination,

for

to speak of the culture of domination (his
emphasis) is to speak not only of the ideas,
attitudes, and values that guide the life of
peoples, but also of the systems that sustain
its life and do not allow it to develop and
bear fruit (Salazar Bondy, 1969b: 47)
.

The distinct consequence of Salazar Bondy

regard to the question for

a

'

s

view with

"Latin American

philosophy" takes our own inquiry onto new grounds.

How would it be possible

new question imposes itself:

to do authentic philosophy in the context of
of domination?

a

culture

Such is the way in which we have to

reformulate the question for

A

a

"Latin American
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philosophy".

In his own way Salazar Bondy also opens

the horizon for a possible answer:

The condition for

doing authentic philosophy is that philosophy must
prevail over the cause of inauthenticity.

philosophy in Latin America has

a

That is,

possibility of being

inauthentic in the midst of the inauthenticity that
surrounds and consumes it:

convert itself into

a

to avoid this it must

lucid awareness of this condition

and develop thought capable of unleashing a process

that can overcome it.

It must be a meditation,

according to Salazar Bondy, about the Latin American

anthropological status and from its own negative
status, and with a view to cancellation of this

negative status.

Consequently, Latin American

philosophy has before it

task that, in the long run,

a

will be destructive to its current form.

It must be an

awareness that cancels prejudice, ideological myths and
idols, awakening their subjection as peoples and

cancelling their depression as individual men and women
(Salazar Bondy,

1969c:

20)

.

In other words,

underdevelopment, enslavement, and domination have to
be canceled in order to transcend philosophical

unauthenticity
The problem of our philosophy is
unauthenticity. Unauthenticity is rooted in
our historic condition of underdeveloped and
dominated countries. The surpassing of
philosophy is, intrinsically bound to the
surpassing of underdevelopment and
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domination, so that if there is a possibility
of an authentic philosophy, it will be the
result of this transcendental historical
change (Salazar Bondy, 1968 125). 25
:

Certainly, this affirmation can be construed as

deterministic.

For Salazar Bondy, the surmounting of

underdevelopment is the proces in which the framework
of the overcoming of inauthenticity at the level of

philosophy can be accomplished.

Along this specific

"reading" of the Latin American conditions for an

authentic philosophical discourse, we infer that
Salazar Bondy

'

s

overly pessimistic "diagnosis"

judgement could also be interpreted as an outmoded

defense (or perhaps, an indirect derivation) of the

positivistic Marxist claim regarding the ultimate

determination of the economic and social base of an
specific social formation on the philosophical

25

We contend that Salazar Bondy' s analysis bears the
same deterministic teleological structure (i.e. an
apocalyptical structure) of the argument regarding that the
perfect society will be achieved only under the conditions
As history has already proven, the
of a socialist society.
In the context
perfect society is far from being achieved.
its search
and
philosophy
of the Latin American history of
would be
argument
s
for identity, philosophy Salazar Bondy'
an
attain
will
America
"translated" accordingly that Latin
it
if
only
and
authentic philosophical discourse only
surpasses its condition as a Third World underdeveloped
The deteriorating examples of Cuba and other Third
region.
World nations which have attempted the solution of the
appalling problems inherent to underdevelopment through the
construction of a socialist economy, should constitute a
clear evidence that this cannot be regarded as the ultimate
solution for socio-economic and cultural (i.e.
philosophical) underdevelopment.
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activity, or any other cultural activity that takes

place at the superstructural level.
We argue, on the other hand, that despite the

current and persistent situation of "a culture of

domination and unauthenticity", Latin American

philosophy may rediscover in its own history
possibili ty
i-^iteqr ated

in

a

the form of an exemplary thinker who has

himself /herself with the general socio~

political movement of cancellation of Latin America's

underdevelopment

.

We acknowledge the relevance of Salazar Bondy

'

works with regard to our own re-assessment of this
question.

The definition of the project for

"Latin

a

American philosophy" in the specific sense of

a

"philosophy of liberation" undoubtedly articulates and

contributes to the resolution we are proposing.
We recognize along with Salazar Bondy, that to

speak of the necessity of a forceful inclusion of

philosophy into the process that is striving for the
"cancellation of underdevelopment and the overcoming of
domination", is to speak of the possibility of re-

directing its role in terms of critical and

emancipating thought.

In 1968, and without employing

the expression "philosophy of liberation" 26

,

Salazar

26

Salazar Bondy will actually "inaugurate" this phrase
in a document read in the Jornadas de San Miguel Argentina,
In this text he encourages his fellow Latin
in 1973.
,
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Bondy allows us to anticipate that possibility when he

writes as follows:
But there is still a possibility of
liberation and, insofar there is such a
possibility, we are forced to choose
decidedly for a course of action that
materializes that possibility and evades its
frustration.
Furthermore, Hispanic American
philosophy has also right in front of itself
that choice of which it depends its
definitive configuration as an authentic
thought (1968, 133).

Salazar Bondy here suggets the theoretical foundations
that can facilitate the emergence of
horizon.

Bondy

'

s

a new

referential

Although we endorse this aspect of Salazar
analysis, we think that the subsequent task is

not a matter exclusively inscribed in
but uncertain future.

a

forward looking

Rather, we must perform a

hermeneutic step-back in order to underscore and "rulein"

confirm and legitimize) already existing

(i.e.

patterns of thought that could be construed as concrete

alternatives to the "unauthentic and alienated thought"

rightfully denounced by Salazar Bondy (e.g. Jose Carlos
Mariategui)

This new context will provide the

.

fundamental conditions for the re-formulation of the

problem of an authentic Latin American philosophy in
terms of

a

philosophy of liberation.

This outlook

American philosophers to "aim the effort of their
philosophical activity, clearly and resolutely in the sense
that is, in the sense
of attempting to cancel domination...
of liberation..."
philosophy
of what could be called as a
1974: 8).
(Scannone ed.
,
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enables us to conclude, almost as an inevitable
consequence, that only the philosophical reflection
that defines itself in terms of how it could foster the

liberation process of the Latin American peoples should

essentially be defined as Latin American in its most
authentic sense

.

We argue that Salazar Bondy's perspective (i.e.

the meaning and role of philosophy in the dependent

countries of Latin America) does not necessarily imply
a total

oblivion and radical break with what we

consider manifest paradigmatic instances of Latin

American philosophical history.

We have already shown

that many figures belonging to the Latin American

intellectual tradition had earlier affirmed the

possibility of autonomous thought:

Andres Bello, and

Juan Bautista Alberdi (with his demands for

a

philosophy adjusted to the necessities of the Latin

American peoples' needs).

Alongside these warring and

revealing ideas developed by such "consanguineous
intellects" struggling for intellectual independence,
we must also recover and adhere to the normative and

consolidating motto with which the Cuban Jose Marti
succinctly reiterated the social responsibility of the
intellectual:

"To think is to serve".
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2.3

The Re-Interpretation of Mariategui’s Thought As
the Actualization of a Latin American
Philosophical Discourse Construed As a Philosophy
of Liberation

According to one of our claims mentioned above we
argued that the problem of a "Latin American

philosophy

achieves its most explicit and systematic

formulation in the relatively recent context of the

philosophy of liberation.

In view of the historical

outline we have offered on this subject, we understand
that we are approaching a point at which a process of

clarification and definition with regard to the central
problem that pertains to our research takes shape.
Our approach claims that tradition and innovation,
far from being mutually exclusive, can converge

harmoniously under the auspices of
certain Latin American thinkers who

a

"repossession" of
have been

arbitrarily "exiled" to other remote theoretical
disciplines.

Incidentally, these other disciplines

have also been traditionally (and officially) related
to particular

(social) sciences, apparently engaged

with the socio-economic, political, and cultural

liberation in Latin America.
We have been tracing a path designed to show that

the preoccupation with searching for a definite and

authentic philosophical discourse culminates precisely
in the project of a philosophy of liberation.

This

line of thought culminates in the proposition that a
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line of thought culminates in the proposition that
a

philosophy of liberation is not one possible form of
"Latin American philosophy", but is the only promise of
an authentic Latin American philosophical discourse.

To develop this conclusion we begin with a text that

expresses the idea unequivocally:
Among us (i.e. Latin Americans), the only
possibility of philosophy is the philosophy
of liberation, which is the same as saying
that it is the only possible philosophy for
us.
A philosophical thought that does not
take into critical account its circumstances
and does not devote itself to the
enlightenment and liberation of the Latin
American peoples is right now, and it will be
in the future a decadent, superfluous,
ideological, misleading, and unnecessary
thought (Ardiles ed., 1973: back-cover text).
This statement of the problem allows us to define

our own perspective by supporting the notion that the

question of "Latin American philosophy" has to be
examined in terms of

a

philosophy of liberation.

We

dedicate the last section of this chapter to studying
the special philosophical problems that have been

emerging in the process of

a

constitution of a

philosophy of liberation as the authentic Latin

American philosophy.

This requires the reassessment of

some of the questions we have alluded to at the

beginning of the chapter, specially those regarding of
the problem of the

"

inculturation" of philosophy.

"Inculturation" of philosophy could be defined as the

effort to place philosophical reflection in the
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favorable context of the cultural tradition in which it

operates and to which it should respond.

This

tradition, as we said before, would provide us with the

concrete problems that would have to be elucidated by
such a distinctive philosophical discourse.

Philosophy of liberation thus understood 27

defines itself as an attempt to re-locate philosophical

reflection through

a

new frame of reference that is

constructed on the basis of

reflective task.

a new

meaning as its

We have stated at a general level

that these new references are sought within the context
of Latin American culture.

We have also commented on

the "diagnostic” that Salazar Bondy, as a

representative of

a

whole new generation 28

,

has

assigned to the situation of Latin American philosophy.
In view of this analysis, we propose a critical

assessment and

a

discreet move in their interpretation

of some of the theses presented in general by this so27

Because of the impossibility of presenting here the
whole intricate history of this movement we will refer the
reader to the items dedicated to this topic in the
bibliography of this dissertation. Among those works we
strongly suggest one which we believe is fundamental and
where the development of the movement is thoroughly
analyzed:
Filosofia de Hispanoamer ica Aoroximaciones al
panorama actual (Eudaldo Forment, ed.
1987), particularly,
Raul Fornet-Betancourt s "La filosofia de la liberacion en
America Latina" (1987: 123-150).
:

,

1

28

See the first chapter of this dissertation for the
mention of the "generation of articulation" (pp. 38-46?), to
which this "diagnostic" that has been applied to the "Latin
American philosophy" is attributed.
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called movement of philosophy of liberation.

.

This

turn should yield different conclusions and
hopefully
new paths of development.
The notion of "Latin American culture" presented
by this new philosophical movement so far seems
to us

excessively abstract.

In the existing analysis of

philosophers of liberation, Latin American culture
appears to be

a

monolithic entity without internal

differences and multiple concrete determinations.

This

view necessarily simplifies and furthers the assumption
that we are witnessing

tragically condemned
genesis and logic.

a

process in which

a

culture is

to stagnation by its own internal

Such a culture would deserve the

status of a "dependent and unauthentic" culture in
toto.

In existing interpretations there is no adequate

discernment of the different cultural practices that
are related to the diverse socio-economic classes in

the continent.

The "anchors" to a philosophy with

social reality as its foundation have not touched
bottom.

We think that philosophers must "descend" into

social reality to levels that are genuinely
foundational.

A "descent" that would ground the

creation of a philosophical discourse of liberation in
Latin America is not easy to accomplish.

It implies

going beyond what has been suggested by other thinkers,
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restoring to its object (i.e. Latin American
social
reality)
all of its immanence, all its creative
,

explosiveness
At this point, we are unveiling and
confronting a

relatively new subject-matter:

the cultural

expectations of the popular masses.

We want to

underscore that we are talking about what have been
called rather loosely "the people" or the "popular
masses", and the processes that are involved in their
economic, social, and political liberation 29

.

We want to point out that although the concepts of

"the people" and "popular masses" are frequently

utilized in this literature, the recourse to so-called
popular culture" has not been employed in its most

revolutionary consequences by the current adherents to
the movement of "philosophy of liberation" in Latin

America.

In this "popular culture", which we perceive

as the actual antithesis to the official culture of

domination as interpreted by Salazar Bondy and others,
we have located a potentially revolutionary human

reserve for

29

a

new ethics.

The primary content and

Those aspects will constitute the genuine context in
which we are going to concentrate our analysis of
Mariategui's alliance to the Peruvian working class and
popular masses' organizations, and discursive ideological
and political practices.
Certainly, Mariategui represents
the characteristic "organic intellectual" (Gramsci) who gave
adequate philosophical expression to the struggles of those
sectors of the Peruvian society.
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identity of this new ethical discourse is

resistance 30

.

The history of domination in Latin

America is also

a

history of resistance; the popular

masses resist in the name of values, myths, and symbols

which they experience as the origin itself of their
identity.

30

It is from this compelling source that the

The concept of "resistance" has operated jointly at
the theoretical and political levels to denote the
progressive and revolutionary alternatives to the "status
quo" or dominant system.
In the context of contemporary
social and political philosophy one of the thinkers that has
reflected on the importance of "resistance" and its
relationship to individual and collective moral
responsibility, and revolutionary action is indisputably,
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Sartre's philosophy
elaborates the notion of resistance from a criticoepistemological perspective toward a politico-existential
commitment. According to Sartre, resistance suggests an
active concept of opposition and it is related to the
phenomenological level by a notion of struggle.
Initially,
Sartre utilized it as the basis for the resistance against
fascism (Sartre, 1949:11-13). He also employed it, in a
more general sense, with regard to the critique of bourgeois
idealism and of the deterministic and ultrarrealist
prototype of historical materialism (Sartre, 1966; 1968).
Sartre claims that consciousness is characterized by a
negative activity through which the human individual
introduces in the world his capacity for action. He points
out that the human individual never encounters reality
"concluded", since at any moment the creative action of the
human being can negate the totalizing presuppositions of the
"status quo" and the environment. The spirit of struggle
expresses itself in the capacity of resistance to all the
values that restrict the faculty of self-determination of
the human being. Therefore, the revolutionary causes that
subsequently get ossified in one way or another in new
systems of political and cultural hegemony, self-disqualif
For Sartre, the
of their initial revolutionary character.
authentic cultural creation counts on a struggle base
against the "fixed" values that pretend to confine the
individual liberty, and against the political and juridical
From
power utilized to legitimize such stagnant values.
are
movements
this perspective revolutionary and progressive
measured by their capacity for resistance.
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philosophy of liberation must ultimately derive some
meaning for itself as

a

fundamentally philosophico-

political movement.
However, to approach the source provided by

"popular culture", philosophy of liberation cannot

advance without challenging the traditional notions of

philosophical knowledge.

This would be the first

special philosophical problem introduced in the process
of the constitution of a philosophy of liberation.

To

take "popular culture" with its rituals, myths and
symbols,

into consideration necessarily requires a

radical re-orientation of philosophical consciousness.
We regard this re-orientation of philosophical

consciousness as a radical move 31

,

for what is being

attempted is not only the reconciliation of theory and
praxis, but the authentication of the primacy of the

ethical in the process of approximating reality.
all this and more.
a

It is

What is being pursued is to surpass

model of rationality that only "knows" how to reason

by reducing reality to abstract categories, categories

that are totally removed from the specificity of the

Latin American social, political, and cultural context.
We designate this inappropriate

reasoning the "de-

realization of reality" [des-realizar la realidad]

31

It would be a appealing to research and analyze this
a gesture parallel to an "epistemological break".

move as
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Incidentally, classical Marxian theory calls it

ideology (i.e. false consciousness).

To look for

meaning into the sources of "popular culture" thus
indicates the disposition to operate with an

intensified notion of rationality in which the purpose
of the concept would not be in conflict with the

validity of the symbol or the myth.
This problem leads us logically, to another

question that is not less important:

the problem of

the "collectivization" of the subject (agent) of

knowledge 32

.

Certainly this has always constituted

a

challenge to philosophy, namely, to learn to think in
with

.

.

and from the community, assumed now as the

subject (agent) of knowledge.
32

Certainly, the radical critique of the overtly
individualistic nature of Western philosophy epistemological
tradition, particularly, naturalistic objectivism and its
underlying "scientism" is in some way presupposed in some of
the writings of the so-called Western Marxism (e.g. Gramsci,
Korsch, Kosik, Lukacs).
Conceivably, the example of Lukacs
peculiar notions of "class" and "class-consciousness" as
they are introduced in History and Class Consciousness may
suggest the idea for a "collective social epistemology".
For instance, Lukacs contends that,
,

the individual can never become the measure of all
things.
For when the individual confronts
objective reality he is faced by a complex of
ready-made and unalterable objects which allow him
only the subjective responses of recognition or
For the individual, reification and
rejection...
hence determinism are irremovable... Only the
class can relate to the whole of reality in a
practical revolutionary wav [our emphasis] (The
'species' cannot do this as it is no more than an
individual that has been mythologized and stylized
in a spirit of contemplation (Lukacs, 1971: 193).
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We believe that Latin America, the "mestiza"

America

treasures, as does any other culture, a

,

specific cultural nucleus, treasures it in

a

way that

is irreducible and capable of formulating from its own

perspective

a

meaningful philosophy that indeed

conforms to it.

This "translation" of sense from what

was understood from the point of view of traditional

philosophical and sociological discourses as the
"object"

(i.e.

the popular masses whose given their

creative and re-creative capacity become the
subject/agent) to the "subject" that assimilates it, is

what would overcome the break, so typical of Latin

American countries, between its "cultivation"
(precisely the etymological sense of culture) and the

cultural production (super-structural) that it
generates.
words,

What we are trying to instigate, in other

is the re-establishment of the lost unity

(precipitated by an imperialist's brand of rationality)

between what has been called "common experience" and

philosophy
To assume a philosophical doctrine that privileges
the ontological dispositions of the object and

simultaneously "contains" the philosophizing subject,
is to circumscribe philosophy to the theoretical

33

"Our America" as Jose Marti preferred to call it.
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discipline of hermeneutics 34

To hermeneutics belongs

.

the task of interpreting or reading critically
the
"text" of Latin American social and intellectual

history.

it is its responsibility to "discover" and

articulate conceptually, those aspects of Latin

American history that normally are concealed by
traditional forms of conceptual analysis in which the
subject is ineffectually empowered by

a

false

objectivity.

Certainly, this strategy cannot be

confused with

a

simple philosophy about Latin America.

Our main concern is precisely that Latin America itself
be the one to reveal, with its own elements, its

genuine philosophical vocation, that, according to this
(hermeneutic)

interpretation by disclosure

34

Contrary to historical objectivism (i.e. historicism)
which pretends to interpret a particular historical
phenomenon by the unsuspecting trust in its methodology
("methodical alienation"; Gadamer, 1976a: 26) and by acting
obliviously of the effective histor icality acting upon the
"inquiring subject", hermeneutics supposes that any critical
assessment of historical material necessarily comprises the
consciousness of being exposed to history and to its
effects.
This takes place in such a way that this action
over the "inquiring subject" cannot be objectified, for the
(historical) effectiveness belongs to the very meaning of
the action as an historical phenomenon. As Gadamer explains
it:
By that I mean, first, that we cannot extricate
ourselves from the historical process, so distance ourselves
from it that the past becomes an object for us... We are
always situated in history.
I mean that our consciousness
is determined by a real historical process, in such a way
that we are not free to juxtapose ourselves to the past.
I
mean that we must always become conscious afresh of the
action which is thereby exercised over us, in such a way
that everything past which we come to experience compels to
take hold of it completely, to assume in some way its truth
(as quoted by Ricoeur, 1989a: 73-74).
.

.
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[desvelamiento]

,

philosophy must enhance and deliver in

combination with other disciplines related to the human
sciences, determining and perhaps, synthetic clues for

reading the Latin American life-world 35

.

It must

35

We are employing the expression "life-world"
following partially the Husserlian connotation (Lebenswelt)
and therefore, in agreement with our hermeneutic approach.
This word has a very broad meaning that expresses very well
the specific character of Husserlian thinking over against
the dominant philosophies of Neo-Kantianism and positivism.
It does not restrict the task of philosophy to the
foundation of science but extends it to the wide field of
everyday experience
With regard to this Husserlian
concept, Gadamer points out that "it is quite
understandable..., that this wider sense of the concept of
the life-world proposed in Husserl's later work should be
accepted and acclaimed by many scholars who by no means
intended to follow him on his path toward transcendental
reduction.
Rather, in perfect opposition to it, they have
used the popular term "life-world" in the sense of turning
away from Cartesianism, or at least they sought to
legitimate their own investigations as independent analyses
of the social and historical world in the context of a
phenomenological anthropology (our emphasis)
This use is
not unjustified, insofar as Husserl himself acknowledge that
it is genuine though secondary task to work out an ontology
of the life-world.
To do so does not necessarily require
that one follows Husserl's own way of transcendental
phenomenology and transcendental reduction" (Gadamer 1976a
.

.

,

183)

.

As we have suggested, this somewhat differentiated
sense of the Husserlian "life-world" discussed by Gadamer is
the one we have endorsed in our own analysis of Latin
American cultural history. The science of the the lifeworld is the most discussed part of the later Husserl.
Husserl's later texts from the 1930s, which concentrate on
the problems of the European Sciences, contain attempts at
consciously elaborating the conceptual foundations of a new
hermeneutic ontology. These attempts concentrate on the
concept of historicity as the highest ontological category.
What we have perceived as methodologically serviceable in
Husserl's own philosophical project is the aspect that by
rooting all sense and all understanding in the original,
pre-reflexive stratum of the life-world, and thus, in the
historical realm of action and word, language and labor,
needs and meaning where "objectivity" is always a world
,
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establish other paths of access to more originary and

profound aspects (hardly perceived at

glance)

a

of

popular culture.
This philosophy does not nourish itself from

university faculties or their curricula.

Rather its

fundamental source of "nourishment" comes directly from
street life, working class neighborhoods, workers
unions, marginal communities (e.g. the ghettos, "misery

cordons" in Argentina and Chile, or the "favelas" in
Brazil), offices, peasants religious festivities,

indigenous reservations, etc.

It is popular culture

and not any other intra-philosophical motivation or the

"exteriority" that should serve to constitute,
prefigure, and determine the philosophical wisdom of

Latin America.

However, Latin American philosophical

"wisdom" is not yet informed by this primal or founding

form of knowledge:

the synthesis we urge is a category

of thought that has its most distant reminiscence in

the notion of "poetic wisdom" utilized by Giambattista

Vico (1668-1774) in his renowned work The New Science
(1744,

19 68

36
)

.

which is already experienced by conscious subjects and the
consciousness of these subjects is given in a "cogito" which
is always already objectively embodied
.

Though Vico wrote and published in the eighteenth
century, he was actually a child of the seventeenth, "the
century of genius". He was born in 1668 and attained in
1699 the professorship of rhetoric which he held until his
The seventeenth century is marked above all
retirement.
36
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We have been defining popular culture as

complex concept that entails
and constitutive levels.

a

a

rather

series of considerations

According to

Julio De Zan's

essay,

"Para una filosofia de la cultura
y una
filosofia politica nacional" [For a Philosophy of

Culture and

a

National Political Philosophy]

(1975:

87-

others, by the frequency with which, in the titles of
scientific and pseudo-scientific works, such words as "new"
and unheard of" appear.
It was more honorable to create a
new science singlehandedly than to continue or extend or
even to revolutionize an old one. Vico's intellectual
ambition was to create a science of human society, a science
that should do for "the world of nations" what men like
Galileo and Newton had done for "the world of nature".
Presumably Vico's new science, as a characteristic creation
of the eighteenth century belongs to that "New World of the
Sciences" envisaged by Bacon. However it is a science which
faces the opposite direction. Vico's idea was that although
his new science had been created in the context of modern
science and its intrinsic alliance with mathematics, its
foundation had been made possible by a return to the poetic
wisdom by which the world of nations was first created,
according to him.
In his work The New Science (1744)
Vico
presents scientific and philosophic wisdom seeking to know
itself by recovering its own origins in what he calls,
"vulgar or poetic or creative wisdom".
In doing this, it
becomes itself creative, or recreative. Doubtless all
science is in some sense constructive, but the "new science"
would be so in a special way. For in this science,
philosophic or scientific wisdom comprehends, though with
the greatest difficulty (Vico, 1968: 100), that vulgar or
creative wisdom which is the origin and presupposition of
all science and all philosophy.
The new science, like all
science, must begin where its subject-matter begins.
But
its subject-matter is, according to this philosopher,
institution-building wisdom and that began with the first
beginnings of institutions (when men first, "began to think
humanly") (Vico, 1968: 109-297).
It should be to noted that
Vico's concept of a "new science of human society" shares
with the Marxists and existentialists the negative view that
there is no human essence to be found in individuals as
such, and with the Marxists the positive view that the
essence of humanity is ultimately the ensemble of social
relations, or the developing systems of institutions.
,

,

131
139)

,

the ensemble of characteristics that constitute

every culture is:

its natural habitat

:

the systems of

symbols that express and transmit the experiences

common to

a

particular community; the beliefs and

values of

a

historically determined community; the

system of implements that mediate humans

1

activity upon

the objective world, and the particular historical

experience by which they were acquired; and finally,
the ensemble of relations and social structures within

which these systems are recreated and reproduced, that
is,

the social structures that incorporate and regulate

individuals and groups.

De Zan considers the ensemble

of all these elements to constitute a structure that

bears the character of "a dialectical totality".
Nevertheless, he does not regard culture as

a

totality", but rather as an "open totality".

"closed
In the

first place, it is opened toward itself, that is,

toward man himself that through the mediation of
culture, objectifies and fulfills himself historically,

but at the same time, always transcends it and is

always the source of "innovation", "transformation",
and "self-overcoming" by virtue of the socio-political

project that
itself.

a

particular community may have set for

Secondly, culture is an "open" totality to the

exteriority of other cultures" by means of the
"dialogue" that individuals establish with other
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cultures of the historical past and the present
also "open" in the sense of

a

.

but

critical stance toward

"the relationships of alienation and cultural

domination" 37 (De Zan 1975: 87-139).
The notion of "people" that we are attempting to

articulate here must allow the most extensive range of
expressive possibilities.

Those possibilities exclude

of course, the social sector directly responsible for

assuming the position of the "dominant" faction.

In

our approach, popular culture is defined, as the

particular way of seeing, thinking, and valuing
(although not exclusive or unchanging, but diverse and

always evolving) that, in the course of

a

unique

historical experience, has conquered gradually the
segregated and oppressed groups or classes.

We agree

with De Zan, when he claims that such forms of
seeing, thinking, and valuing" (De Zan, 1975:

"

108),

that constitute themselves as results of extended

historico-social experiences, are the "a priori forms
of the historical reason"

(De Zan,

1975:

108)

that

configured in each people the basic formation of its

37

The category of "alienation" utilized here by the
author should not be understood exclusively in its
"Heideggerian" connotation, namely, as an estrangement from
De Zan defines "alienation" as a
its originary essence.
On the
"false identification with someone else's essence".
other hand, the author thinks that both connotations are
complementary aspects of the same process (1975: 89-90).
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"national consciousness" (De Zan, 1975

:

108)

38
.

Obviously, this meaningful system with which the people

hsve identified, far from being some kind of
"monad"

,

a

cultural

has resulted from an extremely intricate

historical process.

It has been a process particularly

replete of impositions, of actions and reactions, of

discontinuities and progressions.
Again,

in our attempt to explore the concept of

popular culture, we have approached some of the
intuitions and concepts provided by philosophical
hermeneutics, more specifically, by Paul Ricoeur's
philosophy.

In particular, we are referring to what

Ricoeur calls the "ethico-mythical nucleus" that is the
ethos of a people.

Considering the decisive relevance

of Ricoeur's concept of "ethos"
284)

(Ricoeur,

1965:

271-

to our re-assessment of popular culture; and,

considering its implications for the second half of our
research (i.e. the representative case of Jose Carlos

Mariategui's thought: Chapters

38

3

and 4), we are going

In defense of De Zan special use of Kantian
categories on his effort to articulate a philosophy of
culture capable of explaining the relationship between
philosophy of culture and a national political philosophy in
Latin America, we are compelled to expand his conceptions
regarding this relative theoretical correspondence with
Kant's Transcendental philosophy. Attentively to such
purpose, he points out that "those 'forms of thinking' and
those 'forms of seeing' things are not identical, atemporal, as an innate and immutable apparatus, according to
Kant's own thinking" (De Zan, 1975: 108).
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to reproduce entirely the precise
passage where the
French philosopher defines and utilizes
it.

It seems to me that if one wishes
to attain
the cultural nucleus, one has to cut
through
to that layer of images and symbols which
make the basic ideals of a nation.
I use
these concepts of image and symbol here in
the psychoanalytic sense; indeed they are not
discovered by immediate description; in this
respect, the intuitions of sympathy and of
the heart are misleading; what we need is an
authentic deciphering, a methodical
interpretation
All the phenomena directly
accessible to immediate description are like
symptoms or a dream to be analyzed.
in the
same way, we should have to be prepared to
conduct our research up to the stable images
and the permanent dreams which make up a
nation's cultural resources and which feed
its spontaneous judgments and its least
elaborated reactions regarding experienced
situations.
Images and symbols constitute
what might be called the awakened dream of a
historical group. It is in this sense that I
speak of the ethico-mvthical nucleus (our
emphasis) which constitutes the cultural
resources of a nation. One may, therefore,
think that the riddle of human diversity lies
in the structure of this subconscious or
unconscious.
The strange thing, in fact, is
that there are many cultures and not a single
humanity (Ricoeur, 1965: 280)
.

.

In spite of Ricoeur

's

explicit reference to

psychoanalysis in this text, and to its methodological
resources such as dreams and the unconscious, his

hermeneutic philosophy distances itself and it is even
opposed to a psychoanalytic reduction to the

interpretation of culture 39
39

.

Paul Ricoeur' s important contribution to hermeneutic
thought centres on his theory of the conflict of
interpretations; that is to say, Ricoeur mediates between
theories of hermeneutics so far advanced by considering the
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This notion of ethico-mythical nucleus sustains
itself on the hypothesis that "behind" the most visible

manifestations of popular culture is found, profoundly
imbricated in the people's daily life,
vital attitude hardly reducible to

people's cultural life.

determinate

rational pattern.

a

This attitude determines decisively

a

a

particular

Furthermore, it is, not

directed to an a-temporal or metaphysical substance, as
suggested by De Zan, previous to every contact with the

historical process.

It is rather an existential

behavior, shaped in praxis, and therefore, never

concluded.

An authentic philosophical activity in

Latin America will be clearly marked by a deliberate

acceptance of an essential task:

with the aid of other

disciplines, it should engage in the deciphering of
some of the revealing contours of this constitutive

cultural depth.

reconstructive determination of objective sense and the
existential appropriation of traditioned meaning as egually
It
justified and operating on different strategic levels.
by
is necessary to note that hermeneutics is restricted
Ricoeur to the interpretation of texts. However, a later
conception of "hermeneutics" in Ricoeur 's theoretical
evolution merged with a theory of "language as
interpretation" into a hermeneutic that exhibits an affinity
with Gadamer s philosophical hermeneutics. The
methodological implications of this development are clearly
and succinctly formulated in his paper on 'The Model of the
Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text (Ricoeur 1979:
'

'

73-101)

.

,
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We have suggested that the idea of
the "de-

privatization" of the subject (/agent) of knowledge
in
the context of a philosophy of liberation
and its

relationship with the vindication of the popular
masses
as main protagonists in the struggle for
constituting
an authentic philosophical discourse in Latin
America

are essential components of completing a philosophy
of

liberation.

A philosophy "metaphysically" enthroned in

the collectivity and not in the "solitary I", must

exercise, along with the hermeneutical analysis and

cultural recovery above mentioned,

a

task of "mimetic"

characterization of the primary features disclosed in
popular culture 40

.

Philosophy in Latin America should

In the Poetics Aristotle tells us that tragedy seeks
to imitate human action in a poetic way.
He remarks that
the "mythos" of tragedy, that is, both its fable and its
plot, is the "mimesis", the creative imitation, of human
action.
For Aristotle, "mimesis" does not mean the
duplication of reality. He postulates that "mimesis" is not
a just a copy:
"mimesis" is "poiesis", that is,
construction, creation.
For the fable (in a tragedy) is
firstly, an original, coherent construction which attests to
the creative genius of the artist; and secondly, tragedy is
an imitation of human actions which makes them appear
better, higher, more noble than they are in reality
(Aristotle, 1984: 68-78).
.

We are thus, applying the notion of "mimesis" in the
same fashion Ricoeur has utilized it (Ricoeur, 1989b: 274Paul Ricoeur, has incorporated this Aristotelian
296)
notion into his theory of interpretation of both fiction and
history.
He claims that the link between the history of the
historians and the interpretation of texts is no way
dissolve by what he calls the "realist intention" of
history.
Although Ricoeur does not doubt that history
claims to offer a true representation of past events (by
means of many kinds of material and textual evidence) he
maintains that, just as "mimesis" endows fiction with a
.

,
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never ignore the historical process of
constitution of
its popular sphere, in their symbolic or
ideological

developments.

Neither should it disengage itself from

such cultural resource courageously constituted
by the
acts of resistance and affirmation against the

battering of imperialism and its aggressive devaluation
®very cultural expression that comes from the

popular masses.

An authentic philosophical expression

of Latin America consequently assigns to itself the

responsibility of abandoning

a

style that does not

corresponds to the tasks that it has consented to
undertake.

From that operating perspective, it must

incorporate all of the "imported" philosophical
influences that seem more convenient.

But it must be

nonetheless an "appropriation" pervaded or critically
"possessed" by the "spirit" of its people.
The ethos of a people does not have only a

singular sense of cultural immanence merely "anchored"

referential relation to the real world, so too history has
an imaginary aspect.
By recognizing the values of the past
only through their differences from those of the present,
history opens up the real towards the possible. As Ricoeur
says, "the 'true' histories of the past uncover the
potentialities of the present" (Ricoeur 1989b: 295)
Therefore, treating the cultural life of the popular masses
in Latin America, as a "literary artifact", in the same
fashion Ricoeur approaches historical texts, its "mimetic"
quality vis a vis the "textual constitution" of the
expressions of popular culture (especially the non-ostensive
reference of such testimony) would disclose a world
impregnated with significance and totally unknown by
traditional philosophy.
,
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to its lowest levels of expression, nor does it
present

itself as a passive stratum of the Latin American

social being.

As we have suggested with the notion of

resistance, this ethos pervades all levels of the life
of a people, consolidating in itself determinate

dynamic attributes, that potentiated and transcended,
constitutes the authentic paths of popular liberation.
It is at this level that Latin American philosophy

meets with politics.
An immense part of the relevant Latin American

population still confronts

a

reckless ordeal which

denies its authentic cultural identity.

Theoretically

speaking, we believe that in view of this predicament,

the task of liberation philosophy is to contest those

oppressive circumstances by calling forth all the

historical and political possibilities of this
authentic popular and praxeological ("extra-textual")
"poiesis"

Following these defining lines, an

.

authentic Latin American philosophical discourse would
be basically branded by the sign of liberation

.

As we have suggested above, another significant

consequence of proposing "the people" as the historical
subject of philosophy is the re-definition of the

tradition of "First Philosophy" (e.g. Descartes'

Meditations

)

in terms of "politics".

This political

ingredient which pervades absolutely every existing
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interpretation of the "philosophy of liberation"
(Cerutti Guldberg

,

1983; 1988-89: 43-61),

joins end to

end with one of the most essential and consistent

qualities of philosophical thought in the Latin

American intellectual tradition.

Philosophical thought

in Latin America is definitely characterized by its

ethico-political vocation and orientation (Ardiles,
ed.,

1973; Ardao,

Dussel,

1973; Zea,

1976; Crawford,
1952,

1969,

1961; Davis,

1982).

1972;

Indeed, even a

quick glance at Latin American cultural history would

verify how all of the leading representatives of this

history since the colonial period have displayed an
exceptional receptiveness toward the vital problems of
the indigenous and the black population, in short, a

receptiveness to the oppressed of this continent (Roig,
1982

59-86)

:

The attempt to construe an authentic Latin

American philosophical discourse as

a

"philosophy of

liberation" (by envisioning "politics" as

philosophia" 41

)

a

"prima

must absolutely embrace this

41

This specific formulation which re-defines "politics"
as "prima philosophia" in relation to philosophy of
liberation, has also been suggested by other authors who
explicitly have acknowledged the influence and relevance of
Emmanuel Levinas' thought on this philosophical movement in
Quoting Levinas
Latin America (Dussel and Guillot, 1975)
in Totality and Infinity Derrida pertinently corroborates,
"Ontology, as first philosophy ["prima philosophia"], is a
philosophy of power" (Derrida, 1978: 137). However, these
authors' (Dussel and Guillot, 1975) application of Levinas'
ideas such as the "exteriority of the other" and that
.

,
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tradition.

Consequently, our emphasis in bringing

about this (interpretive) re-assessment of the problem
that concerns this research will also presuppose a

similar conception and endeavor.

Our strategy is

defined fundamentally by an encounter and

a re-

interpretation of certain "emissaries" of Latin

American intellectual history.

What privileges those

distinct cases is that their exemplary constitution and

development would facilitate the recognition, analysis,
and assemblage of an alternative and intelligible

theoretical paradigm.
Such historical cases should eventually clarify

subsequent investigations or retrospective re-

assessments of Latin American intellectual history.

It

may even provide for the most ambitious and original

thinkers some explicit valuations, conceivably welcomed
(and criticized)

in the actual attempts to create

innovative and "upgraded" Latin American philosophical
discourses, that is, authentic Latin American

philosophical discourses that truthfully continue
responding to the historical, political, and cultural
projects of the diverse Latin American peoples.

Such

"justice well ordered begins with the other" (Levinas, 1987
54-56) assumes a concrete and radical content motivated by
the impoverished and other oppressed sectors in Latin
America, whose marginal experience mark the "exteriority"
from which the totality of the existing system can be
disintegrated.
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philosophical discourses would bestow upon the
"speechless" oppressed popular masses of Latin America
(the "Calibans")

,

the genuine philosophical voice and

identity that historically has been denied to them.
The distinctive sign of our perspective is not

merely definable as

a

consequence and successive

application of the traditional ethico-political

characteristics of Latin American philosophical
thought.

In our interpretation of a "philosophy of

liberation",

"politics" is not originally

a

simple

means, not even the practico-social dimension where

philosophy becomes "pragmatic" by contributing to the
solution of the real problems of the society in which
it operates.

Rather,

it designates "politics" within

its perspective as the practico-ref lexive act of

returning to the underlying causes of poverty to the
actual context where the marginal existence of the

"wretched of the earth" in capitalism and imperialism
is staged.

Installed within this marginal socio-

economic context, philosophy must denounce inarticulate
outrage in order to assert the justice deserved by the

impoverished masses.
The special philosophical problems that

philosophical reflection in general pose to current
Latin American attempts to constitute

a

philosophy of

liberation do not exhaust the whole range of
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possibilities.

But we believe that other

possibilities, which sometimes have assumed the form of
direct challenges have helped us to accept its

considerable level of complexity.

Among many other

difficulties not less important, the question of
proposing that any authentic Latin American philosophy
must be construed as a philosophy of liberation

presupposes, first, the possibility of

a

comprehensive

development of Latin American philosophy as a
contextual and

"

in-cultured " philosophical discourse;

and second, the radical revision of the traditional

conception of philosophy in general, given the positive
acknowledgement of our first working hypothesis, (i.e.

philosophy is necessarily an "in-cultured knowledge").

2.4

Toward a Reading of Mariategui in
Context

a

Distinct

Given the difficulties sketched, and the problems
of completing a liberation philosophy, the purpose of

this "concluding" section cannot be the statement of

definitive "conclusions".

Our intention at this time

can only be to point out an idea that seems fruitful to
us.

It can at best posit to some new elements that

will ultimately further our present efforts to

elucidate the problem.
The idea we would like to submit is the following:

Since the question for a "Latin American philosophy"
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The idea we would like to submit is the
following:

Since the question for

a

"Latin American philosophy"

has become a challenge primarily for the
(Latin

American) philosophers informed by a "more or less"

Eurocentric philosophical tradition, it has resulted in
a

dissipated effort of acquiring "philosophical

universality" by means of absolute abstraction.

In

many cases, subsequent philosophical production has
been tragically deprived of the cultural milieu (and

political exigencies) in which such philosophical

activity is grounded.

Consequently, the real challenge

posed to Latin American philosophy is perhaps to
achieve a form of "philosophical universality" without
eluding contextual and cultural differences

.

Our

strategy here is to place and re-read contextually from
the perspective of the Latin American philosophical

tradition and its quest for its definite philosophical
identity (i.e. this approach should constitute a

supplementary support to the insistence of calling our
task a hermeneutical examination) the crucially
important thought of the Peruvian revolutionary
Marxist, Jose Carlos Mariategui (1895-1930).

Within the specific context of Latin American
international Marxist tradition, Mariategui has been

recognized consistently by many Marxist historians as
the "first American Marxist" (e.g. Davis, 1972: 189-
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191; Melis

Vazquez,

,

1971:

9-49; Liss,

1988-89: 114-128).

1984:

However, our contextual

£© reading consists precisely of

Mariategui's legacy within

129-137; Sanchez

a

a

recovery of

broader context of the

Latin American philosophical tradition.

As we

mentioned before, we want to place his writings against
the specific problematic background of the Latin

American quest for philosophical identity.

By

interrogating and evaluating the theoretical and

praxeo logical "responses" Mariategui offered in his

writings to the specific and contextual challenges
posed by the prospects of

a

socialist revolution in

Peru, on one hand, and to the hindering limitations

inherent to the Marxist paradigm in its extremely

Eurocentric form (i.e. Marxism-Leninism in the 1920s),
on the other, we try to decode in its emergence,

maturation, and articulation the explicit and

intelligible anatomy of an authentic Latin American

philosophical discourse
only be understood now

,

.

So to speak, Mariategui can

within the context of

liberation philosophy.
Like Karl Marx, Jose Carlos Mariategui also

believed that committed philosophers should not simply
study and interpret the world; they need to transform
it

(i.e.

the "eleventh thesis on Feuerbach").

As a

Marxist, Mariategui understood that revolutionary
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praxis was very much in order if Peru was to
undergo
its own socialist revolution.
He was not only a highly
original Marxist thinker but also a committed
political
activist who often used his written work and his

magazine Amauta 42 to attain his political objectives.
Furthermore, his writings have received scholarly
concern, if not scholarly understanding 43

.

Mariategui was explicitly an internationalist
Marxist.

He was convinced that any program aimed at a

socialist revolution at

a

national level, had to be

indispensably envisioned within
strategy.

a

broader international

At the same time, his Peruvian and Latin

American identity directed his thought along highly
original paths.

He was one of the first to develop

Marxist theory from within the Latin American reality,
to think the problem of socialist revolution in Latin

American [pensar el problema de la revolucion
socialista en Latinoamericano 44

]

.

Such "thinking"

conform with what we have been vindicating as

a

condition for an authentic Latin America philosophy.
Mariategui'

s

theoretical practice is a practical socio-

42

For a more detailed introduction to Mariategui
and works, please refer to our chapter 3.
43

See the special section dedicated to works on
Mariategui in the bibliography of this dissertation.
44

In Spanish this is read as a pun; as if "Latin
American" were a language similar to other national
languages

's

life
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historical activity conscious of its
social and
historical roots. Although such thought
in general
terms might be framed within Marxist
theory,
it is

nevertheless historic and entirely conscious
of the
particularities that determine the reality at
hand.

thinking

in

context

,

By

Mariategui was able to elucidate

the Peruvian and Latin American reality in
light of his

interpretation of Marxist method and the wealth of

personal and intellectual experience he had acquired
in
Europe and Peru.

—filosofia

1=^

-(

19 69)

,

americana como filosofia sin mas

the Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea quotes

Simon Bolivar's teacher Simon Rodriguez to the effect
that Latin America must not imitate either Europe or
the United States, but must be original 45 (Zea, 1969:
32-33)

.

The necessity for originality in culture and

philosophy is especially great, Zea adds.

One cannot

slavishly imitate academic or philosophical systems
that are imported from Europe or elsewhere.

It is

indispensable to think, to interpret, to create from

within one's own reality.

Only in this way can

formerly colonized people affirm their own culture and
indigenous-mixed "essence" and contribute to universal

X

cv
45

Although we mention Simon Rodriguez in chapter 1, the
reader can refer to Zea
The Latin-American Mind (1963: 3744) for more details on Simon Rodriguez notion of "mental
emancipation"
'
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philosophy and culture (1969: chapters

1&

2).

This

argument which parallels in many ways
that of Frantz
Fanon (i.e. The Wretched of the F.rth,
i 968) and other
Third World nationalists and revolutionary
leaders
(e.g. Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Ernesto
"Che" Guevara),
is most applicable to Mariategui.
He was endeavoring
to analyze and interpret Peruvian reality
from
the

perspective of an intellectual system that relied on
Marxist methodology and analysis but applied them,

and

other intel lect ual innovations

peculiar Peruvian reality.

,

in the context of the

The result was an

exceptionally original and authentic analysis of Peru's

complex social reality.

in other words,

the rise of an

authentically Latin American Marxism and therefore of a
l® 9 itimate Latin American philosophical discourse.

It is difficult to situate Mariategui in the

historic epoch in which he was writing.

There were a

few Latin American Marxists, like the Argentinean

Anibal Ponce

(

1898-1938)

46
,

who may have been much

better versed in the classical categories of European

Marxism and consequently better able to frame their
46

In his comprehensive work on the history of Marxist
thought in Latin America, Sheldon B. Liss characterizes
Ponce as "the strongest link between the thinking of Jose
Esteban Echeverria (1805-1851; one of the first socialist
thinkers in Argentina, strongly influenced by French utopian
socialism) and Lenin, between Argentina's sometimes
positivist-oriented Socialist party "pensadores" [thinkers]
and the country's more radical Marxist thinkers" (Liss,

1984

:

49)

.
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analyses in accepted Marxist terminology (Liss, 1984:
49-51; Teran, 1980: 169-190).

As with many later

Marxists in Latin America, this classical Eurocentric
view would however, militate against original

analyses in situ (from within the Latin American
contextual reality)
^^-"®^tion of Latin

.

it would not generate the

American Marxist thought or analysis,

but would permit Latin Americans to employ a European

Marxism that (like previous philosophic and cultural
systems) was not of their own making.

This,

it could

further be argued, would only help to perpetuate Latin

American cultural dependency in
more subtle way 47

.

a new,

although far

Conversely, there were some

4

Regardless of the tendency of many contemporary Latin
American Marxists to comply with Marxist doctrines in a
dogmatic way, there are also outstanding cases that have
clearly perceived the Eurocentric nature inherent to Marxism
as a philosophical discourse.
Worthy to mention is the
example of the exceptional Argentinean revolutionary,
Ernesto "Che" Guevara (1928-1967). Exasperated by the
circumspection of some Marxists in making critical remarks
of certain flawed assessments of Latin American political
history performed by the founders of "scientific socialism",
and of course, empirically supported by the triumph of the
Cuban revolution (1959), "Che" Guevara outspokenly
challenged an old "taboo". For instance, in an article
written in October, 1960 ("Notes for the Study of the
Ideology of the Cuban Revolution"), Guevara confronts some
of the "evident truths" of Marxism:
"Obviously, one can point to certain mistakes of
Marx, as a thinker and as an investigator of the
social doctrines and of the capitalist system in
which he lived. We Latin Americans, for example,
cannot agree with his interpretation of Bolivar,
or with his and Engels's analysis of the Mexicans,
which were made accepting as fact even certain
theories of race or nationality that are
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Peruvian writers, like Victor Andres Belaunde
and
Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, who were beginning

to

make original analyses of aspects of the Peruvian

reality (Davis, 1972: 185-188; Liss, 1984: 127-148).
However, they were doing so without the full benefit
of
the intellectual and analytic innovations that
Marxist

theory was contributing to world culture.
Mariategui's innovative thought would be

criticized by "Europeanized" Marxists like Eudocio
Ravines for being to nationalist and by the
nationalists for being too Marxist (Aguezolo Castro,
1976)

.

We consider that neither of these two general

tendencies can understand the nature of Mariategui's

highly original undertaking.

Mariategui had been able

to creatively combine a wide range of intellectual and

political trends at

a

crucial stage in the development

of Latin American politics and ideas.

He used his wide-ranging knowledge and experience
to ingeniously merge the most dynamic currents in

Marxist thought and European culture to the growing
national and Third World consciousness that was

developing in Peru and Latin America.

Although his

Marxism may not have conformed perfectly to the Soviet
Leninism that the Third Communist International

unacceptable today" (Guevara, 1987: 134).
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(Comintern) began to project as the universal formula
for socialist revolution,

it seems to have been closely

adapted to national conditions.

As such it was an

early, and perhaps unique, example of national Marxism
in Latin America.

Definitely, it was similar to

Antonio Gramsci's Marxism 48 and to subsequent
"acculturations" of Marxist-Leninist thought to the

realities of Third World nations like China, Cuba,
Viet-Nam, and Mozambique.

subordination of

a

In Latin America,

the

great deal of later (post-1930)

thought and praxis to an overly deterministic European-

oriented (Eurocentric) Marxism made adequate

comprehension of his contribution difficult and did not
allow many others to follow his path until much later.
It has taken almost fifty years for most Latin American

revolutionaries and leftist intellectuals to come to
terms with Mariategui's unique contribution to social

analysis and revolutionary thought.

It was only after

the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, the "boom" in

Latin American literature, and thus the implicit

validation of

a

genuinely Latin American praxis and

perception, that the full import of Mariategui's

48

For a remarkable political, and theoretical
assessment of Antonio Gramsci's as the Marxist theoretician
and revolutionary socialist who promoted a daring a new
conception of the relations between politics, economics,
ideology and society, see Carl Boggs, The Two Revolutions:
Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism 1984.
,
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theoretical undertaking could be understood.

CHAPTER

THE RE DISCOVERY OF THE

3

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

IjATIN

IDENTITY

Jos6 Carlos MariStegui: "First Marxist in
America"

3.1

1

Jos6 Carlos Mari^tegui is one of the most important

twentieth century revolutionary leaders and thinkers
in
Latin America; and perhaps, one of the least known
Latin

American thinkers in the United States.
mentioned above (Chapter

1)

,

As we have

the French socialist writer

Henri Barbusse 2 once remarked, "Do you know who MariStegui

Antonio Melis, in the introductory essay (titled
precisely, "MariStegui: Primer marxista de America") of the
work, MariAtogu.i: Tros ostudjor, (Lima: Amauta, 1071: 0 - 40
),
c a mr> that Maridtogui can bo justly regarded a s the first
Marxist in America, in the sense of being the first
revolutionary thinker in Latin America to bring about an
or g na
app cat -Lon of the Marxian methodology and its
phi o: .oph ca
on look to the social real
ve
y of his na
Peru
1

i

i

i

1

1

I

i

1

i.

I

i

t

2

t

i

Barbusse 's familiarity with Mari&tegui was given in
the particular circumstances of the latter's relatively long
Vis.it to Europe (Garcia Sa vat occ
1070; and specially,
NCifiez, 1978).
Maridtegui arrived in France in the late
1919, at the moment when the wounds of First World War had
no yet been healed.
Social and economic crisis wore still
latent and the debate on the political future of France had
been initiated.
Socialists and communists were discussing
intensely on the possible solution of the situation. The
horrors of the war were generating a desire in the general
European population for securing the peace. Along with some
of the Left intellectuals in France and Germany, Henri
Barbusse (1873-1935) had engaged himself to this effort with
his publication of Tha Fire (I9ir>).
During this period the
"war novels" focused on the support of peace, were then
"best sellers".
Barbusse did not limit his collaboration
with the pacifist effort by publishing The Fire, and later
on, The Enchainment (1925).
Simultaneously, he summoned .ill
the intellectuals to participate in pacifist actions and
created the political group "Clarte" (1919).
Soon, this
group launched a campaign for the conquest of political
,

,

,

I

i

,
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is?

He is America's new luminary.

The prototype of the new

person of that continent" (Del Prado 1983: 179)
In the last years, the interest in this radical
thinker has

increased remarkably.

Undoubtedly, this concern is

associated with the "revival" of the revolutionary potential
in Latin America and in the capitalist world in general.

This is certainly an aspect of the re— appraisal (or "rediscovery") of the Peruvian anti-dogmatic Marxist of the
1920s and the 1930s.

In this sense, the attention to his

legacy is not different from that demonstrated for Lukacs,
Korsh, Bloch, and Gramsci.

Mariategui's most important and

best known work, Siete ensayos de interoretacion de la

realidad peruana [Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian
Reality] has been recently translated in France, United
States, and Italy (Podesta, 1981: 19).

In Peru,

in addition

to the Latin American editions (the Cuban included)

,

an

edition of his complete works in twenty volumes has been

recently completed.
Now, more than 60 years after his untimely death,

Mariategui's contributions are finally being acknowledged,

power and the creation of a "new thought", which would
gather the progressive intellectuals. Mariategui on his
part, had already read The Fire which had been published in
Lima in a popular edition (1917). However, in spite of the
unquestionably personal impact of Barbusse on the young
Mariategui, Barbusse 's never constituted an intellectual
archetype for him. As the reader will shortly corroborate,
Mariategui followed his own unique path in his theoretical
and political development (Nunez, 1978: 37-39).

154

not only in his native Peru, but
throughout Latin America as
well.
The democratic anti-imperialist
forces in Peru have

adopted "Mariateguismo" as their common
reference point.
"Mariateguismo" now promises to be the symbol

of the largest

and most unified revolutionary Left
in South America during
the 1990s.

Perhaps one of the most telling signs of the
richness and
complexity of Mariategui's thought and the range
of his
work,

is the way Mariategui is "claimed" by a
broad spectrum

of intellectual and political forces, both
within and

outside the Revolutionary Left (this phenomenon is
very
similar to the case of Gramsci in Italy).

Mariategui's

probing analyses of Latin American history and culture, his
literary criticism, his meticulous dissection of classes and
strata within the Peruvian society, especially the

indigenous peasantry, have won respect from

a

wide range of

intellectuals, political figures, and cultural workers.
To some mainstream observers, Mariategui is just an

independent intellectual with a few (unfortunate) ideas
about socialism (e.g. Meseguer Ilian, 1974).

To

revolutionary nationalists and Maoists, like the "Sendero
Luminoso" [Shining Path] guerrillas, he is an advocate of

rural-based peasant-led revolution.

To some social

democrats associated with the APRA 3 party he is an advocate
3

APRA stands for the Alianza Popular Revolucionar ia
Americana, founded in 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre
as a broad, Latin American revolutionary, anti-imperialist
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of gradual reforms based on a
multi-class party (precisely
like APRA).
To others on the Left, he is

nationalist

a

w ith the international communist
movement

(Flores Galindo, 1980) or an idealist with
only a

superficial grasp of Marxist theory (Paris,
1981) or a
"creative" Marxist who was so unique he could
never
be

associated with an organized political force (Arico,
1978).
The most consistent, and perhaps the most common
interpretation of Mariategui considers him

a

revolutionary

Marxist-Leninist who made a signal contribution to the
understanding of the centrality of the indigenous question
to the Peruvian revolution, but who was also convinced of

the leading role of the proletariat and its ties to the

international communist movement.

This interpretation has

been upheld mainly by the communists themselves (e.g. Del
Prado, 1972, and 1984; Levano, 1981; Falcon,
is shared by other scholars

Weisse,

1959)

.

(Vanden,

1978), but it

1975; Basadre,

1981;

This assessment often includes a sober

acknowledgement of what is regarded as early contradictions
and vacillations of Mariategui's works (Melis, 1971).

Nevertheless, from the period of his death until the 1960s,

when there was an upsurge in sentiment for national
independence in Peru, there was

a

marked tendency among the

formation.
In 1928, Haya de la Torre established APRA as a
strictly Peruvian party (the Partido Aprista Peruano) and by
the 1940s it shifted to a reformist strategy based on
populism and a petty-bourgeois class base.
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communists to downplay the seminal contributions
of
Mariategui. A critique by a Soviet author

(Miroshevski

that portrayed Mariategui as a populist and
proponent
of peasant revolution rather than an
advocate of the leading
role of the proletariat is often cited as
justification.
1942)

Naturally, the presentation of these assessments

suggest

a

legitimate question:

which interpretation comes

closest to accurately to summing up Mariategui' s thought?
We believe that the general assessment of Mariategui

provided by the communist writers and scholars cited above
is roughly correct for it characterizes his theoretical

development as an organic (thinking) phenomenon.

In

principle, we accept the general Marxist interpretation

despite

a

tendency on its part to turn Mariategui's thought

into dogma (e.g. Del Prado, 1983, 1984; Neira, 1973) 4

.

However, we will accentuate in our own intrepretation that

Mariategui's "unclosed" and anti-dogmatic development of

Marxism is conceived fundamentally as

a

method applicable in

the interpretation of social reality and political action,
and that its open nature allows it to admit into its

4

Hugo Neira has gone as far as to remark that "now is
the moment to approach Mariategui with the same respect and
rigor that the Europeans approach their Hegel or Kant.
For
he is our Hegel or Marx" (Neira, 1973: 8).
We cannot agree
on such immoderate parallels, since we believe that it would
be impossible to comprehend Mariategui's revolutionary
thinking without remitting ourselves, directly or
indirectly, to Hegel or Marx as well as to the world-wide
social and political movement they have generated with their
influence
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theoretical problematic some important non-Marxist

philosophical influences.
The myriad interpretations of Mariategui are in
part
the result of his intellectual breadth; his works cover
a

wide range of topics and can be read on several different
levels.

However, they are also

as a Marxist.

a

function of his evolution

Mariategui began his trajectory toward

Marxism as a radical intellectual mostly absorbed in
journalistic pursuits and literary criticism 5

.

Over the

years his thought evolved considerably, and even came to

clash with some of his earlier works after he had fully

adopted a Marxist world outlook.

This makes any attempt to

sum up Mariategui in terms of the views of the young

Mariategui hopelessly inadequate. It was not until the last
five years of his life that Mariategui'

s

theoretical and

practical work reached its pinnacle, with the publication of
his best-known writing and his catalytic role in founding
the Peruvian trade-union and communist movements.

5

These

Born to poverty, afflicted by poor health, and largely
self-educated, Mariategui became enamored of the printed
word while a teenager working as a typesetter. He was
barely 19 years old (1914) when he started writing short
articles on political and social criticism signing them
under various pseudonyms ("Juan Croniqueur", "Monsieur de
Camomille", "Kundall", "El cronista criollo", etc.). His
writings (Mariategui founded the socialist magazine Amauta)
fill twenty volumes and cover a variety of topics, including
political theory, international relations, economics, land
tenure, regionalism, the Church, Indian problems, and
literary criticism (Liss, 1984: 129).
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were the years when Mariategui thoroughly
embraced
socialism.
Jose Carlos Mariategui was no historical
anomaly.
He
was the product of the rise of
imperialism in the Americas.
He reflected the emergence of the
politically inexperienced
proletariat in Latin America the early twentieth
century, as
well as its striving for a strategic alliance
with the

oppressed rural masses,

a

proletariat whose emergence was

made possible and necessary by the decline of
the Latin
American oligarchies and the appearance of new ruling
classes organically linked to the United States.

He was,

in

short, consciously expressing the objective motion
towards

socialism in the Americas caused by historical forces.
In this chapter, we will attempt to review in fairly

general terms Mariategui' s short but extraordinary life and
his contributions to revolutionary Marxism.

This section

could have focused on any one of the numerous aspects of
Mariategui'

s

life and work that have become the subject of

both scholarship and political debate.

However, the purpose

here is to summarize his work and develop a portrayal of the

overall significance of Mariategui, especially given that so
little is known in the United States.

As with any summary,

it necessarily excludes many details and leaves many

questions unanswered 6
6

.

Chapter 4 will concentrate on some fundamental notions
in Mariategui 's thought.
By placing his thought within the
specific framework of the quest (and con-quest) for an
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For a more precise view of Mariategui's theoretical

production, we have classified his contributions into three

main categories.

The first involves (class) consciousness

and the role of the subjective factor.

This includes

Mariategui's classical critique of economism, his work in
cultural criticism and philosophy, and his role in founding
the Peruvian communist movement.

The second is a

historical-materialist analysis of "the Indigenous Question"
as central to the class struggle in Peru, regional and

cultural differences, and the leading political role of
Peru's small but nascent proletariat.

This is among the

first examples in the Latin American intellectual history of
the application of the Marxist method to the concrete

conditions in this continent.

The third develops the

internationalist approach to the question of national
democracy.

This is expressed not only in Mariategui's

solidarity with the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions of his
day, and with the support of the Soviet Union, but also in

an organic analysis of imperialism and the international

working class.
Before proceeding with our preliminary analysis of his

most important works, it would be well to briefly review

authentic Latin American philosophical discourse, we will
attentively scrutinize some of those elements to see if they
provide us with a well-defined "anatomy" of the
philosophical identity of Latin America.
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Mar lategui

'

s

life within the context of the
period in which

he lived.

An Outline of Mariategui

3.2

's

Biography

Mariategui was born in 1895 7 into
family.

a

poor provincial

His family moved to the Lima area when he
was still

young, and he soon became involved in various
literary and

publishing projects.

As he advanced in the world of

journalism, he ran up against the conservative cultural

biases bred by the moribund Peruvian oligarchy, and

developed an inclination toward social criticism.

In 1918,

he co-founded Nuest ra Epoca [Our Epoch], a newspaper

dedicated to social criticism.

It lasted only two issues,

as Mariategui came under heavy attack for a criticism of the

Peruvian Army's social composition.
La.

Razon [The Reason]

,

a

In 1919, he co-founded

daily paper squarely in opposition

to the autocratic regime of Augusto Leguia, whose rule as

President became

a

model for dictatorships in the twentieth

century
Under pressure from Leguia' s government, Mariategui

went to Europe with his close associate Jorge Falcon, where
he lived until 1923.

His experiences there, especially in

Italy, marked a turning point in his development as a

socialist.

He witnessed and studied the revolutionary

upsurges in the European working class and had contact with
7

Some authors situate his birth date in 1894.
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the emerging communist movement there;
he gravitated toward
the forces associated with the Third
International, and

developed an appreciation for the relevance
of the Bolshevik
Revolution (Mariategui, 1969; Nunez, 1978).
When he returned to Peru in 1923, he immersed
himself
in political work.
He taught at the Universidad Popular
Gonzalez Prada [Gonzalez Prada Popular University]
and
became its rector, while at the same time continuing
his
-j

°urnal ist ic activities in

publications.

a

number of major Lima

His lectures at the university reflected the

international perspective he had consolidated in Europe
(Mariategui,

1959b)

In 1926, Mariategui founded the journal Amauta

("amauta" means teacher in Quechua, the most common South

American Indian language; Mariategui has now come to be
known in Peru as "El Amauta")

.

The new journal brought

together progressive intellectuals in the exploration of

a

broad range of revolutionary ideas and was one of the most

exciting enterprises in Peruvian history; to this day, it
remains one of the most important projects in forging a
national identity among Peruvian intellectuals.

After he published an article supporting the struggle
of Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua against U.S.

intervention,

Mariategui was arrested in Lima, probably at the request of
the United States embassy.

In the face of Leguia's charge

that Mariategui was part of

a

"communist conspiracy"
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directed by Moscow, he insisted that he
was a "tried and
true Marxist" who did not believe in
conspiracies, and for
whom Peruvian socialism could not be a
"carbon copy" of any
other revolution elsewhere. with the support
of a broad
range of Peruvian intellectuals and the workers'
movement,

Mariategui was released and soon resumed his
activities.
In 1928, Mariategui formally broke with the
attempts of

Victor Raul Haya de la Torre to found
on APRA

'

s

ideology.

a

Peruvian party based

Like Haya de la Torre, Mariategui

sought the unity of the revolutionaries around

a

single

strategic conception, program, and organization that

encompassed the particularities of the class struggle in
Latin America, and more specifically in Peru.

Mariategui rejected APRA

'

s

Nevertheless,

notion that, unlike Russia and

Europe, the transition to socialism in Peru would be

essentially

a gradual,

uninterrupted process characterized

by the accumulation of reforms.

He would not accept Haya de

la Torre's deliberate attempts to distance the Peruvian

revolution from the revolutionary experiences and movements
in other parts of the world.

orientation towards

a

He also repudiated APRA's

multi-class party based on the petty-

bourgeoisie in favor of

a

proletarian party whose strategic

conception was the forming of

a

worker-peasant alliance.

That same year, Mariategui formed the first cell in what was
to become,

in 1929,

the Peruvian Socialist Party, and soon
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been a source of inspiration to the
generations that
followed him, in Peru and across the
continent.

3.3

Class Consciousness and the Role of the
Subjective
Factor

Mariategui’s most important contribution to
the Latin
American revolution is his resolute focus on
the role of

human consciousness as a reflection of history
and as a
crucial force in the shaping of history.
what we call the subjective factor

8
.

This is exactly

This took the form of

critical analyses of religion, philosophy, art, ideology,
and literature.
for,

His works are filled with an appreciation

and critique of, the role of the subjective factor in

the class struggle,

as concretized in the individuals who

brought that consciousness to bear in changing historical
reality or, the element of (class) consciousness

.

He took

up the major intellectual trends in Europe and Latin America
g

Actually, the expression "the subjective factor" was
first formulated by Lenin in his effort to articulate an
effective theory of revolution, which by the way, Marx nor
Engels never produced.
According to Lenin, revolutionaries
had to realize that, in the last instance a revolution
depends not on techniques, weapons, etc, but on militants,
on their class consciousness conjugated with an effective
revolutionary organization (i.e. constituted by
"professional revolutionaries"), their devotion and their
courage, that is, the subjective factor
On the other hand,
Mariategui’s forceful emphasis on the subjective factor came
from his conviction that the whole Marxist tradition had
refused to say that it is "man" who makes history. He
believed that this indifference was the direct result of the
fact that practically this expression had been exploited by
the bourgeois ideology which uses it to resist another,
true, expression, one vital for the proletariat:
it is the
masses who make history (Mariategui, 1985, 1987).
,

.
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.
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up the major intellectual trends
in Europe and Latin America
and analyzed their theoretical
expressions in class terms.

His subjects included both cultural
and political figures:
Lenin, Trotsky, Tolstoy, and Gorky
in Russia; Croce,

D'Annunzio, Pirandello, and Marinetti in
Italy; Zweig, Zola,
Sorel and Barbusse in France; Diego Rivera
and Jose
Vasconcelos in Mexico; Jose Marti in Cuba; and
,

in Peru,

the

artist Jose Sabogal, the poets and writers
Cesar Vallejo,
Jose Eguren, and Martin Adan, and the "Apristas"
Haya de la
Torre and Luis Alberto Sanchez (Mariategui,
1959a,

1970b,

1972).

1964,

Mariategui's intellectual vigor was

unflagging and he took up every expression of human
consciousness with

a

characteristic curiosity and

concreteness, completely devoid of the dogmatism distinctive
of many other contemporary Marxist thinkers.

This enabled

him to analyze complex intellectual currents all the way
from philosophical handmaidens of fascism (e.g. D'Annunzio)
to leading socialist theorists (e.g. Lenin, Juares, and

Liebknecht

)

,

touching all the major liberal and conservative

currents in between the two.

Unlike the literary

dilettante, Mariategui dealt with these ideas in

a

concrete

fashion, within a relatively consistent political and

ideological framework.

This was all part of his

contribution to the process of building the ideological
center of the Peruvian working class with an
internationalist, revolutionary Marxist outlook.
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The

mam

debate over Mariategui is rooted in
confusions
about the nature of his philosophical
commitments.
Some,

such as Robert Paris (1981), believe
that Mariategui was an
inveterate idealist. On the surface, one
need only consider
his extensive and sympathetic treatment
of Sorel, Gobetti,
Croce, and other "idealists"; his repeated
use of the term
"myth" to describe certain concepts, such
as socialism; or
his unity with contemporaries who put forth
the pre-

capitalist formations of "Inca communism" as a model
for
Peruvian socialism, in order to draw this conclusion.
Paris states, for example, that "if he had been a
'Leninist' like many of his contemporaries, Mariategui would

not have written 'the Indian Question'" (Paris, 1981:
8).
In this essay Mariategui asserts that the key to an "Indian

renaissance" lies not in its "Westernization" but in "the
myth, the idea of the Socialist revolution"
1971:

28-29)

Is this,

as Paris claims,

a

(Mariategui,

classical

inversion of materialist dialectics?
These examples demonstrate the dangers of grounding any

interpretation of Mariategui on specific quotations rather
than a comprehensive assessment of his work.

In the very

same essay cited by Paris, Mariategui clearly begins by

framing the question in materialist terms:
The assumption that the Indian problem is
ethnic is sustained by the most outmoded
repertory of imperialist ideas. The concept
of inferior races was useful to the white
man's West for the purposes of expansion and
conquest.
To expect that the Indian will be
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emancipated through a steady crossing of the
aboriginal race with white immigrants is an
anti-sociological naivete that could only
occur to the primitive mentality of an
importer of merino sheep. The people of
Asia, who are in no way superior to the
Indians, have not needed any transfusion of
European blood in order to assimilate the
most dynamic and creative aspects of Western
culture.
The degeneration of the Peruvian
Indian is a cheap invention of sophists who
serve feudal interests. The tendency to
consider the Indian problem as a moral one
embodies a liberal, humanitarian, enlightened
nineteenth-century attitude that in the
political sphere of the Western world
inspires and motivates "the leagues of human
rights"... The problem of the Indian must no
longer be obscured and confused by the
perpetual arguments of the throng lawyers and
writers who are consciously or unconsciously
in league with latifundistas
The moral and
material misery of the Indian is too clearly
the result of the economic and social system
that has oppressed him for centuries. This
system, which succeeded colonial feudalism,
is gamonalismo 9
While it rules supreme,
there cannot be no question of redeeming the
Indian (Mariategui, 1971: 25-30)
.

.

.

Following this essay on the "Indian question",

Mariategui gets to the heart of his basic thesis:

the

land question is the key to the emancipation of the

indigenous population, the basis for their political
and ideological transformation, and for their

9

The term "gamonalismo" designates more than just a
social and economic category: that of the "latifundistas"
or large landowners.
It signifies a whole phenomenon.
"Gamonalismo" is represented not only by the "gamonales" but
by a long hierarchy of officials, intermediaries, agents,
parasites, etc.
For instance, the literate Indian who
enters the service of "gamonalismo" turns into an exploiter
The central factor of the phenomenon is
of his own people.
the hegemony of the semi-feudal landed estate in the policy
and mechanism of the government (Mariategui, 1971: 30).
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identification with the historical mission of the urban
proletariat, socialism.

Thus,

"the agrarian problem is

first and foremost the problem of eliminating feudalism
in Peru"

(Mariategui, 1928: 32).

It is hard to imagine

a more materialist way to pose the question.

It was

not any innate cultural or psychological "idea" of the

Indians that made them strategic allies of the
proletariat, but the oppressive property relations that

prevailed in the Peruvian countryside.

The continuing

presence of the collectivist institutions in the Andes
(in particular the avllu

.

a form of

communal

production) explained the prominence of collectivist
ideas in the Indian communities, and was the basis for
the worker-peasant alliance.

In other words,

the

"myth" of Indian communism was thoroughly grounded in

the material and historic conditions of the Indian

community (see our discussion of the Indian question on
the next section of this chapter)

Independently of Mariategui' s materialist analysis
of Peruvian society in Seven Essays

,

we also have his

explicit critiques of idealism in general, and all the

prominent idealists of his time in paticular.
del Marxismo [In Defense of Marxism]

Def ensa

(Mariategui,

1985)

includes a fairly orthodox presentation of the

philosophical precepts of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and
direct disapproval of Croce and Sorel.

a

Peruan icemos—ad
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Peru [To "Peruvianize" Peru]

(Mariategui,

1970b: 80 - 87

)

contains his critique of Edwin Elmore's
quixotic
10
idealism
However, along with critique, we
always
find an appreciation of the contributions
of these
thinkers within the context of their class position
.

For instance, Mariategui'

alike Gramsci's 11

)

s

admiration for Croce (much

stems from Croce's ability to

articulate straightforwardly the interests of
the
rising Italian bourgeoisie in opposition to

feudalism.

Croce was an example of what Gramsci called an
"organic
intellectual" (See our Chapter

projected the necessity for

a

1,

footnote 25)

who

unified nation over the

aggregate of provincial Italian interests, much as

Mariategui saw the need for

a

unified Peru, except

under working class rather than bourgeois rule.

Croce

was a liberal intellectual who was in many ways in
A Peruvian of British descent, Edwin Elmore was one
of the most influential and brightest student leaders in the
1920s Peru, criticized and yet respected by Mariategui.
Mariategui regarded him as a progressive young intellectual
whose "mentality was typically liberal". He considered
Elmore a "sincere", "flexible", and an "authentic" liberal,
who although "comprehended socialism", never understood its
historical necessity. Mariategui insisted that Elmore's
"social idealism" had to be grounded concretely on the
working class and its economic and political revindications.
Otherwise, according to Mariategui, such "idealism" would
exhaust its propitious nature in an anti-historical and
romantic, thus inconsequential effort (Mariategui, 1970b:
82)

.

n For an illuminating
discussion on the philosophical
influence of Benedetto Croce (1866-1954) on the young

Gramsci see Carl Boggs' The Two Revolutions: Gramsci and the
Dilemmas of Western Marxism (1984: 37-43).
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advance of his class position.

Finally, Mariategui's

approach is very much in the Marxist tradition; after
all, Marx himself admired Hegel, and incorporated
many
of the advances the latter made into the Marxist

philosophical method.
To some, the fact that Mariategui paid so much

attention to the cultural leaders of bourgeois society
is automatic proof of his own "ideological

backwardness"; that he could discover any historically

progressive aspects to bourgeois culture is absolute
evidence of his "corruption".

Nonetheless, Mariategui

clearly located his cultural criticism within the
context of historical development.

For example, his

appreciation of the Peruvian writer Martin Adan 12
derives not simply from Adan's literary skills, which
were considerable, but from his ability to express the
non-conformist, anti-establishment sentiments of

a

discontented bourgeoisie frustrated by the traditional
straight- j ackets of

a

declining oligarchy.

Mariategui

recognizes how Adan himself is not conscious of the
12

Martin Adan

is the pseudonym of Rafael de
He is the son of an aristocratic
family from the north of Peru. Received his elementary and
secondary education in the "Deutsche Schiile" in that city.
He continued his studies in the Liberal Arts faculty at the
National University of San Marcos. His first poems were
published for the first time in various literary magazines,
especially Mariategui's Amauta, at the end of the 1920s and
beginning of the 1930s. Adan is regarded by many literary
historians, critics, and writers, as one of the great names
of Peruvian literature.
(b.

la Fuente y Benavides.

1908)
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historical role he was playing (Mariategui, 1970b: 150154)

.

Another crucial factor in evaluating Mariategui is
his evolution from a radicalized liberal thinker,

journalist, and literary critic to a Marxist via

contact with the philosophical rebelliousness of the
Italian "Risorgimento" thinkers such as Croce, anarcho-

syndicalists such as Sorel
Gonzalez Prada (in Peru)

.

,

and radicals such as

Like Gramsci, Maridtegui was

of humble background and gravitated toward the

intelligentsia during his youth.

Both absorbed the

most dynamic ideas accessible to them at the time (much
as Marx and Engels absorbed Hegel)

;

and both,

ultimately, rejected their idealist underpinnings.

They had a profound appreciation for the contributions
of revolutionary bourgeois intellectuals, especially in
a setting in which an abyss existed between these two

intellectual and their own ruling class.

They also

identified with those intellectuals who gravitated

toward the revolutionary working-class groundswell,
like Sorel.

Mariategui was impressed, for example,

with the fact that Sorel was one of the few

syndicalists of the time to defend the Bolshevik

Revolution (Garcia Salvatecci, 1979).

To assess

Mariategui, or Gramsci, or even Marx, based exclusively
on their early works, would always yield

a

one-sided
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and shelved portrayal.

Such portrayals necessarily

ignore the process of maturation.

Mariategui carried

out a conscious (and necessarily immanent)
critique of

his earlier thinking until his death.

Inflexible

interpretation has induced some of Mariategui'

commentators to portray him merely as

a

Marxist

humanist (Kossok, 1971: 111-147)
There is another tendency in the literature that

treats Mariategui

's

theoretical development as

a

uniform reaffirmation of Marxism-Leninism, without
contradictions, lapses and fragmentary elements.

I

believe Del Prado (1984) best exemplifies this

tendency 13

.

This approach is no less one-sided and no

less a failure to recognize Mariategui

's

dynamic

contributions to Marxist theory and his significance

regarding the articulation of an authentic Latin

American philosophical discourse than the idealist
interpretation.

13

Especially since so many of

Del Prado is currently General Secretary of the
Peruvian Communist party and one of the foremost authorities
on Mariategui in the communist movement.
Although it is not
within the scope of this chapter in particular, or this
dissertation in general to demonstrate this, we believe that
although Del Prado's defense of Mariategui 's MarxismLeninism might be (in principle) both important and
politically correct, it suffers from a dogmatic orthodoxy
rather than a theoretical examination of Mariategui 's ideas
in their own right from the point of view of a Latin
American intellectual history and philosophical tradition.
Alternatively, Del Prado often relies on personal anecdotes
to make his case instead of a systematic theoretical
(philosophical) and political analysis of Mariategui.
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Mar lategui

books are collections of diverse
articles,
it is necessary to have a broad
overview of the
literature in order to synthesize its
main elements.
Any pedantic attempt to prove an
intepretation with
isolated quotations may give an impression
of authority
or logical consistency, but in actuality
it will be
false of its subject (e.g. that of Luna
Vegas, 1984).
1

s

No less silly is any tendency to rely
on anecdotes and
personal reminiscences in order to construe an
adequate

characterization of Mariategui theoretical development
(e.g.

Del Prado,

Mariategui

's

1983).

attraction to the European idealists

is accompanied by a profound political commitment,

namely

the struggle against revisionist tendencies in

,

the socialist and working-class movements.

In Def ensa

del marxismo (1985), he directly criticizes the

classical revisionism of Eduard Bernstein (19-30), and
several current versions such as that of Henri De Man
(19-27)

His defense of Marxism was aimed specifically

.

at the distortions of mechanical materialism that

downplayed the role of the conscious element in
history 14
14

.

This goes far beyond Mariategui' s explicit critique
of the economistic theories that he was aware of in Peru and
his forceful rejection of European Social democracy.
Indeed, all of Mariategui' s work is implicitly a criticism
of the prosaic, economistic interpretation of Marx that
reduced the struggle for socialism to a series of economic
struggles for higher wages and better working conditions.
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However, Mariategui's critique goes far
beyond the
explicit exposure of the so-called "distortions"
of

Marxist theory.
work.

The critique is implicit in all his

It is to be found in his persistent

preoccupation with the creative role of political
leadership and its ability to utilize every ideological
instrument at its disposal (e.g. his distinctive

characterization of what he called the "revolutionary
myth")

in order to advance the revolutionary

process 15

.

Mariategui's materialist understanding of the role
of consciousness is not only to be found in his

intellectual affirmations; it is also apparent in his
actions.

The subjective factor was not a self-

indulgent or utopian concept; it was the central factor
in attempts to change material reality.

Mariategui

believed that many Marxist intellectuals overstated the

deterministic element inherent in Marxist theory.

This

outlook might seem to be trivial bourgeois voluntarism

Coming as it did in the decade following the Bolshevik
Revolution, Mariategui's work objectively upheld the
reaffirmation of the Leninist principles underlying the
seizure of power in Russia, which were attacked throughout
the world as either only applicable to Russia or
inconsistent with proletarian interests to begin with.
15

This and other aspects (e.g. the notion of a "realist
Utopia") of Mariategui's thought which makes him a unique
thinker, not only among the Marxist of his own historical
epoch but also in the Latin American intellectual history,
will be treated in the last chapter of this dissertation.
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Mariategui returned from Europe
to dedicate
himself to the political and
ideological training of
the Peruvian working-class by
starting at the

logical

beginning, that is, at the formation
of a conscious
revolutionary vanguard.
To undertake this enterprise,
he turned to the intelligentsia
and students, whose
access to a broader worldview could
open them up to

socialism’s promise, just as Mariategui
had seen that
promise maturing in Europe and the Soviet
Union.

Regardless, far from resting all his hopes
on the

educated Peruvian elite, he sought out,
supported and
guided the major working-class organization in
Peru,
the first confederation of trade unions.

These

concrete projects reflected a fusion of revolutionary
theory with practice, hardly the hallmark of idealism.

3.4

Mariategui ’s "Historical-Materialist" Analysis of
Classes and the Class Struggle in Peru
If all Mariategui had done was to advance

revolutionary Marxism and challenge mechanical
materialist and reformist versions of Marxism, he would
still have left an important mark on both the Peruvian
and international working-class movements.

Nonetheless, his most enduring contribution was the

application of Marxist theory to the elaboration of
be found explicitly enunciated in 1928.

a
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application of Marxist theory to the elaboration of

a

revolutionary strategy for national liberation in the
concrete conditions of Peru.

Mariategui

'

s

Seven Essays was and remains today

a

classic analysis of Peruvian society for all

revolutionary sectors of the population.

For the

emerging proletariat, it called attention to the

significant mass of impoverished Indians without whose
alliance no socialist revolution could be won or
consolidated.

For the Indians,

it was in resonance

with their awakening from centuries of servitude and

milestone in the establishment of Indian culture as
pillar of Peruvian society.
and petty bourgeoisie,
a clear and precise

a
a

For the urban bourgeoisie

it presented for the first time

depiction of the economic and

social adaptability of the pre-capitalist relations of

production in the countryside whose replacement was
directly linked to their own ascendancy over the rural
oligarchy

Through its probing class analysis, Seven Essays
perceives the particularity of Peru's under-development
and unlocks the doors to its national history and
culture.

Whereas this was relevant for all classes, it

was an especially critical revelation for the Peruvian

proletariat.
Mariategui'

s

Unfortunately, for many decades after
death, the proletariat, given the weakness
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of its leadership, was overwhelmed in
its own narrow

trade union battles, and it never learned
the profound
lessons of Seven Essays; at times it even
cultivated
its own "criollo"

[creole] biases against the

indigenous population.
There are two main points in Seven Essays

.

The

first is that the Indian question is central to

Peruvian society.

The second is that this question is

expressed in every realm of Peru's political and social
life.

To illustrate this second aspect, Mariategui

uses examples of education, religion, government, and

literature 17

.

Mariategui' s analysis of the Indian question

starts from the growing awareness that the vast

majority of Peru's population (at that time about 80%)
were still wedded to

a

semi-feudal agrarian system of

production and distribution, and lived in conditions of
absolute poverty contrasted with the urban population.
He saw Peru as a dual society:

one part was largely

rural,

indigenous and oppressed, and the other was

urban,

"criollo" [creole], and relatively well off.

17

The way and sequence in which Mariategui arranged the
entire content of the Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian
Reality (1971) certainly reflects a strictly materialistmethodological foundation:
1st) "Outline of the Economic
Evolution"; 2nd) "The Problem of the Indian"; 3rd) "The
problem of the Land"; 4th) "Public Education"; 5th) "The
Religious Factor"; 6th) "Regionalism and Centralism"; 7th)
"Literature on Trial".
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This did not mean that the urban proletariat
directly
o ppressed the rural Indians,

enjoyed

a

privilege.

but it did mean that they

position of relative economic and social
In concrete political terms,

this meant

that there were objective divisions between the urban

proletariat and its natural ally, the rural indigenous
population; these divisions were based on their
f ©rent

relations to the dominant mode of production

and were reflected in very real differences in standard
of living and economic opportunity.

It was the central

task of the Peruvian revolution to go beyond these

divisions and forge

strategic alliance between

a

workers and peasants.

Evidently, this alliance did not

appear spontaneously but had to be consciously built by
the proletarian party.

Unlike functionalist sociologists, however,

Mariategui's concept of dualism (i.e. the urban

proletariat/the rural indigenous population) was based
on a class framework 18

.

Thus, the urban proletariat

18

Mariategui in his interpretation of the Peruvian
social reality of his times, he tried to overcome the
primacy of the object (i.e. the social structure) over the
subject (i.e. the social agents) in functionalism, and the
His
social determinism typical of orthodox Marxism.
analysis (comprised in Seven Essays 1971) had been
articulated within a conception of social praxis that
emphasized that human beings are neither to be treated as
passive objects, nor as wholly free subjects. Mariategui's
approach concedes central importance to class divisions in
Peru, according to which class divisions largely determine
In this
or govern the alignments of other institutions.
view, the specific class conflicts described by Mariategui
,

,
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obviously did not enjoy the same degree
of privilege as
the urban bourgeoisie; rather, its
relation
to

production and its conditions of life were
in general
much more similar to the peasant than the
bourgeoisie.
Because of the persistence of collective
forms of

ownership and semi-feudal relations of production
in
the countryside, the Peruvian peasantry,
relative
to

the peasantry in other Latin American nations,
was much
less rooted in small property ownership, and
therefore

had a strong basis for unity with the urban proletariat
in the mission of bringing about socialism in Peru.

Likewise, the urban proletariat in its struggles

capitalism for social ownership of production,
had a basis for unity with the peasantry in resolving
the question dividing all Peruvian society: the "Indian

Question".

Thus the "Indian Question" was the key to

the national question, the forging of a strong united
nation.

The potential alliance of workers and Indians

was the key political pivot for a revolutionary

resolution of Peru's contradictions (Mariategui, 1971:
22-30; Kapsoli Escudero, 1979: 179-195).

Mariategui

's

particular contribution to the

analysis of the Indian question was to point up the
central importance of property ownership.

This was

in the 1920s Peru, would be ultimately the fundamental motor
of social change, that is, the space in which the Peruvian
socialist revolution had to be envisioned.
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seen essentially as

a

land question.

it was bound up

with the endurance of many aspects of
pre-capitalist,
feudal modes of production in the countryside,

and the

persistence of Indian traditions of communal ownership.
This corresponded to the relative weakness of

capitalism in Peru and the underdevelopment of its
ruling class.

Insofar as the consolidation of a

Peruvian nation was necessarily linked to development
of capitalism, national formation was also constrained

(Mariategui,

1971:

Mariategui'

s

31-76,

Levano,

1969:

47-188).

materialist analysis contrasts

sharply with classical liberal attempts to explain the
Indian question simply in terms of racial or religious
differences, or as an ideological remnant of colonial
domination.

Thus Mariategui asserted,

The land tenure system determines the
political and administrative system of the
nation.
The agrarian problem, which the
republic has not yet been able to solve,
dominates all other problems.
Democratic and
liberal institutions cannot flourish or
operate in a semi-feudal economy (Mariategui,
1971:

34).

The agrarian problem is first and foremost
the problem of eliminating feudalism in Peru,
which should have been done by the
democratic-bourgeois regime that followed the
War of Independence.
But in its one hundred
years as a republic, Peru has not had a
genuine bourgeois class, a true capitalist
class.
The old feudal class -camouflaged or
disguised as a republican bourgeoisie - has
kept its position (Mariategui, 1971: 32).
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Mariategui does not limit his discussion to
the
semi-feudal economy inherited from the Spaniards,

as do

many "criollo" economists.

He underlines the

durability of the pre-feudal relations of production,
or "Indian communism".

He points out that despite the

dominance of the semi-feudal property relations
introduced by the Spaniards during the colonial period,
the Andean people continue to exercise various forms of

association in production that approximate the ancient
ayllu

.

The ayllu is

a

communistic formation based on

sharing of the major means of production and

distribution (Mariategui, 1971: 56-58).

"Communism",

observed Mariategui, "has continued to be the Indian's
only defense" from exploitation (Mariategui, 1971: 27).

Mariategui saw this enduring system of cooperation not
as some tourist relic, but,

in a typically political

way, as the basis for linking the indigenous population

to the socialist revolution 19
19

:

Mariategui position parallels in many ways with
Lenin's own views on the mix, which was also a form of rural
collectivism in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik
Revolution (Mariategui, 1971: 44-45). Mariategui, like
Lenin, also rejected the idea that the persistence of such
pre-capitalist forms necessitated a prolonged period of
capitalist development as a "prerequisite" for socialism.
Instead, they considered such forms of rural collectivism as
a foundation for the transition to socialism.
The former
theory (i.e. the "two stages" theory of building socialism),
was on the other hand, supported by the Western European
social-democracy and Bukharin's followers in the Soviet
Union.
It might be argued that because today the ayllu is
but a remnant of the past and the majority of Peru's rural
population are either small property owners or rural
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Faith in the renaissance of the Indian is
not
pinned to the material process of
"Westernizing" the Quechua country.
The soul
of the Indian i s not raised by the whitP
man's civiliza t ion or alphabet but by the
myth, t he idea of the Socialist revolution
(our emphasis)
The hope of the Indian is
absolutely revolutionary (Mariatequi, 1971
.

*

28-29)

Starting with this assessment of the centrality of
the Indian guestion, Mariategui then goes on to develop

his analysis by taking on four national issues that

were vehemently debated at the time, and very much the
focus of liberal and radical reform movements.

Those

were the problems of education, religion, government
de-centralization, and literature.

These problems

inspired many of the activists and intellectuals who
proletarians, or a combination of both, and because only 40%
of Peru's population is strictly rural
he agrarian
question is therefore no longer (if it ever was) a central
one.
However, this argument must rely on a strictly
quantitative approach to class analysis and fails to take
into account the qualitative way in which the indigenous
question continues to dominate all Peruvian politics, that
is, urban and rural.
It requires that one overlook the
relatively tenuous hold of capitalist relations even in
urban areas and the continual emergence of new forms of
cooperation and indigenous consciousness, despite the
obvious process of integration in the imperialist system
most clearly felt in the metropolitan centers (Liss 1984:
127-148; Chavarria, 1979).
The persistence of this question
explains, in part, the insurgency of "Sendero Luminoso" (the
Shining Path guerrillas which, though based in the isolated
Ayacucho region, had managed in the beginning to stir
sympathies throughout the nation). Nevertheless, failing to
take the materialist approach that Mariategui followed so
unfailingly, "Sendero" has chosen to completely ignore the
process of transformation of the Peruvian countryside in the
twentieth century; particularly, the extensive agrarian
reform of the Velasco era (1968-1975).
Politically and
militarily, they act as if Peru was still a nation occupied
by the Spaniards.
,
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revolved around the socialist movement
to seek a more
scientific analysis and a suitable
strategy for social
change.
The spontaneous ideas fostered by
the liberal
reformers exercised considerable influence
within
the

revolutionary movement.

Liberal reforms supported the

"criollo" chauvinism that in the last instance

prevented the socialists from developing
national strategy and democratic program.

established for the first time

a

a

truly

Mariategui

clear alternative with

regard to both dominant liberal thinking and the

reactionary view, of the oligarchy.

Mariategui'

solution reflected the spontaneous radicalism of the
student and workers' movements as well as the

discontent of the radicalized intelligentsia Mariategui
his solution a Marxist foundation by grounding it
in a concrete analysis of Peruvian history and

political economy.

3.4.1

Education

Mariategui rejected the ineffective attempts at

educational reform encouraged by the liberal

bourgeoisie on the grounds that they ignored the
central problem, namely, the educational impoverishment
of the rural population, most clearly manifested in the

dramatic illiteracy rate.
explained,

"...

"National education", he

does not have a national spirit;
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instead it has the spirit of colonialism
and the

colonizer" 20 (Mariategui, 1971: 78).

The liberal

reforms of the day reflected the influence of
North
American pragmatism, an influence quite ritual
with the
bourgeoisie's response to the feudal idealism so dearly

revered by the oligarchy.

To both the liberal reforms

and the traditional rigidity of the colonial system,

Mariategui counterposed the proletarian program.

This

included such important developments as the

Universidad Popular Gonzalez Prada",

a

progressive

university at which he taught and served as rector.

It

included support for the student movement's demands for

genuine reforms abolishing the subservience and elitism
that pervaded the traditional educational system.

But

above all, Mariategui brought to these spontaneous

alternatives
basis for

a

a

more profound objective:

to lay the

socialist Peru capable of implementing a

20

We would like to underline the fact that although we
are actually utilizing the English translation of the Seven
Essays (1971, translated by Marjorie Urquidi)
it will not
force us to follow in every case that translation.
From the
point of view of the Spanish original which we initially
consulted, we encountered many cases where the English
edition did not achieve a suitable interpretation. Take for
instance the passage that precedes this footnote:
"La
educacion nacional, por consiguiente no tiene un espiritu
nacional: tiene mas bien un espiritu colonial y colonizador"
(Mariategui, 1974: 109).
On the other hand, Urquidi's
translation does not only follow the Spanish original, but
also forces upon the original a disparaging "revision":
"Peruvian education, therefore, has a colonial rather than a
national character.
,

,
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truly national educational reform and eradicating
rural
backwardness

3.4.2

Religion

Mariategui attempted to go beyond the radical
anti -clerical ism that attracted the emerging

proletariat

(a

political sentiment traditionally

associated to liberal Jacobinism)

,

but whose logical

social base was among the petty bourgeoisie.

He also

repudiated the idealization of the Inca religion by
demonstrating the material basis for the religious
beliefs in the economic relations of society, and the
close connection between the state and religion.

For

Mariategui, the problem was not organized religion "per
se"

religion was but

a

reflection of the economic and

class relations within society.

The problem was not

the Catholic Church's organic connection with the

oligarchy ever since the Spanish conquest, as many
liberals maintained, but the social order upon which
the oligarchy rested.

As pointed out:

Socialism.
considers that ecclesiastical
forms and religious doctrines are produced
and sustained by the socio-economic
structure.
Therefore, it is concerned with
changing the latter and not the former.
Socialism regards mere anti-clerical activity
as a liberal bourgeois pastime.
In Europe,
anti-clericalism is characteristic of
countries where the Protestant Reformation
has not unified civil and religious
conscience and where political nationalism
and Roman universalism live in either open or
.

.
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latent conflict, which compromise can
moderate but not halt or resolve (Mariateaui
y
1971:

151).

Mariategui'

s

'

reflections on religion in Seven

Essays go beyond the critigue of the "a priori" anti-

clericalism of some liberal intellectuals.

He clearly

understood that anti-clericalism was an inadequate
instrument for understanding some of the most profound

sentiments of the popular masses.

The rejection of

such attitudes runs parallel with his aversion towards
a

purely transcendental rationalism.
In the center of his position we find an

examination of the real levels of consciousness of the
indigenous population.

Mariategui clearly realized

that revolutionaries cannot obstinately ignore the

religious dimension.

Mariategui recognized religious

alienation, which he considered to be the result of

ecclesiastic social organization.

But he also

acknowledged the existence of the human's authentic
concern with the symbolic and sacred dimension.

Mariategui believed that those who were engaged in
trying to transform social reality through a

revolutionary process, had to understand profoundly the

phenomenology of the sacred, as well as the mechanisms
of the use of religion as

"

instrumentum regni"

[instrument of the supreme authority].
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The entire essay, "the Religious Factor" (1971:
124-152), is grounded on this polarity, which finds its

most evident expression in the continuous and

systematic opposition established by the author between
the religious and the ecclesiastic

:

Bringing the gospel to Spanish America must
not be judged as a religious undertaking, but
as the ecclesiastic enterprise it has been
almost since the beginning of Christianity.
Only a powerful ecclesiastic organization,
able to mobilize militias of battle-hardened
missionaries and priests, was capable of
colonizing people in faraway and exotic lands
for the Christian faith (Mariategui, 1971:
142)

.

the Inquisition behaved more like a
political than religious institution
(Mariategui, 1971: 144)
.

.

.

From this broadened perspective regarding the

appreciation of the religious phenomenon in general,

Mariategui attempts to "read" Inca religion through one
of the most renowned contributions to comparative

history of religions and contemporary anthropology,
that is, James George Frazer's The Golden Bough: A

Study in Magic and Religion (1922)
we encounter, once more,

Mariategui'

s

a

21
.

At this point

consistent attitude in

theoretical practice.

On the one hand, he

critically appropriates the results provided by the

In "Presencia de J.G. Frazer en la obra de
Mariategui" [Presence of J.G. Frazer in the Works of
Mariategui] (1982: 23-34), Antonio Melis offers an
interesting and thorough study of Mariategui 's critical
utilization of Frazer for the analysis of Inca religion.
21
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sciences, abandoning in passing any

pretension of transforming Marxism into
doctrine.

"totalizing"

a

On the other hand, and in more specific

terms, he challenges the most prominent thinkers of
his

own epoch.

Regarding Mariategui

's

interpretation of

the indigenous religious beliefs and his utilization of
the available historical sources, the author claims

that Spanish chroniclers could not offer

a

panorama

w °rthy of consideration of the Inca religion because of

their own religious prejudices.

To the colonizer's

vision of that religion, linked to their hostile idea
of the "extirpation of idolatries", Mariategui opposes

an interpretation founded on the paradoxically secular

character of Inca religious beliefs.

He condemns as

clearly erroneous the interpretation of the historians
who believe to have found a resemblance between Latin

America and Hindu religion (Mariategui, 1971: 126).
observes that the Hindu religion is in obvious

contradiction with the Inca religion:
The Inca religion lacked the spiritual power
to resist conversion.
Some historians deduce
from philological and archeological evidence
that the Inca mythology was related to the
Hindu.
But their belief rests on
similarities of form, not on really spiritual
or religious similarities.
The basic
characteristics of the Inca religion are its
collective theocracy and its materialism.
These characteristics differentiate it from
the essentially spiritual Hindu religion
(Mariategui, 1971: 125-126).

He
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According to Mariategui, the political aspect prevails
over the spiritual.

To illustrate this point the

author utilizes Frazer's Golden Bough (Mariategui,
1971:
E.

126)

,

Valcarcel

as we noted above.
'

s

He disagreed with Luis

interpretation that the Inca mythology

lacked an idea of a "beyond" world:

Without sharing the conclusion of
Valcarcel that the man of Tawantinsuyo had
virtually no idea of a "beyond", or behaved
as though he had none, we cannot be oblivious
to the tenuous and sketchy nature of his
metaphysics. The Quechua religion was a
moral code rather than a metaphysical
concept, which brings us much closer to China
than to India. State and church were
absolutely inseparable; religion and politics
recognized the same principles and the same
authority. Religion functioned in terms in
society.
From this point of view, the Inca
religion opposed to the religions of the Far
East in the same that the latter, as pointed
out by James George Frazer, opposed the
Graeco-Roman civilization (Mariategui, 1971:
.

.

.

126)

.

Above all, Mariategui

's

main interest is to

underscore the fundamentally uneven encounter produced
between the two civilizations in the sixteenth century,
in the context of the Spanish conquest.

From the point

of view of its theoretical reflection on religion, his

conclusions bear an urgent political significance.
Indeed, Mariategui claims that the absence of an

authentically religious tension may be designated as
one of the causes that facilitated the Inca defeat by
the Spaniards.

Given the theocratic character of Inca
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society,

in which religion was the state,

the author

points out the following:
... on the ruins of the empire, in which
church and state had been one, anew theocracy
was built.
In this theocracy, the
latif undium, an economic mandate, was born of
the "encomienda" an administrative,
spiritual, and religious mandate.
The friars
who took solemn possession of the Inca
temples.
Perhaps a certain Thomist
predestination decreed that the Dominicans,
masters in the scholarly art of reconciling
Christianity with pagan tradition, should
install themselves in the temple of the sun
(Mariategui, 1971: 131-132).
,

At a political level, Mariategui's approach to the

religious problem promises an innovative and

potentially rich way of elucidating the relations
between Marxism and different ideologies and

religions 22

.

Government De-Centralization

3.4.3

Peru is explicitly divided into three distinct

geographical and social areas:
jungle.

coast,

sierra, and

The coast, especially the capital city of

Lima, was the cradle of "criollo" [creole] culture and

capitalism; the sierra, relatively isolated, was

dependent (economically and politically) on the coastal
cities; the jungle was till largely underdeveloped and
We believe that an examination of Mariategui's
general and susceptible attitude toward religion, may have
constituted an instrumental device in the subsequent
articulation of theology of liberation in Latin America;
perhaps the tendencies closer to Marxism.
22
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sparsely populated.

The chief regional contradiction

was between coast and sierra:

"The Peru of the coast,

heir of Spain and the conquest, controls the Peru of
the sierra from Lima; but it is not demographically and

spiritually strong enough to absorb it.
is still to be accomplished"

Peruvian unity

(Mariategui,

1971:

164).

This testified to the incomplete formation of the

Peruvian nation and the incapacity of both colonialism
and capitalism to forge an economically and politically

integrated nation, in which coast and sierra would both
be consolidated parts of a national whole.
In response to the divisions within Peru,

and

increasingly dominant role of Lima, various proposals
for "de-centralization" were introduced.

Mariategui

criticized these reforms as centralist at heart, only
aimed at tightening the control of the capital over the
hinterlands, or relieving the central government of

responsibility for financing local services.

They were

but superficial administrative shuffles that failed to

address the central problem of the Indian question.
Instead, Mariategui insisted:

Any formal triumph of decentralization and
autonomy is subordinate to the cause of the
Indian, which must be defended and given
first place in the revolutionary program of
the vanguard (Mariategui, 1971: 172).
In other words, the key to national integration and de-

centralization rested on the liberation of the rural
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population from poverty and discrimination.

This was a

task that neither the oligarchy nor the liberal

reformers could carry out with their "decentralization" schemes.

Only a powerful (centralized)

system of revolutionary authority could carry out

successful de-centralization program based on
of agrarian reform and national unity 23

3.4.4

a

a

policy

.

Literature
In Seven Essays

.

Mariategui links the historical

development of Peruvian literature with the nation's
economic and social development (Mariategui, 1971: 182"If the indigenous question is part of politics,

287):

economics, and sociology, it cannot be absent from

literature and art" (Mariategui, 1971: 269).

He

reviews colonial literature as an imported product

devoid of any national spirit.
"criollism)

Criollo culture (i.e.

"has not been able to flourish in our

literature as

a

current with a national spirit first of

all because the criollo does not yet represent our

nationality" (Mariategui 1971: 270).
toward

a

The first steps

genuinely national literary expression were

taken by the contemporaries who brought to the fore the

For an excellent and clarifying discussion of this
apparent paradox see Levano's "Mariategui: La voz del Peru
integral" [Mariategui: The Voice of Integral Peru] (1969:
47-188)
23
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central images of indigenous life (e.g. Cesar Vallejo
and Luis Valcarcel)

These were the first spontaneous

.

signs of a national consciousness, itself based on the

economic transformation of Peruvian society.

The

earlier rebellion of urban non-conformists had an anti-

colonial spirit, but because it was apolitical, it
could not project

a

positive national alternative 24

.

The new "indigenista" literature bore the first signs
of a partisan and explicitly national stance,

just as

Mariategui's analysis of literature was based, in his
own words, on an "explicit revolutionary and socialist

partnership"
Finally, Mariategui's Seven Essays is

uncompromisingly and outspokenly partisan.

Yet,

it is

a work clearly devoid of any dogmatic tendency to

repeat the generalities of socialist theory as a
substitute for the creation of

situated revolutionary policy.

a local,

concretely

An appropriate

illustration of his anti-dogmatic approach has been

definitely registered in the following passage:
Because of the special character of Peruvian
literature, it cannot be studied within the
framework of classicism, romanticism, and
modernism; nor of ancient, medieval, and modern;
I
nor of popular and literary poetry, et cetera.
This trend which came to be known as "colonida", for
it came from an outlandish literary magazine bearing that
included the Peruvian writers Manuel
same title (Colonida)
Gonzalez Prada and Abraham Valdelomar (Chang Rodriguez,
31 - 43
1986
24

,

:

)

.
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g hall not use th e M arxist classif icat nn nf
li 1:era ture as feudal or aris toc ratic,
bourgeois nr
jjjToletar lan
OU r emphasis).
in order not to
str e ngt hen the impression that I
have organized my
case aiong poUCica! or class lines,
I
it on aesthetic history and criticism. shall base
serve as a method of explanation rather This will
than as a
theory that a priori (the author's emphasis)
judges and interprets works and their
authors
(Manategui, 1971: 190-191).
i

(

Mariategui's work remains the seminal scientific
work
on modern Peruvian society precisely because
it focuses
on Peru's historical reality and brings
marxism to

bear

to explain it in all its originality and detail
(Chang

Rodriguez, 1986; Melis, 1980).

3.5

Mariategui's Revolutionary Internationalism
Given the richness of Mariategui's analysis of

Peruvian society, it is not difficult to understand how
he can be characterized as merely a nationalist or

proponent of indigenous independence.

Regardless, if

we are to take Mariategui as a whole, it becomes

obvious that his analysis of Peruvian reality is

directly related to, and based on,
internationalism.

a

thoroughgoing

This can be confirmed on several

different levels.
First of all,

Mariategui's maturity as an expert

on Peruvian reality paralleled his development as an

internationalist.

In his most productive years, he

corresponded and collaborated with revolutionaries and

revolutionary-minded intellectuals throughout the
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hemisphere, from Juan Marinello of Cuba to Waldo Frank
in the United States.

Amauta

.

the magazine founded by

Mariategui, declared its solidarity with the Cuban and

Nicaraguan revolutionary movements and the successful
Bolshevik Revolution.

In other words,

in addition to

being at the center of the revolutionary current in
Peru, he was also the principal conduit to the

international movement.

Secondly, Mariategui'

European experience, by his own admission, represented
a

turning point in his political development.

Mariategui witnessed the Italian and French working
class in a period of dramatic development, in large

part inspired by the Bolshevik victory.

He began to

comprehend the immense potential of the organized

working class for transforming society.

He also

observed first hand the damaging effect of opportunism
in the movement,

and consistently united with the

communist split from the second International 25 (for
The Second International was a formation of socialist
It was
and workers' parties, mostly based in Europe.
divided first of all over the question of World War I. One
section, led by Karl Kautsky, left the doors open for the
individual parties in each country to support their own
nation's role in the war. The section led by Lenin and the
Bolshevik party, followed by Leon Trotsky and Rosa
Luxemburg, called for workers to oppose the war as an
imperialist one in which the working class could only become
cannon fodder defending their "own" bourgeoisie. Later, the
decisive split in the Second International occurred oversupport for the Bolshevik revolution. The Kautsky section
withheld its support on the basis that the revolution was
The Bolsheviks spearheaded the organization
not democratic.
of the Third International, based on defense of the
25
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example, Mariategui attended the 1921 founding
congress
of the Italian communists at Livorno)

.

After his

European experience, he returned to Peru determined to
take up his internationalist responsibility and prepare
the political and ideological terrain for the growing

Peruvian socialist movement (Nunez, 1978).

As would

any serious internationalist, he understood that

Peruvian socialism could not be

a

"carbon copy" of

European or Soviet socialism, but there is no
insinuation in his theory or practice that his quest
for originality was based on a rejection of other

experiences
Third, Mariategui' s adherence to the process of

consolidating the international working-class movement
around the political line of the Third International
(Comintern) was fairly consistent.

All attempts to

infer political differences or underlying disaffection

from the Third International, and Leninism, rely on

trivial points, speculation or remote inference.
instance, many have implied that Mariategui

For

's

preference for naming the organization of the Peruvian

revolution "socialist" instead of "communist" reflects
Bolshevik Revolution and the consolidation of a
revolutionary wing of the worker's movement in Europe and
internationally.
By 1921, this split had resulted in the
formation of separate parties in most European nations, with
the reformist parties adhering to the Second (SocialDemocratic) International and the revolutionary parties to
the Third (Communist) International.
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a

principled difference over the vanguard party.

To

support this idea, one only has to "forget" that

Mariategui explicitly rejected the multi-class party
both in theory and practice when he rejected the Second

International, APRA, and the revisionist theses they
proposed.

as Jorge Falcon has pointed out:

Or,

"The

discussion over the clothing has overlooked... the
anatomy" (1970: 56).

Another approach has been to try to prove that

Mariategui was moving away from the Comintern (the

organization of the Third International) and toward

a

formal break with the international communist movement.
The evidence for this argument revolves largely around

Mariategui's disagreements with the leadership of the
Comintern at the 1929 Buenos Aires conference of Latin

American communists.

The controversy was over the

Comintern's line calling for national self-

determination foro the indigenous population, and the
formation of an Indian republic out of portions of
several South Americans nations.

This was based on an

inadequate overall framework that underestimated the

extent to which nations had already developed in Latin

America and failed to make any distinctions between
Latin America and other regions of former colonial
world.

The Comintern leadership at the conference

paralleled in

a

rather mechanical way, the indigenous
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question in Latin America with the national
question in
Europe and the Soviet Union.
in fact, however,
the

indigenous population of Latin America had never

constituted

a

separate nation, and 400 years of

colonial domination made the Latin American continent
one of the most developed (i.e. in capitalist
terms)

within the colonial world.

Finally, Peru's

collectivist traditions were definitely not the same as
those of feudal Europe.
Mariategui and the Peruvian delegation intensely

opposed the Comintern leadership at the conference and
insisted that its position had no basis in the history
and the contemporary reality of Latin America.

Peruvians instead struggled for

a

The

conception of the

indigenous question that placed the Indian regions in
the broader context of the existing nations in Latin

America, and stressed their transformation into

socialist nations (Mariategui, 1971: 22-30; Flores
Galindo, 1982: 15-36).

Mariategui

's

differences with the Comintern

representatives at this conference were therefore
important ones.

However, there is no basis for

deducing from the serious divergences that took place
in this conference,

communism.

that Mariategui was defecting from

In the first place, the debate over the

Latin American indigenous nations did not represent at
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that time, nor has it since,

a

major line of

demarcation within Latin American communism 2

^*.

Secondly, there were many dubious positions coming
out
of the Comintern during this period including many,

like the one on Indian nations, that have long since

been abandoned.

Finally, no matter how secondary this

debate was in the historical broader sense (and to our

specific research), the fact of the matter is that

Mariategui never once gave any indication (either
during or after the conference) that he was actually

re-evaluating his internationalist allegiance.

All

attempts to prove that Mariategui was inclined toward
such disengagement are based on dubious inferences and

speculation, not on fact.
All of the attempts to imply a tendency by

Mariategui to abandon the communist movement correspond
with efforts to dissociate Mariategui from the
theoretical principles of Leninism.

Perhaps the

boldest and most sophisticated effort has been

advocated by intellectuals identified with the
ideological assumptions of APRA, who have tried to

appropriate Mariategui (with some re-arrangement) as
26

Mar iategui s position on the Indian question which
had been definitely expounded in his Seven Essays (1971: 22
30) and commented in other writings, became the basic
political line and theoretical approach to their own
indigenous populations (e.g. Colombia) embraced by other
Latin American progressive students and intellectuals (Liss
1984
149)
'

:
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their own.

Such is the case of Chang-Rodrlguez
and his
interesting notion of "eclecto-Marxism"
(an amalgam
of

Marxism and other interpretive
techniques mostly
utilized in literary criticism, but
turned by

Mariategui into

a

"methodological principle"

implemented in the interpretation of
social reality)
that he ascribes to Mariategui in an
effort to

demonstrate the negligible weight that
Leninism had in
the latter's whole theoretical outlook
(Chang-

Rodnguez

,

1986

:

183 - 204 ).

The basic problem with this

position is that the "Apristas" would have to
overlook
Mariategui 's decisive break with Haya de la Torre
in

1928 when the latter moved to found a Peruvian
party

based on social-democratic principles and the
middle
class,

in direct opposition to the principles of the

Third International (which was constitutionally

Leninist in its strategic and therefore organizational
approach to the problem of socialist revolution at

world level)
break.

,

a

as well as the polemics that preceded the

This crucial political controversy developed

between the "Aprista" Haya de la Torre and Mariategui
in 1928

,

has been investigated and discussed by many

Latin American historians (e.g. Davis, 1972
Franco,
1978

;

1982

:

3 - 22

;

Levano,

Meseguer Ilian, 1974

:

1970

:

168 - 169

159 - 165 ).

;

:

183 - 191

;

Luna Vegas,
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Although the fundamental purpose
of our research
is not to present Mariategui
as the
"ultimate Latin

American Leninist"

27
,

we must point out that his

theoretical adherence to Leninism is
explicitly
declared in his works, and also has been
well

documented by many historians and political
commentators (e.g. Choy et al., 1970; Del
Prado, 1970
1972; Luna Vegas, 1978).
This is evident not

&

only in

his direct allusions to Lenin and the
Bolshevik

Revolution, but in his fundamental adherence to
the

Leninist theories of imperialism, the state, and
the

construction of

a

vanguard worker's party (and its

instrumental notion of the "professional
revolutionary")

.

Nonetheless, Mariategui did not

simply nod approval of Lenin, but in his own analysis
of imperialism, the state, and party verified the same

revolutionary principles that Lenin had come to
a

it.

At

more formal level, Mariategui like Lenin, applied the

existing body of Marxist theory to the concrete

conditions in his own country and took into account the

qualitative transformations that capitalism underwent
with the emergence of imperialism in the twentieth

27

According to our perspective and undertaking (i.e.
the identification and analysis of a legitimate Latin
American philosophical discourse and how it gets critically
articulated with regard to the European philosophical
tradition)
this Leninist component in Mariategui is perhap
the least appealing and obsolete aspect of his thought.
,
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century.

He also concluded that
socialism would not be

possible without

a

qualitative transformation of the

state under working class direction
and

a

revolution

led by the most advanced elements
of the proletariat.
To conclude, a comprehensive
characterization of

Mariategui leads to the inescapable conclusion
that his
ability to penetrate the essence of Peruvian
reality,

and intervene in its resolute way, is
inextricably

bound up with his internationalist convictions.

His

internationalism gave him the determination that
the
Peruvian revolution was one component of a broad
historical process; his European experience brought
home to him the revolutionary capacity of a
politically

mature and well-organized proletariat, the unfavorable

consequences of opportunism in the working-class
movement, the relevance of the struggle against
fascism, and the need to organize broad democratic

fronts against such threatening political tendencies.
He could recognize that Peru's working class was still
in its earliest stages of development, an understanding

decisive to his own commitment to the construction of

revolutionary party.

a

Mariategui was evidently

persuaded by the unmistakable contrasts between Europe
and Latin America and never tried to apply mechanically
the experiences of European history to Peru; on the

contrary, he directed his analysis on the

204

particularities of the Peruvian class
struggle, its
economic underdevelopment,
unfulfilled national
consolidation, the centrality of
the Indian question,
the pre-capitalist elements in
production.

Despite the obvious parallels
between Peru and
Italy, a country also divided
into two distinct geoeconomic zones (i.e. the industrially
developed urban
North and the impoverished rural South)
Mariategui
never argued by analogy, but instead
analyzed
,

the

specific Peruvian situation.

His appropriation of the

Marxist methodology necessarily assumed
an undoubtedly
creative disposition, for it was one of
the first

applications of Marxism to the concrete conditions
in
Latin America during the age of imperialism.
An exchange between Haya de la Torre and

Mariategui in 1928, cited by Cesar Levano in his
"Lenin
y Mariategui en nuestro tiempo"
in Our Time],

[Lenin and Mariategui

is particularly revealing.

Torre protests against Mariategui'

s

Haya de la

constant attempts

to situate the Peruvian revolution as part of an

international revolutionary process, and his

straightforward identification with the revolutionary
process in Europe and the Soviet Union.

Haya de la

Torre wanted to confine the Peruvian revolution to the

project of national democratic reform.

"We will make

the revolution without mentioning socialism", he said,
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"but instead by distributing the land and
struggling

against imperialism".

To which Mariategui responded:

"We are anti-imperialists because we are
Marxists,

because against capitalism we pose socialism as an

antagonistic system destined to succeed it" (Levano,
1970:

168-169).

Therefore, Mariategui's national

revolution was conceived as an integral part of the
international process of proletarian liberation from
the burden of capitalism.

3.6

Marxism As the "Science of Utopia"
The purpose of this chapter has been to summarize

Jose Carlos Mariategui's contributions to revolutionary

theory in general, and particularly to Latin American

intellectual history.

We have only touched on some of

the numerous debates surrounding Mariategui that have

assumed

a

growing significance in recent years as his

work has become

a

reference point in the struggles for

national independence and socialism in Latin America.
However, given that Mariategui's theories themselves

emerged in the heat of an intense ideological struggle
among revolutionary-minded forces, they can really be

understood only in that precise context.

Mariategui's

main contributions to revolutionary theory and Latin

American political philosophy, which we have tried to
outline, must be seen in the light of

a

wider process
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of establishing a political and ideological
foundation

for socialism in Latin America.

This required the

development of conscious forces within society, based
in the working-class and peasant-movements, grounded

with an internationalist perspective and

a clear

political understanding of the national democratic
struggle.

While Mariategui understood that the

twentieth century was, in objective terms, the age of
imperialism (in this he coincided with Lenin), he also

understood that radical social transformation would not
come about spontaneously.

He was convinced that

revolution could not happen without the decisive role
of the subjective factor (i.e. human will power)

and

its indispensable class consciousness (i.e. the working

class and its allies, ideologically and politically

armed with

a

revolutionary "myth")

THe present day significance of Mariategui is

therefore not just his brilliant analysis of Peruvian
society, but his approach, his method, and above all

his dedication to strengthening the conscious forces

who had to address the task of transforming that
society.

At a time when the Latin American

revolutionary movement is renovating its capacity for
conscious leadership, with

a

renewed ideological

struggle, Mariategui has many lessons to offer.
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So far, we have documented that
in spite of

Mar lategui s short life his work
is exceptionally farreaching and diverse. This fact allows
many distinct
utilizations of Mariategui's thought to
emerge
different viewpoints.
From our own perspective, as we
have suggested in the conclusion of
chapter 2, we will
restrict our approach to some philosophical
and
'

theoretical aspects of Mariategui's thought.

For this

reason, the "Ariadne's thread" of our distinctive

interpretation will underscore the elements we consider
to be the most instrumental in grasping his

idiosyncratic appropriation of the Marxist discourse
and the extent of that interpretation regarding Latin

American struggle to create an authentic philosophical
discourse vis

a vis

the European philosophical

influence

Mariategui was not

a

totally systematic thinker,

for most of his entire intellectual production is

compiled in articles of journalistic length.
the rare exception of the Seven Essays

,

Even in

which his

perhaps his most sizable work, Mariategui himself

points out that his
work has developed as Nietzsche would
have wished, for he did not love authors who
strained after the intentional, deliberate
production of a book, but rather whose
thought formed a book spontaneously and
without premeditation. Many projects for
books occur to me as I lie awake, but I know
beforehand that I shall carry out only those
.

.

.

208

t° which

am summoned by an imperious
force
n
llfS arS ° ne P rocess
And
if I hooe tn h
some mer it recognized, it
~ f ° 1 owln( another
3
of Nietzsche's
?;
precepts
I have written with my
blood
(Manategui 1971: XXXV).
I

^

-

,•

,

However, we contend that Mariategui
had accomplished a
remarkable consistency throughout his
entire

theoretical production after he devoted
his thoughts
and his political action to the attainment
of socialist
revolution in Peru. This consistency is
precisely what
we will try to demonstrate by assuming the
legitimacy
of Mariategui' s understanding of Marxism
underlying his

critico-political activity.

We believe that such

coherence derives fundamentally from the synthesis
that

Mariategui himself establishes between theory and
praxis.

with regard to this approach to the guestion

of theory and praxis, he indicates that "the faculty
of

thinking history and the faculty of making or creating
history, are integrated" (Mariategui, 1970b: 119).
a

in

more concrete and personal manner he declares in the

introduction to the Seven Essays the following:
Once again I repeat that I am not an
impartial, objective critic. My judgments
are nourished by my ideals, my sentiments, my
passions.
I have an avowed and resolute
ambition:
to assist in the creation of
Peruvian socialism
I am far removed from
the academic techniques of the university
scholars [our emphasis] (Mariategui 1971:
XXXVI)
.

Up to now, our interpretive strategy has consisted
of a two-stage approximation to Mariategui 's thought.
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In the first stage, which comprises
the present

chapter, we attempted a broader and more
situational

perspective.

The second stage (i.e. chapter
4), is

installed within

problematic 28

.

a

more specific but significant

in specific,

this problematic is the

P art cu ar conception of Marxist theory that Mariategui
-*-

^-

articulates in its anti-dogmatic appropriation of
that

philosophical discourse.

Thus, the first stage meant

to be an introduction to Mariategui's life and works.
It has been an effort to outline the intrinsic

correlation existing between the terms of "Marxism" and
"revolution" evidenced in Mariategui's life and
thought.

For basically, he could not conceive a

revolution that would not be Marxist, nor

a

Marxism

that would not be revolutionary.
Initially, we have tried to unravel his notion of
a

socialist project for Peru.

In the second stage

last chapter), we will accentuate the strikingly

(i.e.

conspicuous lines that identify Mariategui's unique

understanding of Marxism.

On the other hand, the

second stage, which we have entitled, "Mariategui's

Realist Utopia: Marxism as the 'Science' of the

Necessity for Utopia", pretends to intensify some of

28

We are using the term "problematic" in its
Althusserian connotation. Namely, Althusser designates the
"problematic" as "the particular unity of a theoretical
formation" (Althusser, 1970: 32).
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the perspectives opened by the general
presentation.

We will underscore the original thematization
that

Mariategui presents of the notion of "social myth"
and
its correlation to his particular notion of
"utopia " 29
In order to estimate Mariategui 's theoretical
foresight

and scope we must address the theoretical contributions
of

other thinkers (i.e. within the Marxist theoretical
paradigm) whose works however, were produced after his own

writings.

Accordingly, one of the crucial intentions of

this hermeneutic treatment of Mariategui'

s

thought is to

situate his philosophical conception within the context of
the various European (contemporary)

interpretations of

Marxist philosophical discourse (e.g. Ernst Bloch, Antonio
Gramsci, Karel Kosik, Georg Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse).

29

Unf ortunately the term "utopia" is not only
ambiguous but also misleading. We utilize the term in its
most actualized significance by comparing it to the meaning
given by Bloch (1965), Marcuse (1964??), Neussus (1971), and
in the Latin American cultural milieu, one of the principal
theologians and ideologues of the "theology of liberation"
movement:
Gustavo Gutierrez (1972).
,

CHAPTER

4

MARIATEGUI'S REALIST UTOPIA: MARXISM
AS THE "SCIENCE" OF THE
NECESSITY OF UTOPIA
Marxism therefore is not a
non-utopia, but the genuine,
concretely mediated and
processually open one.
Ernst Bloch
4.1

(

Freedom and Order

)

The Originality of Mariategui's Thought
As we have suggested above, Mariategui's
writings

constitute the expression of

a

thought that specially allows

the redefinition of the problem of the
authenticity of the
Latin American philosophical identity. However,
since his

theoretical practice developed fundamentally guided by
the

paradigm represented by Marxist theory (i.e. its theoretical
matrix)

,

we must first, evaluate the nature of the reception

of Karl Marx's thought present in his works.

This "nouvelle lumiere de l'Amerique", according to

Barbusse's fortunate expression

1

,

read the author of

C apital "with the filter of Italian historicism and its

debates with every transcendental, evolutionist, and

fatalist views of the development of the social relations

characteristic of the II International's Marxism" (Arico,
1978: xv)

and, what is perhaps more important, he read it in

the particular scenario of the post-war Italy's class

struggles.

Born in 1895, of humble origins, self-taught,

'See the introductory section of Chapter 3 for a more
extended reference on Henri Barbusse's remark on Mariategui.
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typographer when he was just an adolescent,
Mariategui
initiated his revolutionary career in 1914 writing

short

articles with many different pseudonyms (e.g.
"Juan
Croniqueur", "Monsieur de Camomille", "Kundall",
"El

cronista criollo", etc.)*

The impact of the Russian

Revolution on his ideological development took place at
an
age not so young as to ignore the enormous significance
of
the first socialist revolution in history, neither so
mature
as to resist its influence, which ultimately "re-shaped"
his

interpretive methods already in progress.
His participation as a founding member of the "Comite
de Propaganda Socialista" [Socialist Propaganda Committee]
in November,

1918 and his comradeship to Argentina's

International Socialist Party are necessarily inscribed in
this context.

It would be, however, very unlikely to affirm

that in that very moment Mariategui had
education.

a

well-bred Marxist

The reception of Marx's thought as much as the

lack of maturity of the classes peculiar to the capitalist

mode of production in Peru, whose level of political

expression were symptomatic of the level of development of
the productive forces, constituted real obstacles for that

possibility.

Thus, the "Mariategui" that in October,

embarked to Europe as

a

1919,

result of the political repression

of Leguia's dictatorship,

passionate revolutionary.

still represented an intuitive and

Nevertheless, with the strength

of his writing and his vigorous imagination he was already
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contributing to the formation of

a

genuine class

consciousness of the Peruvian proletariat and Indian
peasantry.
He travelled to the Italy of the "Communist Councils",

the revolutionary socialist journal "L'Ordine Nuovo", the

Livorno Congress and the foundation of the Italian Communist
Party in January, 1921 (but also Mussolini's Italy with the

resulting advent of fascism)

,

the Italy of a solid

philosophical tradition such as that of Croce 2

,

of a

theoretician like Gobetti 3 who interweaved the latter's
2

Benedetto Croce (1866-1954) was born in Apulia and
attended the University of Rome. A philosopher and theorist
of Italian history, he carried forward the Italian idealist
tradition, helped to translate Hegelianism into a national
intellectual tradition, and emerged by the turn of the
century as probably the country's leading intellectual
figure, a kind of "lay pope", to use Gramsci's language.
he
had a powerful influence upon the young Gramsci during 19151918, and his Prison Notebooks are filled with references to
his work.
His theories are most fully expressed in What is
Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel (1915)
and A History of Italy (1929).
In politics a liberal and an
anti-fascist, he served as Minister of Education in the
Giolitti government in 1920-1921. Following Mussolini's
rise to power he went into retirement and exercised a waning
influence on the Italian scene.

Notwithstanding all the concurring philosophical
persuasions which operate in Mariategui's theoretical
practice, Piero Gobetti (1897-1926) was apparently, the
Italian revolutionary intellectual who exercised the
strongest influence on the Peruvian thinker. He was a
talented young Italian writer who, like Mariategui, was in
part, self-educated and who also launched himself on a
literary career while he was still a young man. He
advocated a revolutionary liberalism, which held that the
industrial workers were the only class that could revitalize
Gobetti wrote
(if not revolutionize) liberal democracy.
prolifically for newspapers and journals and was the
literary drama critic for the communist daily L'Ordine Nuovo
In 1922, he founded his own weekly, La
of Turin.
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Hegelianism with Antonio Labriola's 4
particular reading of
Marxian theory, and to Antonio Gramsci's
Italy (Boggs, 1984

vn-35)

.

With regard to a possible parallelism
between

Manategui and Gramsci, we concur with Arico
that

it might

not be only generational, but also in
view of the following
considerations

Comparable to other unorthodox Marxist thinkers
e belongs to the lineage of the
'rara avis' who
ventured to establish an innovative and original
relationship with reality, in a difficult historic
stage and in a period of dogmatic cristallization
of the workers and socialist international
movement (Arico, 1978: xiii)
This Italian background provides Mariategui with the
vital

training and the theoretical resources that will merge
into
the social science with which he will perform the analysis
of the Peruvian economic and social formation.

Revo lu z i one Liberale which he used to establish his
literary and political opinions. He died in Paris in 1926,
as a result of a severe beating administered earlier by the
Italian fascists for his opposition to their movement.
.

4

Antonio Labriola (1843-1904) was born in Cassino and
went to the University of Naples where he was deeply
influenced by Hegelian philosophy and Mazzinian Liberalism.
He became a schoolteacher in Naples, where he lived until
1874.
He began work in the area of philosophy and history,
and wrote an anti-clerical volume Morality and Religion in
1873.
During the 1880s he gradually moved from liberalism
to Marxism, a shift which is reflected in his On Socialism
(1889). He was a key figure in establishing the Marx-Hegel
connection in Italy. His most well-known work was Essays on
the Materialist Conception of History (1896)
which
apparently had a strong impact on the young Gramsci. While
he integrated Marx into his writings he did not consider
himself a Marxist in any strict sense, and always managed to
keep his distance from the politics of the Second
International
,
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According to Robert Paris
J ose Carlos Mariategui

,

(

La formacion ideolog ic

Mexico: Siglo XXI,

1981),

it is

particularly significant to Mariategui's
methodological
outlook that when the Peruvian revolutionary
observed
closely the vast workers movement which
involved the
industrial triangle formed by Turin, Milan,

and Genoa, he

interpreted the turning point of the European
post-war post
revolutionary ascension as the direct political
result of
the historical maturity of the development of
the forces and

relations of productions in northern Italy.

For that

reason, Paris points out that Mariategui's analysis

downplayed as ultimately decisive factors, events such as
the assassination of Rosa Luxemburg, the setback of the Red

Army in Warsaw or the "Spartakists" uprising in Germany
(Paris,

1981: 89)

In spite of the obvious cosmopolitan

inclination (i.e. "a-political") of most of the traditional
Italian intellectuals, it was precisely that intellectual

community who played
education.

Karolyi 5

,

a

pivotal role in Mariategui

'

It is in Italy where Mariategui meets with Count

and discovers certain works of the Russian

literature such as Lidia Seifulina's Humus (Mariategui,
1971a: 91-94)
In his work "Cartas de Italia" we detect the

influential role of Italian publications such as Avanti
5

.

Former president of the ephemeral Soviet Republic of
Hungary who spent some time in Florence as a political
exile

II
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Soviet

,

Critica Sociale, Umanita Nuova
La—Rivo luzione Liberale

.

.

L'Ordine Nnovn

and

r

From those readings,

Mariategui partially assembles the material that will
eventually constitute the substance of his writings on world
crisis

Subsequently, it will be the global perspective

.

that will help him place the economic and political

evolution of contemporary Peru (Mariategui, 1975, Vol.
3

15-347

II:

6
.

In virtue of Mariategui's intellectual agenda,

after

his return to Peru in March, 1923, he will differ with the

standard characterization held by most of the Latin American
sections of the Comintern regarding the problem of
"accommodating revolutionary action to an exact perception
of reality"

(Mariategui,

1975, Vol.

II:

188)

in the

6

Later, back in Peru (1922), within a period that marks
relative absence in Mariategui's political activism,
certainly forced by the necessary amputation of one of his
legs (Mariategui was afflicted by a bone cancer that
the
inevitably cut his life at barely 35 years old)
Peruvian thinker will approach "less politically compromised
themes" regarding Italy. Refer for instance to "El paisaje
italiano", "Las tres Romas" in El alma matinal v otras
estaciones del hombre de hoy (Mariategui, 1975, Vol. I: 401On his last years of life, definitely his most
430).
productive ones, he wrote a series of articles that in view
of his themes, represented a somewhat peculiar balance to
the "serious" articles on Piero Gobetti, or those devoted to
For
the Italian influence on Latin American culture.
Mariategui, those "atypical" writings form the so-called
"true small events" (Stendhal), conceived to bestow to
writing a realistic dimension, that is, all the rich
political ambience to the Italy from which he learned so
much
a

,
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continent

.

During the First Latin American Communist

Conference celebrated in Buenos Aires (June, 1929)
insist on the

,

he will

question of "how far the situation of the

Latin American republics could be assimilated into that of
the semi-colonial countries" (Mariategui, 1975, Vol. II:
He believed that although "the economic conditions of

187).

these republics are semi-colonial, the national bourgeoisie
who understands that cooperating with imperialism

constitutes the best source of benefits, feels confident

enough of their political power as not to concern themselves
with the national problem" (Mariategui, 1975, Vol. II: 187).
Therefore, "it would be an error to pretend that a

revolutionary nationalist sentiment will take hold of this
social stratum, like the one which in different conditions

represents a factor of anti-imperialist struggle in the
semi-colonial countries subjugated by imperialism in the
last decennials in Asia" (Mariategui, 1975, Vol. II: 187).

Inasmuch as "the creole aristocracies and bourgeoisie do not
feel solidary with the people in virtue of the bond of

a

common history and culture, the nationalist factor is not

decisive nor fundamental in the anti-imperialist struggle of
our people (Mariategui, 1975, Vol. II: 187).
The basic revolutionary strategy dictated by the
Comintern upon the various sections in Latin America and the
semi-colonial countries during the late 1920s, was to
support unconditionally their respective national
bourgeoisies on the grounds that they were potentially
revolutionaries because of their subservient position with
regard to imperialism.
7
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Mariategui will estimate the question of the political

dimension of the behavior of the Latin American social
classes on the basis of the Marxian notion (and its

methodological significance) which states that
the same economic basis, in virtue of innumerable
different empirical circumstances, natural
conditions, racial relations, historical
influences operating from the exterior, etc.,
could present infinite variations and degrees in
their manifestations, which could only be
understood through the analysis of these
empirically given circumstances (Marx, El Capital
V. 3
Siglo XXI, 1981)

.

In agreement with Marx, Mariategui definitely insisted on

the unity

of the economic and social formation at a world

scale where effectively capital constitutes "the starting

phase and its culmination" (Marx, Introduccion senera

critica de la economia oolitica

.

Mexico: Siglo XXI,

a

la

1975),

but where the specificity of the articulation of interests

between the capitalist centers and the "national
bourgeoisie" conditions the political behavior of the
latter.

However, what compromises the "national

bourgeoisie" does not necessarily confine the "colonial" and
"semi-colonial" peoples.

Mariategui contends that as long

as those countries do not posit the question of national

liberation in the center of their struggles in terms of

a

colony/empire dichotomy, it will be the manual laborers and
their allied revolutionary intellectuals, the genuine

depositaries of the idea of "nation", who will redefine the
conflict, since their interests indeed clash against those
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of imperialism and of the "national bourgeoisie"
as well 8

.

As a way of "dissolving" the application of the category
of

"colony" to the economic and political analysis of Latin

America in

a

single formulation, Mariategui affirmed that,

"we are anti-imperialists because we are Marxists, because

against capitalism we pose socialism as an antagonistic

system destined to succeed it" (Levano, 1970: 168-169).

With this formulation, he underscored the importance of
regarding the role of the political in the conceptual
representation of social reality.
Nonetheless, the aspect of Mariategui s works which
'

perhaps shows with more intensity his intellectual and

political talent, is his attempt to reassess the Marxian
notion of the "super-structure" and its political agency

regarding revolutionary social change.

He addressed this

queston by incorporating in his theoretical practice Georges
Sorel's idea of the "myth"; since, according to Mariategui,
"reason nor science are sufficient to placate the necessity
of infinite in man"

(Mariategui,

1975, Vol.

1:412).

If for

Sorel the "men who are participating in a great social

movement always picture their coming action as

a

battle in

which their cause is certain to triumph" (Sorel, 1941: 22);
in Mariategui, this idea assumes the form of a concrete

The relations of interests between "national
bourgeoisie" and foreign capital should be here understood
as the appropriation of a share of the surplus through taxes
by the former and stable political conditions (i.e.
repression) that would guarantee a cheap labor.
8
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revolutionary proposal, for "the proletariat
has a myth:
social revolution and toward that myth it
moves with a
vehement and active faith" (Mariategui,
1975, Vol.

In this way,

I:

415 ).

the Sorelian system of images comes
alive

in Mariategui 's thought in a constructive
proposal

in which

"human will" performs a definite role, since according
to
Mariategui
the strength of the revolutionaries does not reside
in their

science, it resides in their faith, in their passion, in

their will (Mariategui, 1975, Vol.

I:

415).

This

construction evidently and positively revitalizes the role
of ideology insofar as "the strength of the revolutionaries,
is a religious,

a mystic,

spiritual strength, it is the

a

strength of the myth" (Mariategui, 1975, Vol.

I:

416).

In

an article on Gandhi, Mariategui affirms that "the

revolutionary sentiment is

a

(Mariategui,

389).

1975, Vol.

Theses on Feuerbach

,

I:

religious sentiment"

Almost paraphrasing Marx’s

he declares that "the religious myths

have migrated from heaven to earth.

.

.

they are not

celestial, they are human, they are social" (Mariategui,
1975, Vol.

I:

390)

Therefore, Robert Paris' remark may not be after all

inconsequential.

On this point, Paris points out the

following
The myth, the irrational or mystic element,
inherited from Sorel or from Nietzsche emerges
here as the symbol or instrument of a dialectic
that attempts to incorporate the present and its
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goals and proclaim its unity as likewise the
translation of all the problematic and
undemons tr able elements that could be faced in the
1920s Peru with regard to the socialist project
[como la traduccion asimismo de todo cuanto puede
haberen el Peru en los anos 1920 de problematic
y de indemostrable en el proyecto socialista]
(Paris,

1981:

144)

9
.

In this framework, the counterpoint economics-willpower

reaches

a

climax in Mariategui's analysis of the Latin

America's struggles for independence which indicates that
Spanish America could not have achieved its
independence had it not commanded a heroic
generation, sensitive to the emotional tenor of
its time, able and willing to carry out a genuine
revolution.
From this point of view, independence
takes on the appearance of a romantic adventure.
But this not contradict my thesis of an economic
pattern underlying the revolution of liberation.
The directors, "caudillos" and ideologists of
this revolution did not precede or transcend the
,

’Although Paris does not go so far as to suggest that
Mariategui's creative process (at the level of theoryproducing) is better described as eclectic, we do believe,
however, that his thought process could be better understood
if we approach, as a
structural metaphor, CLaude LeviStrauss s notion of "bricoleur" as expressed in his work The
Savage Mind
According to Levi-Strauss,
'

.

the "bricoleur" is adept at performing a large
number of diverse tasks; but unlike the engineer,
he does not subordinate each of them to the
availability of raw materials and tools conceived
His
and procured for the purpose of the project.
universe of instruments is closed and the rules of
his game are always to make do with "whatever is
at hand", that is to say with a set of tools and
materials which is always finite and is also
heterogeneous because what it contains bears no
relation to the current project, or indeed to any
particular project, but is the contingent result
of all the occasions there have been to renew or
enrich the stock or to maintain it with the
remains of previous constructions or destructions
(Levi-Strauss, 1966: 17).
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economic premises and causes this event.
Intellectual and emotional circumstances did not
precede economic circumstances (Mariategui 1971
6

)

*

.

Social totality, thus perceived, becomes Mariategui'

conceptual and methodological assumption in his approach
to
Indian society, fiercely challenging the "economism" of the

existing Workers Internationals.

For instance,

in his

reflections on Inca communism, Mariategui believed that the

collective experience developed by Inca society represented
a

point of support for the socialist project, in spite of

the historical fact that "the indigenous society and the
Inca economy were wholly disrupted and annihilated by the

shock of the conquest".

He insisted that "underneath the

feudal economy inherited from the colonial period, vestiges
of the indigenous communal economy can still be found

(Mariategui, 1971:

4

&

16).

Finally, the underlying conceptual motif in the

following sections of this chapter will be constituted by

what the Marxist tradition has called the super-structure
(identified in Mariategui'

s

particular lexicon with terms

such as "myth" and "human will").

In Mariategui 's

theoretical practice, the super-structural element is

regarded insofar it has gone beyond the material conditions
that gave its life, rendering possible its projection in the
future.

Certainly, such crystallizations suggest that we

must identify and define the boundaries of autonomy and
specificity implied in the model that according to
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Mariategui conceptually reproduces social reality;
representing ultimately

a

recovery of the most authentically

Marxian and Latin American thought, so far unidentified in
Latin America.

4.2

An Unfinished Becoming

Reality is certainly unfinished.

Indeed,

it falls to

the sovereign subjectivity to be the faculty to conceive the

actualization of the "reality's surplus" that has not yet
taken shape 10

.

The limits of what is real are not

definitively fixed, neither is concluded the constitutive
process of the world.

Man's anticipative consciousness can

trace in its historical praxis the latent processes that are

being actually spawned.

Furthermore, because consciousness

is opened to the future,

it can refuse itself to the passive

acknowledgment of reality as it appears to it, that
an irreversible "given".

as

is,

It is exactly from such attitude

that the most fecund projects come about to inhabit

eventually the forthcoming worlds, although in conformity

with a just and harmonious arrangement of existence.
Jose Carlos Mariategui, the "agonist of socialism" 11
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, in a speech to the Cuban
communist youth, urged them to "be realist and to insist on
the impossible". This slogan became very popular among the
rebellious French youth during the revolutionary student
movement that paralyzed France in the summer of 1968.
10

^Alberto Flores Galindo's, La aqonla de Mariategui: La
polemica con la Komintern (1982) suggests an interpretation
of the nature of Mariategui 's thought vis a vis his reading
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of the late nineteenth century, Spanish
philosopher Miguel
de Unamuno.
He claims (and we subscribe this view)
adequate textual evidence, that Mariategui 's notion with
of
"agony" or "agonic" does not involve the negative
or
fatalistic undertone to which this term is usually
associated. According to Flores Galindo, "agonic" must
be
understood not as the inevitable end of existence but
rather
in its Unamunian sense, that is, as struggle for
life
As a
matter of fact, Unamuno's La agonia del Cristianismo
[The
Agony of Chr istianism] was a book intensively commented
by
Mariategui in the first issue of the journal Amauta
(1926).
In his commentary on Unamuno Mariategui took advantage
of
the occasion to establish some parallelisms between
Chr istianism and Marxism.
In both cases, what really counts
for Mariategui is the strength in which both doctrines are
embodied in the masses (this postulate would suggest that
Mariategui was already foreshadowing the doctrines implicit
in the later "Theology of Liberation" movement in Latin
America)
Mariategui believed that in both instances
"doctrine" yielded to life, understood from such perspective
as struggle and combat, that is, agonv and not inflexible
precepts.
This view of Marxism resisted the conventional
repetition of dogmas. In any case, the "heresies" were
always welcomed (take for instance, the influences of
Georges Sorel and Henri Bergson)
for Mariategui believed
that it was the only possible way to renew and force the
progress of Marx's thought to go beyond its self-imposed
limits (Flores Galindo, 1982: 13)
For this reason
Mariategui admits to be identified with "those for whom
Marxism is struggle, agony" (Mariategui, 1971a: 120)
Agony
also means polemic eagerness, not to just "upset" the
ordinary bourgeoisie, but to interchange ideas, to dialogue,
to discuss with potential allies.
Agony, as Mariategui puts
it, is synonym of internal conflict:
currents of thought
encountered currents of thought which generate an innermost
tension.
Mariategui illustrates this conflict with the
example of the "two contemporary spirits": revolution and
decadence, both co-existing "agonically" in the same
individuals (Mariategui, 1964: 18).
.

,

.

,

.

.

The aspects of Unamuno's thought gathered in Mariategui
informs this conception of Marxism defined as the myth or
the religion of our time. The validity of Marxism can only
be testified by the masses.
Its ultimate criterion of truth
is its capacity to mobilize the masses.
Mariategui regarded
Marxism as a faith, without mistaking
... the fictitious, intellectual, pragmatic faith
of those who achieve their equilibrium in dogmas
and in the old order, with the passionate,
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-"

excellence

,

belongs to the lineage of creative men who

do not satiate themselves with the "normal" course of

events.

For they certainly understand that things just do

not stay as they are.

Perceiving the entire far-reaching

significance of the post-war (World War

"world crisis"

I)

that would bring to an end the "belle epoque" of capitalism,

Mariategui decides to insert himself in the social movement
that aspires to forge

a

of the bourgeois world,

new civilization.

The rationality

in the paroxysm of its own

contradictions, shows itself in all its irrational
brutality.

However,

that world emerges

a

in the midst of the death rattles of

new rationality that strives to be

self-contained in the strength of the rebellion

born,

against the prevailing order.

This rationality nourishes

itself on the invincible hope that it is possible to build
an unalienated world.
In a work dedicated to Mariategui' s lifetime attachment

to literature
1980)
"

,

(

Mariategui v la literatura

,

Lima: Amauta,

Antonio Melis alludes to the so-called

irrationalist" motifs in Mariategui

's

Marxism.

He points

out that such dimension in his thought possesses all the

quality of a radical rejection to the traditional idea of
rationality.

With regard to this matter, Melis asserts that

precarious, heroic faith of those who fight
dangerously for the victory of a new order
(Mariategui, 1959a: 30).
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the profound limit of traditional rationality,
expressed within the workers movement by the
social-democratic ideology, appears to be the
mindless consent of the existing social order.
Mariategui, on the other hand, advocates for a
creative rationality that would be on the same
level as his fundamental obligation to modify
reality.
Such is the theoretical foundation,
although not expressed in a systematic form and
sometimes merely outlined, that sustains the
creative interpretation of Mariategui 's Marxism
(Melis
1980: 133-134).
,

Without consciously attempting any academic systematization,

Mariategui

's

invariably dynamic reflection certainly knew

how to penetrate the "one-dimensionality" of an

"instrumental reason" 12 marked by the capitalist efficiency
12

Mariategui s parallelism with the philosophicopolitical characterization of the task of philosophy by the
later Frankfurt School critical theorists (i.e. Adorno,
Benjamin, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas) must be
underscored.
Fundamental to critical theory is a concept of
reason as both historically objective and autonomous (i.e.
capable of self-transcendence)
Critical theory, as
expressed in Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964), is concerned with the historical
alternatives which haunt the established capitalist society
as subversive tendencies and forces.
He claims that the
values attached to the alternative do become facts when they
are translated into reality by historical practice.
Marcuse's analysis is focused on advanced industrial
society, in which the technical apparatus of production and
distribution functions, not as the sum-total of mere
instruments which can be isolated from their social and
political effects, but rather as a system which determines
"a priori" the product of the apparatus as well as the
In this society,
operations of servicing and extending it.
according to Marcuse, the productive apparatus tends to
become totalitarian to the extent to which it determines not
only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes,
In this
but also the individual needs and aspirations.
particular context, technology serves to institute new, more
effective, and more pleasant forms of social control and
social cohesion. The totalitarian tendency of these
controls seems to assert itself in still another sense - by
spreading to the less developed and even to the preindustrial areas of the world, and by creating similarities
'

.
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and its maxim of accumulation of capital.

The

logic of capitalism, with its voracious urge for profits,

generated the imperialist war (i.e. World War

I)

with the

single purpose of conquering other world markets and the
implicit re— partition of the planet.

In view of the inhuman

frenzy of these actions, Mariategui understood that the

rational grounds of the proletarian masses’ protests had to
be consolidated upon an entirely new philosophical basis.

On the other hand, the so-called "scientific socialism"

conveyed by the reformist workers organizations of the II
International, had succumbed to the "illusion of industrial

progress" and to

a

social reality that was becoming

gradually more reluctant to any radical change.

As some

type of "social Darwinism", Marxism had turned itself into
an ideology that would conceal opportunistic politics; that

in the development of capitalism and communism.
As a
technological universe, advanced industrial society is a
political universe, the latest, the latest stage in the
realization of a specific historical project (i.e. in the
Sartrean sense of the term, which emphasizes the element of
As
freedom and responsibility in historical determination)
the project unfolds, it shapes the entire universe of
discourse and action, intellectual and material culture. In
the medium of technology, culture, politics, and the economy
merge into omnipresent system which swallows up or repulses
The productivity and growth potential of
all alternatives.
this system stabilize the society and contain technical
progress within the framework of domination. Although the
1920s and 1930s Peru hardly represents the social model that
Marcuse is analyzing, Mariategui’ s notion of radical
rationality and its revolutionary application certainly
anticipates and embodies one of the critical theory's most
significant dictums: technological rationality has become
political rationality (Marcuse, 1964: xi-xvi)
.
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is,

into a discourse that had been smoothly confiscated
by

the reigning system.
In this situation, the historical negativity of

revolutionary dialectics, as it was originally conceived by
the founders of scientific socialism (i.e. historical

materialism)

,

diluted itself in a lineal and mechanic

"evolution" of the socio-economic processes.

In view of

this positivistic and naturalistic interpretation of
Marxism, Mariategui joins the ranks of revolutionary

thinkers that have conceived what has been denominated as
the "Marxism of the subjective factor" 13
13

.

Marx in his

Mariategui was possibly the only Latin American
counterpart to this critical trend within Marxism which had
its main center in Europe.
Naturally, there were many
historical and political factors that were determining the
direction of this theoretical development.
The crucible of
the whole "critical Marxism" or "Western Marxism" or
"Hegelian Marxism" or "Marxism of the subjective factor"
enterprise was the failure of the German Revolution (19181921) and the success of the Russian Revolution (1917).
The
determinist, evolutionist, economistic social theory of
classical Social Democracy, the first political heir of Marx
and Engels, was discredited by the generally conservative
and even nationalist behavior of most Social Democratic
parties and unions during World War I. The Bolsheviks, who
along with other groups, split off from the Second
International during these events, therefore remained
unsullied by the compromise and surrender of Social
Democracy.
But they inherited the mantle of revolutionary
orthodoxy not because of their purity, or even because of
their superior theoretical and political "line", but because
of the unexpected success of radical revolution of Russia.
With the exception of a few strategic but not highly
theoretical departures the Bolsheviks did not revise the
"world view" of 19th century Marxism, and with the partial
exception of Lenin's State and Revolution did not modify but
in fact put into practice the authoritarian implications of
On the level of philosophy,
one side of that world view.
anticipating far worse things to come, Lenin himself
exacerbated the regressive tendencies of Marxist orthodoxy
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Th eses on Feuerbach

,

once had observed that the fundamental

weakness of the preceding materialistic theories
of
knowledge consisted in the fact that they only
perceived
reality under the form of an object for contemplation,

by moving back toward the 18th century materialism Marx
already repudiated.

The task of the theoretical reconstruction of Marxism
was initially possible only at the periphery of some of the
Western Communist parties, and even here not for long. The
Hungarian Georg Lukacs was eventually (after 1930) forced to
completely renounce his fundamental 1923 work, History and
Class—Consciousness (1971)
The German Karl Korsh was
expelled from the German Communist party for his defense of
his 1923 work Marxism and Philosophy (1970), and the Italian
Antonio Gramsci was "protected" from the Stalinist Communist
International only by Mussolini's prison where he wrote the
so-called Prison Notebooks (1971). As different as these
theorists were intellectually and politically, they shared
two important influences: they had been intellectually
formed outside the Marxist tradition, primarily in contexts
dominated by the revival of German Idealism, and they were
decisively shaped by the October Revolution and by the
various council experiments in which all three had played
crucial political roles. The new intellectual cast of mind
helped them conceptualize the political experience; all
three theorists drew heavily on the hitherto badly known
background of Marxism and German Idealism to work out a
theoretical posture adequate to the new historical
situation. The new theory was first formulated in terms of
a new philosophy, a "philosophy of praxis" (the term is
Gramci's) the central concepts of which (praxis, alienation,
hegemony, reification and mediation) represented Marxian
translations of key concepts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and some
of their modern followers (Arato and Gebhardt, 1982: 185This "philosophy of praxis" represented what we would
224).
like to call "Marxism of the subjective factor".
However,
although Mariategui partially shares the same philosophical
background of these European thinkers, he incorporates into
his own theoretical and political practice other elements
and notions originated in other non-Marxist sources. Our
task is to identify those influences, and to analyze how
those influences merged and articulated in a single and
original theoretical corpus, constituting a textual
documentation of an authentic Latin American philosophical
discourse
.
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whereas for him reality had to be conceived as human
sensuous activity, that is, as praxis:
The chief defect of all hitherto existing
materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that
the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived
only in the form of the object or of contemplation
(author's emphasis), but not as human sensuous
activity, practice (author's emphasis), not
subjectively.
Hence it happened that the active
(author's emphasis) side, in contradistinction to
materialism, was developed by idealism - but only
abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not
know real, sensuous activity as such...
Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking
(author's emphasis)
appeals to sensuous
contemplation (author's emphasis); but he does not
conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous
activity (Marx, 1978b: 143-144).
,

Going beyond these epistemological considerations, we must
indicate that this is how "the actual" cannot be reduced to
the merely effected, it does not limit itself to the

already-given totality.

It must also embrace the "not-yet-

realized", projected as possibility in the historical praxis
of man.

Rosa Luxemburg, in her critique of the reformist

politics of the Social Democracy, points out that the masses
cannot constitute as the exclusive object of social
They are above all, according to Luxemburg, the

evolution.

subject of

a

conscious transformation (Luxemburg, 1970)

The October Revolution, which constitutes from the point of

view of a social and political transformation

a

truly

"qualitative leap", presupposes at least at a certain level

,

the reappearance of the Marxian principle of the self-

emancipation of the proletariat.

For this reason, Lukacs in
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his work, Lenin, indicates that the genius of the Russian

revolutionary leader results from the precise way of

conceiving the conscious and active element of the workers

movement in the revolutionary process.
Along the same line of analysis, Gramsci on his

commentary discussing the unigue character of the Russian

Revolution ("The Revolution Against Capital "

.

1988b:

32-36)

also underscores that such an event (envisioned by him and

other socialist intellectuals and militants of the epoch as
the first great proletarian victory) had taken place without

the appropriate deferment for the long ripening

development

of the material conditions and by eluding the supposedly

"unyielding laws" of historical process; specifically in one
of the most underdeveloped societies in Europe.

Following the same outlook, Mariategui takes on the

argument that right where Marxism has been authentically
revolutionary, never had it responded to
determinism.

vulgar economic

a

For this reason he emphatically notes that:

Lenin proves us, in practical politics, with the
irrecusable testimony of a (triumphant)
revolution, that Marxism is the only method of
carrying on and transcending Marx (our emphasis)
(Mariategui, 1985: 126).
We argue that the point that Mariategui want to underscore
is that the volitive aspect of socialism,

although not less

evident, is perhaps less understood by criticism than its

manifest determinist content.
that makes him declare that,

Triggered by

a

disposition

231

Man s spirit is indivisible and it must be so to
achieve plenitude and harmony.
X declare without
hesitation that I bring to literary exegesis all
my political passions and ideas, although in view
of the way this word has been misused, I should
that my politics are philosophy and religion
(our emphasis) (Mariategui, 1971: 183),

Mariategui sustains that each word and each action of

Marxism presuppose an accentuation of faith and will, of
heroic and creative fervor, which would be absurd to seek in
a

mediocre and passive sentiment of irrevocability.

Consequently he alludes with utmost satisfaction to an

expression he attributed to Lenin, who, before the many
objections he encountered to the effect that he was

plotting against reality, would exclaim:
for reality!".

"so much the worse

In dissension with a dull scientistic

rationalism, the re-creation of Marxism implies for

Mariategui the elaboration of "a more extensive
rationality".

Such a philosophico-political project had to

be capable of integrating a more diverse spectrum of human

motivations which actually intervenes in the praxis of
social transformation.

4.3

The Creative Political Imagination
The structural crisis of capitalism supposes a double

fracture for the Western world:

at the economic level and

at the political, but above all in its mentality and in its

spirit.

Inspired by the Sorelian notion of the "social
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myth" u

,

Mariategui observes that the old ideals of

bourgeois civilization are going through
deterioration.

a

process of

Scientific rationality and parliamentary

democracy, along with transcendental religions, receive the

impact of a profound questioning.

As a result of the

material downfall, the devastation of traditional
rationality, which had supported

a

boundless faith in the

technological and industrial development, manifests itself

u Georges Sorel
(1847-1922) was born in Cherbourg,
studied at the Ecole Polytechnique, and became an engineer
for the French government, where he worked until 1892.
He
then became interested in Marx and later in Proudhon, who
supplied the theoretical basis of the syndicalism he
developed after 1895. He argued for a movement rooted in
the spontaneous energy of the working class directed against
the centers of economic power and outside of the trade
unions and political parties. he emerged as one of the most
severe critics of parliamentary democracy. His impact upon
Gramsci and Ordine Nuovo notably in the emphasis upon
direct action at the point of production, was profound. Not
long after the appearance of his important works,
Reflections on Violence The Illusions of Progress and The
Disintegration of Marxism (all 1908)
he drifted away from
syndicalism and toward nationalism. By the time of his
death he had long since detached himself from the life of
any political movement.
.

.

,

,

Sorel' s thought is pervaded with a pessimism combined
with a strong conviction of the moral disintegration of the
bourgeoisie. He attacked the idea of human inevitable
Sorel
progress.
In his book, Reflections on Violence
attempted a synthesis of Marxist ideas of class struggle
with the ideas of Proudhon. One of the aspects of the
Sorelian revolutionary doctrines that influenced Mariategui
the most was the fact that Sorel combatted any idea that
social change was historically and economically determined;
the victory of the working class depended on its own
militancy, and in this the "myth of the general strike"
would play an important part. He was less interested in the
workers fighting for higher wages than in creating a social
elite of "heroes" who would usher in a new civilization as a
result of a "social war" (Sorel, 1941; Stanley, 1981).
.
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in the self-destructive decadentism that
pervades

everywhere.

in that context fascism merely constitutes
its

most desperate and virulent expression.

For this reason

Mariategui claims that,
every inquest of contemporary intelligence on the
crisis leads to this unanimous conclusion:
bourgeois civilization lacks of a myth, a faith,
of a hope (Mariategui, 1972d: 23).

While the rationalist experience has led to

a

paradoxical

outcome of disbelieving reason and plunging humanity in

a

nihilistic skepticism, Mariategui proposes that only the man
stirred by myth can provoke the progress of history.

With

that regard he believed that
the myth is what moves man in history.
Without a
myth the existence of man does not have any
historical sense. History is made by the men
possessed and enlightened by a superior belief, by
a super-human hope; the rest are the anonymous
chorus of the drama (Mariategui, 1972d: 24).
However, the social myth, the true motor of history, is

not

.

according to Mariategui, an arbitrary invention.

For

this reason, Mariategui in the quest for the new impelling

myth of human progress, does not hesitate in alluding to the

antagonism of the fundamental classes of the capitalist
society in crisis.

From this inescapable incursion he

deduces that
in this epoch, what differentiates most clearly
and distinctly the bourgeoisie and the proletariat
is the myth.
The bourgeoisie does not have any
myth at all.
It has become incredulous, skeptic,
The renaissance liberal myth has aged
nihilistic.
too much.
The proletariat has a myth: social
revolution. Toward that myth it moves vehemently
The bourgeoisie negates; the
and actively.
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proletariat affirms (Mariatequi, 1972a: 23, 24,
27).

Instead of capitulating to the generalized "existential
anguish" generated by the decline of the bourgeois world,

Mariategui proposes himself to respond to the appeal of the

revolutionary project of the proletariat.

Furthermore,

Mariategui believed that from such undertaking the new
civilization of "associated producers" (Marx) would emerge.
In this perspective, the socialist movement is not only

mobilized by scientific critique, regarding the objective
analysis of the contradictions of the commodities
production; it also involves

a

subjective force of

historical affirmation which Mariategui calls, "prospective
enthusiasm".

As he himself points out regarding the

mobilization of the masses toward such

a goal:

the innumerable army of the humble, the poor, the
miserable, has resolutely set itself going toward
the Utopia that Intelligence, in its generous,
fecund, and visionary hours, has conceived
(Mariategui, 1964: 158).
In Mariategui' s thematization of the notion of the

"social myth", we can locate vitalists, pragmatists,

relativists, and even psychoanalytic resonances, which

obviously will correspond to the philosophical universe of
the epoch.

This should not suppress the recognition that

when Mariategui performs this "synthetic" or "creative
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ass imi lat ion "

,

he does it guided by whatever pertinent

function it may have in the context of revolutionary praxis.

Mariategui always displayed

a

shrewd insight that enabled

him to keep an adeguate theoretical distance from his many
sources of philosophical inspiration.

This talent was to be

of particular relevance in the case of Georges Sorel, who

had on him an extremely meaningful influence.
Sorel' s notion of myth carried a significant weight in

Mariategui

's

thought 16

.

Mariategui considered Sorel

's

15

The notion of "creative assimilation" has been
discussed above (Chapter 2, footnote #6). Previously, the
idea was utilized with regard to the characterization of
some fundamental and analogous cases in the Latin American
intellectual history that definitely illustrate this unique
manner of cultural production (e.g. Jose Marti, Alfonso
Reyes, Jose Lezama Lima, and of course, Mariategui, whom
occupies an important part of this research)
and which
"mechanics" ultimately constitute the unequivocal anatomy of
the Latin American philosophical (and cultural) identity.
;

16

Sorel's doctrines on myth and violence caused great
Convinced
impact on the post-war revolutionary movements.
that Marx had been wrong in his forecasts regarding the
increasing oppression and eventual overthrow of capitalism
by the proletarians of the world, explicitly or implicitly,
most of the revisionists of Marxism came to reformist
Sorel, on the
conclusions in their respective analyses.
other hand, acted reversely transferring his support from
orthodox socialism (nominally Marxian) to the anarchosyndicalists, then regarded as the most revolutionary wing
He sustained that although
of the French workers movement.
as
a science, not for this it
regarded
should
not
be
Marxism
He claimed that
obsolete.
altogether
and
ineffective,
was
but rather
science
not
was
world
the
transformed
really
what
utilized
precisely
anarcho-syndicalists
and
the
myth,
Marxism in the capacity of a social myth. Sorel never
interpreted Marx as a deterministic thinker, assuming,
rather hypothetically, that he would have encouraged the
workers to struggle given the inference of his objective
For this reason,
analysis of the social contradictions.
puts
in the
philosophy,
Bergson's
Sorel inspired by
attributes
ethical
bestowing
will
creative
foreground man's
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thought as the renewal of Marx's revolutionary theories.

regarded Sorel as the genuine restorer of Marxism.

He

He

believed that
through Sorel, Marxism assimilates the substantial
elements and acquisitions comprised in the
philosophical currents that came after Marx...
The theory of revolutionary myths which applies to
the socialist movement the experience of the
religious movements, establishes the foundations
of a philosophy of revolution, deeply pervaded by
psychological and sociological realism, and at the
same time anticipating the conclusions of
contemporary relativism (Mariategui, 1985: 21).

Regarding Sorel'

s

emphasis on the role of revolutionary

violence as history's genuine midwife and as

a

power-device

in the hands of the workers against their reformist

leadership, Mariategui says that,
to violence as an instrument to achieve higher forms of
social organization. Regarding the notion of social myth,
he expressed:
In the course of this study one thing has always
been present in my mind, which seemed to me so
evident that I did not think it worth while to lay
much stress on it - that men who are participating
in a great social movement always picture their
coming action as a battle in which their cause is
certain to triumph. These constructions,
knowledge of which is so important for historians,
I propose to myths; the syndicalist "general
strike" and Marx's catastrophic revolution are
such myths. As remarkable examples of such myths,
I have given those which were constructed by
primitive Christianity, by the Reformation, by the
I now
Revolution and by the followers of Mazzini.
wish to show that we should not attempt to analyse
such group of images in the way we analyse a thing
into its elements, but that they must be taken as
a whole, as historical forces, and that we should
be especially careful not to make any comparison
between accomplished fact and the picture people
had formed for themselves before action (Sorel,

1941:

22).
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Sorel by clarifying the historical role of
violence, becomes the most vigorous revitalizer of
Marx in the parliamentary socialist period, whose
most immediate effect was the post-war
revolutionary crisis, (and) the working class
leaders' intellectual and psychological resistance
to the seizure of power that the masses were
demanding (Mariategui, 1985: 21).
,

Nevertheless, the French theoretician of revolutionary

syndicalism established
"myth" and "utopia".

a too

drastic opposition between

He intended to establish the distinct

irrational and combative character of the social myth vis

a

vis the overly elaborate intellectual models underlying all

utopias.

For this reason, he maintains that revolutionary

myths are not "descriptions of things, but rather the

expression of wills", which comprise

a

religious foundation.

Although Mariategui does not attend thoroughly to the
theoretical location of the idea of the social myth, he

nevertheless utilizes it more effectively within
constructive social practice.

a

Hence, while Sorel' s concept

of myth underscores the necessity to destroy the existing

order, Mariategui regards it as

a

proletariat in the constitution of

quickening force of the
a

new social order.

He

presumes that myth is fully inserted in history, it emerges
and eventually dies in it.

Each respective epoch regards

its myth as a definitive and absolute reality.

This is what

Mariategui regards as the "temporal sense" of the myth,
which, according to him, would be an anti-historic absurdity
to try to bestow timelessness to something which doomed to
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fade away in history.

On this point, Sorel's influence is

again clearly detected.
However, Sorel's extreme irrationalism and anti-

intellectualism which renders the "social myth" as something
irrefutable" is not explicitly nor implicitly subscribed in

Mariategui.

He rather conceived the revolutionary myth as a

phenomenon with

a

profound and rigorous economic grounding.

As a conseguence of this materialist element, the contrast

between myth and utopia appears to be more mediated in
Mariategui.

In many instances these two ideas seem to be

equivalent.

Finally,

in a more comprehensively political

sense, Mariategui replaces the Sorelian myth of the "general

strike" with the myth of the "social revolution".
In the effort to set down the foundations of Indo-

American socialism, Mariategui overlooked neither the
penetration of imperialist capital and the industrialization
of Peru nor the communitarian traditions which were deeply

rooted in the Indian peasantry.

It is precisely in those

traditions that he perceived the sources of future
socialism.

This vision causes him to declare that,

faith in the renaissance of the Indian is not
pinned to the material process of "Westernizing"
The soul of the Indian is
the Quechua country.
not raised by the white man's civilization or
alphabet but by the myth, the idea, of the
he hope of the Indian is
Socialist revolution.
absolutely revolutionary. That same myth, that
same idea, are decisive agents in the awakening of
other ancient peoples or races in ruin: the
Universal history
Hindus, the Chinese, et cetera.
today tends as never before to chart its course
with a common quadrant. Why should the Inca
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P e opl e

who constructed the most highly-developed
and harmonious communistic system, be
the only
ones unmoved by this worldwide emotion?
The
consanguinity of the Indian movement with world
revolutionary currents is too evident to need
documentation. I have said already that I reached
an understanding and appreciation of the
Indian
through socialism (Mariategui, 1971 28-29) 17
,

:

.

Beyond the "revolutionary romanticism" that assumes
the
appeal to pre-capitalist structures and values for the

elaboration of the socialist project 18

,

we must however at

Mariategui positively knew how to uncover the
revolutionary socialist potential of the peasantry. in his
study on the problem of race, he observes that "an
indigenous revolutionary consciousness will perhaps take
time to develop; but once the Indian has made the idea of
socialism his, he will observe it with such discipline,
tenacity and strength, that few proletarians of other
regions will be able to surpass" (Mariategui, 1987b: 46).
For an extensive discussion on Mariategui' s ideas on the
national question and the peasantry's role in the socialist
revolution see Flores Galindo, La agonia de Mariategui: La
polemica con la Komintern (1982: 30-33).
18

The romantic mentality nurtures itself from a longing
for the past.
When the present is rejected, this aspiration
for a "paradise lost" manifests itself as anti-capitalist
romanticism. Moreover, when the nostalgia for precapitalist societies merges dialectically with a hope for
the future, and helps to promote the construction of a new
historical project, it can evolve in a revolutionary
romanticism. According to Michael Loewy, in an effort to
construe a sociology of the revolutionary intellectual (e.g.
Georg Lukacs) points out, that in romantic ideology,
opposition to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and
the Napoleonic Code combined with an anti-capitalist
rejection of the bourgeois universe, of economic liberalism
and even industrialization.
Faced with the development of
capitalism, which progressively reduces man to an abstract,
calculable quantity and establishes a rigorously
quantitative system of reasoning, romanticism passionately
defended the concrete, qualitative and intuitive forms of
living and thinking, and the personal and concrete human
relations which still lived on amongst the pre-capitalist
Old
layers (peasantry, petty-bourgeoisie nobility)
traditions, life-styles and social attitudes, now spurned by
abstract capitalist rationalism, were thus ideologically
,

.
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this point, underscore the importance that Mariategui

bestowed upon the mythic and symbolic conceptions of the
peasant population.

This consideration can be understood in

the light of Mariategui'

s

certainty of the insubstitutible

role of class consciousness and "historical mission" of the

revolutionary subject.

Needless to say, he held this view

while seriously disagreeing with the mechanicist materialism
of the orthodox propagandists of Marxism.
In defense of Mariategui and against the stern

defenders of Marxist orthodoxy, we should recall the

significant precedent of Anatoly V. Lunacharsky, ulterior
People's Commissar for Education of the Bolshevik Russia.
In a work published in 1907

(

Religion and Socialism

Lunacharsky affirmed that "Marx's philosophy is

a

^

religion

that has acquired consciousness of itself" (Lunacharsky,
1976:

14 7)

19
.

Later, Antonio Gramsci will consider that in the

struggle for ideological hegemony, an intellectual and moral

reform of the masses has to be achieved (Gramsci, 1988a:

rehabilitated and refurbished by the romantics. Against the
abstract conception of property and freedom propagated by
the liberal bourgeoisie, romantic doctrine developed the
traditional, qualitative view of property and freedom as
concrete, personal relations (Cf. Michael Loewy, Georg
Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism 1979)
,

.

19

In the conclusion of this remarkable book,
Lunacharsky claimed that "to recognize scientific socialism
as a light of lights, living concentration of all human
expectations, highest poetry, profoundest enthusiasm,
supreme religion, is for me true realism (our emphasis)
(Lunacharsky 1976: 262).
.

.
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324-347)

20
.

encouraging

Mariategui insists on the pertinence of
a

class ethics opened to historic universality.

He believed that this effort had to be combined

simultaneously with

a

dialectic secularization of religion,

whose incentives are not divine, but rather social and
political
Mariategui observed that regardless of the sign and
import of the material conditioning enclosing historical
transformation, man is the subject /agent of historical

praxis

.

In this perspective, he dispenses a special

attention to the predictive dimension of human
consciousness, thus re-evaluating the historical role of

creative imagination.

Not by mere chance, Mariategui

alludes to inspiring writers such as Oscar Wilde as

a

way of

suggesting along with this author that "progress is the

realisation of Utopias" 21

,

for without imagination there

Among the concepts that illuminate Gramsci's
contributions to revolutionary theory (i.e. social bloc, war
the one which in some
of position, organic intellectuals)
way coincides with Mariategui' s own theoretical concepts is
For Gramsci as for
the idea of ideological hegemony
Mariategui, the primary focus of the revolutionary
intellectual intervening in the class struggle as an ally of
the
the working class, could not be the simple appraisal of
subjective
objective determinants of crisis but rather the
responses to it. The role of the revolutionary intellectual
analysis
could not be circumscribed to a simply structural
the
of political analysis of political economy but
comprehension of mass consciousness; not the institutional
or
engineering required for the conquest and management for a
preparation
state power, but the ideological -cu ltural
new type of society
20

,

.

.

(The
0scar Wilde, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism"
Complete Works of Oscar Wilde 1988: 1089).
21

,
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cannot be progress of any kind (e.g. Mariategui,
1975, Vol.
II*

227)

.

This exorbitant relevance bestowed upon

imagination can be better understood if it is considered in
its historical context.

This was a moment where the old

bourgeois civilization manifested unequivocal signs of

decadence and where the traditional organizations of the

working class seemed to be drained of all their resources.
Although the slogan "imagination to power!"
[

I

L imagination au pouvoir!] historically belonged to the
*

Parisian students revolt during May and June of 1968, we
believe that Mariategui would have felt no qualms in

incorporating such

a

dictate into his political doctrines.

He estimated that the radical difference between the

revolutionaries and the conservatives resided precisely in
their imaginative faculties.

unable of envisioning
one,

a

While the conservatives are

different reality from the given

the revolutionaries are persistently setting their

vision ahead of their time, inspired by futuristic
fantasies.

On this point, Mariategui reckoned that "history

always agreed with the imaginative men" (Mariategui, 1972a:
44)

.

When referring to the "illusion of the final

struggle", he observes that it is really about a very

ancient and very actual collective phenomenon that keeps

reappearing at certain moments in history with different
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designations.

This apocalyptic-final- judgment myth 22 has

assisted in the renewal of humankind's historical
march
toward what Mariategui called, "the messianic
millennium
that would never come"

.

°f all the renaissances"

Mariategui

4.4

's

It is,

according to him,

"the star

(Mariategui, 1972a: 29)

Marxism: Latin America's "Docta Spes"

In the presence of a conformist realism, the dialectic

of praxis which acts in history through fecund negations and
inflations expresses itself in yet another language:

be realist ... and to insist on the impossible" 23

"to

.

In response to the "accusation" of pessimism usually

brandished against the constestataries of power, Mariategui
re-takes with certain lucidity Jose Vasconcelos 24 maxim,
"pessimism of reality, optimism of the ideal", slightly

overturning the formulation with another perhaps more
accurate:

"Pessimism of reality, optimism of action"

22

Carl G. Jung called this type of collective
phenomenon as "archetypes of the collective unconscious".
23

Rudolf Bahro in his violent clash with "real
socialism", he seizes inspiration from a utopian discourse
and quotes Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg's comrade in the
Spartakist revolution, to underscore that "the boundary of
the possible cannot be reached unless one strives toward the
impossible... To fancy what is objectively impossible is
not then a mere chimera and the product of a senseless
blindness, but a form of concrete politics (our emphasis)
in the most profound sense of the word...
True politics,
the strongest, is the art of the impossible" (Bahro 1979:
129)

.

2A

See above (Chapter 1) for more details on
Vasconcelos' futuristic doctrines.
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(Mariategui,

1975, Vol.

II:

421-424).

We notice that

Mariategui believed the revolutionary spirit
must be
characterized by a critical and militant optimism
which
allows it to be in full agreement with actual
reality in
order to transform it, instead of a defeatist
pessimism.
Notwithstanding, although Mariategui is a firm defender
of the outright display of the utopian imagination,
this

does not prevent him from recognizing that such imagination

may fall short with respect to the concrete events.

He does

not neglect the imminent misfortunes that imagination and

fantasy may suffer.

For this reason he explains that "only

those utopias that can be called realistic should be

considered valid.

Those (utopias) that emerge from the very

entrails of reality" (Mariategui, 1972a: 46)
In the very same context of the open confrontation

between capital and labor, the myth of the social revolution
is for Mariategui a realist utopia.

Mariategui places

himself in direct opposition to the Marxian tradition,

especially the one based on Engels, which establishes

a

drastic substitution of "utopian socialism" for "scientific
socialism".

He was theoretically closer to contemporary

authors, who like Ernst Bloch or Herbert Marcuse, conceive

Marxism as

a

new concretion, with its own distinctive

characteristics of an utopian thought.
Anibal Quijano, in his Reencuentro v debate: Una

introduccion

a

Mariategui (1981), emphasizes that
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Mariategui's Marxism is transfixed by
tension.

a

very uncommon

He claims that Mariategui "assembled in his

intellectual development

a

conception of Marxism as

a

method of historical interpretation and action' and

a

philosophy of history of an explicit metaphysical and
religious content" (Quijano, 1981: 72)

.

It is remarkable

that Mariategui himself asserts in the article "La filosofia

moderna y el marxismo" [Modern Philosophy and Marxism]

,

that

any effort to categorize (Marxism) as a simple
scientific theory is vain, whereas it operates in
the world as a gospel and a method of mass
mobilization (Mariategui, 1985: 41).
Far from being a rigorous methodological model for the

analysis of

a

social formation, Marxism constitutes for

Mariategui a promise of emancipation,

a

revolutionary

historic project for the workers and peasants movement.
We contend that Mariategui, without any kind of

theoretical regret (Sartrean "mauvais foi")

explicitly goes

on to draw his inspiration from sources positively non-

Marxist, and in many instances from sources considered by

many hard-liners (Marxist) materialists as "idealist" (for
many of them were recognized as theories commonly utilized
by bourgeois ideologues)

,

eventually conveying a radical re-

vitalization of revolutionary praxis.

If we had to label

Mariategui's Marxism, we would have to admit that his
conceptual framework comprises an "idealist materialism"

with all the contradictions that this formulation might
suggest.

Mariategui himself expresses that,
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if the materialist professes his
faith
religiously only by a formality of language
could
he be opposed or distinguished from
the idealist

(Manategui

However,

,

1985:

60)

25

.

in a paradoxical way, Mariategui as
the "agonist"

of Latin American socialism (see above,

forces

a

footnote

#

li)

symbiosis of both elements (i.e.

materialism/idealism) creating

a

unique philosophical

discourse characteristic of the Latin American way
of "doing
philosophy"
Some commentators assume a cautious distance from those

critics who speak of Mariategui' s "open Marxism" as an

alternative to
(see above)

,

a

"dogmatic marxism".

For instance, Quijano

considers that

it is more correct to point out that not all in
Mariategui' s thought belongs to Marxist principles
and that in his polemic with revisionism and
positivism, the ethico-philosophical questions
have primacy over the epistemological and
methodological considerations, aspects on which
Mariategui 's theoretical education was inadequate

(Quijano,

1981:

78)

26
.

^Furthermore, in the article "Aniversario y balance"
[Anniversary and Balance] of the journal Amauta which he
helped to found, Mariategui remarks,
.

Socialist materialism encloses all the
possibilities of spiritual, ethical, and
philosophic ascension. And we never feel so
fanatically and piously idealists as when we set
out properly our ideas and feet deep in matter
(Mariategui,

1987b:

250)

26

.

Later on, this author, evidently subdued by a Marxism
of an extreme "scientism" (reminding us of Althusser's
positivistic re-construction of Marxian theory and his
disastrous "theoreticism" supposedly grades down his
initial position by arguing that,
)
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Such an Olympic view, so comfortably launched from our

historical present, may contain

a

grain of truth.

However,

Quijano's argument must not compel us to overlook the fact
that Mariategui was thoroughly aware of Marxism's claim to
sc ient i f ic i ty

.

Notwithstanding, he firmly believed that

since the orthodox Marxist exegetes, in their positivistic
frenzy, regarded historical materialism as an indisputable

scientific doctrine that was bound to surpass abstract
idealism and metaphysical materialism of naturalistic

disposition 27

,

the inescapable outcome to be expected was,

according to Mariategui,
instance, Mariategui

'

marxismo", 1975, Vol.

s

,

I:

a

theoretical "void" (See for

"La filosofia moderna y el

138-143).

Unexpectedly, in an immanent way of criticizing the

positivistic and neo-metaphysical way of construing Marxian
theory, he will attempt to fill this theoretical "lacuna"

with

a

pertinent return to Marxist dialectics, mainly, the

it would not be too uncertain to say, that in some
way, the Marxist breakthroughs (Mariategui s)
regarding the fundamental reality underlying the
Peru of his times, were the triumph of a mentality
whose autonomy and intellectual boldness, were
intensified inclusively in those theoretically
spurious elements and, nonetheless psychologically
effective at not allowing him to simply submit to
an a-critical obedience to the bureaucratic
"orthodoxies" (Quijano, 1981: 79)
'

It is incomprehensible how those orthodox
theoreticians of Marxism overlooked the fact that Engels',
Dialectics of Nature highly favored among communist cadres,
could be clearly included among those works that exhibited
an inclination toward those theories of a "metaphysical
materialism of naturalistic disposition".
27

,
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dialectic between theory and praxis and
the imperative reconstruction of a revolutionary humanism.
For Mariategui,

philosophy was

a

cultural activity which he did not set

apart from other theoretical practices.

Most of his

wrirtings devoted specifically to philosphy
inherently
affirm that philosophy also constituted a
terrain of

class

struggle, the necessary renewal that Marxism
would require
to gain ascendancy, the very basis of socialist
efforts to

theoretically critique and transcend bourgeois society
(e.g.
Mariategui, 1972a, 1972b, 1984, 1985, 1987b 28 ). Just as
important it was

source of internal criticism and re-

a

constitution within Marxism itself; the methodological
underpinnings of

revitalized theory grounded in a new

a

historical awareness: the failure of revolutionary movements
in Europe, the rise of fascism and Stalinism, the apparent

eclipse of the industrial proletariat as revolutionary
subject (at least in Europe) and the reformulation of the

strategic question of the revolutionary subject in the

Peruvian context, the emergence of new ideological

mediations (e.g. the so-called Incaic communism and
religious tradition, Nietzsche, Bergson, Sorel, etc.).

Above all, Mariategi regards Marxist "philosophy" as

a

powerfully transformative enterprise intertwined not only

28

E1 alma matinal v otras estaciones del hombre de hoy
"La imaginacion y el progreso", "^Existe un pensamiento
hispanoamericano?" "La filosofia moderna y el marxismo",
Ideoloqia v politica respectively.
,

.

.
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with politics but with historically-constituted
social life.
It was (at least potentially) the first truly
collective
or

popular" philosophical synthesis, qualitatively distinct
from all past intellectual systems and certainly

representative of Latin American (Peruvian) cultural
identity 29

.

Implicitly, in the context of

a

"double"-f ront

theoretical debate with skeptic nihilism, on one hand, and
the "scientistic" and rationalistic interpretation of

Marxism, on the other, Mariategui is persuaded to search for
an enhancement of the reaches of an empirico-analytic

reason, which he regards as excessively "objectivistic"

This concern leads Mariategui to rehabilitate the critical
and cognitive role of revolutionary imagination, as a

methodological "organ" destined to the fulfillment of an
29

Mariategui s conception of theoretical practice
undeniably foreshadows Antonio Gramsci's re-interpretation
of Marxism which he identified with the expression of the
"Philosophy of Praxis" (the expression actually appears in
the Ouaderni del carcere published between 1948 and 1951)
Although some historians interpret such expression as a
linguistic device to fool the fascist censors, it seems to
us that it has further revealed the deeply philosophical
understanding Gramsci had of his work. For example, in the
essay "Problems of Marxism", Gramsci's definition of the
"Philosophy of Praxis" fairly reflects what we have been
arguing with regard to Mariategui 's own conception of
philosophy
'

.

At the level of theory the philosophy of praxis
cannot be confounded with or reduced to any other
philosophy.
Its originality lies not only in its
transcending of previous philosophies but also and
above all in that it opens up a completely new
road, renewing from head to toe the whole way of
conceiving philosophy itself (Gramsci, 1971: 464).
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entirely new social order.

in a similar perspective,

some

critics have noted that aesthetic and literary production

represents for Mariategui

a

means of access to reality as

effective as any socio-economic theoretical model 30

.

Gerardo Mario Goloboff, in "Mariategui
y el problema
estetico literario" [Mariategui and the Aesthetico-Literary
Problem]

(1980:

109-124), points out that,

Mariategui 's intuition regarding the supremacy
that fiction attains over reality, is what
probably makes him consider it as a privileged
field, precisely for its lack of ties (with
immediate reality)
it confers a meaningful access
in the perception of reality; as a practice that,
for not being submitted to a certain conception of
"truth", it reveals that truth and besides,
produces it (Goloboff, 1980: 112).
,

Mariategui outlines, in

a

unique foresight, one of the

main tasks that later on, the German Jewish philosopher
Ernst Bloch will assume as most politically urgent.

Bloch

believed that philosophy needed to develop a conscience of
tomorrow, a commitment to the future, a special knowledge

capable of grounding hope, or else, it had to renounce to
its will for knowledge.

He considered his philosophy to be

concretely utopian, mediated with real possibility.

philosophy advocates engagement with
contemplation of

.

the world.

,

His

rather than

The utopian content in Bloch's

thought is thoroughly embodied in the "Not-Yet-Conscious

30

For instance, Lakoff and Johnson Metaphors We Live
Chicago: U of Chicago Pr, 1980), develop an
"experiential" account of truth, in which metaphor is one of
the necessary paths to truth and not a deceitful ornament.
(

By,
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ontology" 31

With regard to the utopian
content allegedly
implied in Marxism, Bloch will
claim that,
.

t0
the English ^dftfoTof ^rnst
B^To^The
indicates that, "Consistent with his
contains a cultural inheritance and vli^ that the past
content
still to
tn
p^^ill
be extracted (e.g. The Spirit of ntn utopian
,
g)
P
philosophy, though firmly rooted in the
German tradition
contains an eclectic mixture of progressive
elements drawn
from classical, oriental and Western
philosophies.
The
inheritance that is to be claimed from the
past however is
not a legacy of fixed tradition, but
of
hop4content and utopian content in the woks undisch4rged
of the past
Thus
B1 och takes the utopian aspirations and
energy of the
f ctor
German Idealism first systematized by
j*
Kant and combines
it with the objective factor in the
materialist philosophy of Marx and Engels. He
concept of process from Hegel and develops it takes the
into his own
n
OP n r CeSS at W ° rk in dialect ic=a materialism.
He takes
takes°Ar
n .-? ?
Aristotle's
concept of "entelechy" and builds it
into his own theory of possibility. He takes
Bacon's New
A tlantis and includes it in the historical
program for
socialism... The Principle of Hope (1959), Bloch's
monumental work, is an encyclopedia of hope that
catalogue the surplus of utopian thought from the attempts to
early
Greek philosophers to the present day" (Bloch, 1986*
xxviixxviii)

^

r

i

^

,

Mariategui, like Bloch, definitely perceives the idea
of utopia not as an impossible ideal, but as a real
and
concrete final state which can be achieved politically.
They both see the development of socialism as the modern
expression of the utopian function which effects this
change the goal towards which the process of history is
impelled by utopian thinking. However, there is a
fundamental difference in the concrete parameters which
provoke the development of utopian thought in both thinkers.
Whereas Bloch (including, of course, the philosophical
considerations implicit in his thought) is critically
reacting to the "real socialism" in Eastern Europe and the
oppressiveness of the Stalinism of the "Cold War" era;
Mariategui is constructively stimulated by a still-youngand-not-yet-degenerated Bolshevik Revolution (and
economically disadvantaged) on one hand, and the
materially precarious conditions in Peru (which Mariategui
equaled to the young Soviet Union) and upon which the
Peruvian socialism had to be constructed.
,

,

252

the dialectical-historical tendency
science
Marxism is thus the mediated future science of
reality plus th e o b j ectively real no^jbilitvof
within it ; all this for the purpose of action.
The difference from the anamnesis of the
Become
together with all its variations, could not be
more illuminating; this is true both of the
enlightening Marxist method and of the
enlightened, unenclosed matter within it.
only
the horizon o f th e future, which Marxism occupies.
with that—of the past as the ante-room, gives
reality its real d imension (author's emphasis)
(Bloch,

1986:

285)

Indeed, each one in a distinct style, for Mariategui would

have had rejected Bloch's overly systematic thought, aspires
to transform Marxist theory in the science of the future.

Both thinkers implicitly empathize with the idea that

Marxism's "cold stream" of analysis, empowered to penetrate
the contradictions and possibilities of change in historical

processes, must combine itself with the "warm stream" of

utopia (Bloch, 1986: 205-210).

For the latter (i.e. the

"warm stream") always represents the will of breaking with
the established order (provided that it is an unjust and

oppressive one) and imaginary anticipation of the longed
"realm of liberty".

Following the logic of this idea, Mariategui indicates
that

revolution is not exclusively fulfilled through a
conceptually cold pathway (Bloch's "cold stream").
The revolution more than an idea, is a sentiment.
More than a concept, is a passion. To understand
it, it is necessary a spontaneous spiritual

253

attitude, a special psychological capacity
(Mariategui, 1964: 155) 32
.

On his part, Ernst Bloch in agreement with his understanding
of socialism as the great "realist utopia" of our time, will

concentrate all his philosophical effort to prove that the
emergence of

a

critical Marxist science does not

definitively eliminate utopia.
utopian function in

a

According to Bloch, the

Marxism thus conceived would

constitute the radicalization and realization of what he
calls "the concrete utopia" 33

In this way,

.

socialism can

be envisioned as a rational utopia, as a politico-

revolutionary project incorporated by elements such as
science,

ideal, knowledge, and willpower.

Marxism, assimilated and re-constituted (i.e.

"devoured" along with other philosophical discourses) in
32

Flores Galindo remarks that for Mariategui Marxism is
not a simple "theory", neither a sophisticated play of
"concepts".
It is rather, a way of life:

Marxism was a practice that implicated every man
and all men; it banished the isolationism and
individualism of intellectuals, to immerse them in
politics, synonym of passion.
It is thus, how
reason, sentiments, intelligence, and imagination
converged (Flores Galindo, 1982: 54).
33

In The Principle of Hope

.

Bloch explains that

the thus determined imagination of the
utopian function is distinguished from
mere fantasizing precisely by the fact
that only the former has in its favour a
Not-Yet-Beinq of an expectable kind our
emphasis), i.e. does not play around and
get lost in an Empty-Possible, but
psychologically anticipates a RealPossible (Bloch, 1986: 144).
(
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such an "anthropophagic" manner in Mariategui's
theoretical
practice, is the Blochian "docta spes" [educated hope].
is,

It

in Mariategui's view, the revolutionary social
myth

that,

substantially supported by

science oriented to the

a

future ("Marxism as the 'science' of the necessity of
utopia"), encourages the proletarian movement toward the

realization of

world where, according to Marx and Engels'

a

Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848)
in place of the old bourgeois society, with its
classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an
association, in which the free development of each
is the condition for the free development of all
(Marx,

1978

:

491)

Mariategui believed that here was

a

material basis of human

history, and indeed, of human action.

marxismo

he quoted

,

In Defensa del

Bukharin to sustain this point:

According to Marx, the production relationships
are the material base of society (Mariategui,
1985

:

89)

On first sight this view would seem to conflict with the

importance that Mariategui reserved for myth in human
history.

He does however, seem to have accorded the

greatest importance to this view of materialism:
Marxist materialism encompasses, as I have
affirmed on another occasion, all the
possibilities of moral, spiritual, and
philosophical ascension, in our epoch (Mariategui,
1985:

85)

The other occasion, was his well-known Amauta editorial,

"Aniversario y balance", in which he used practically the
same expression:
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Socialist 34 materialism encompasses all the
possibilities of spiritual, ethical, and
philosophical ascension (Mariategui, 1987a: 250)
He further adds,

(and this sentence follows directly and is

the concluding sentence of the editorial)
and we have never felt more rabid and efficacious,
and more religiously idealist (in the ethical and
not in the philosophical sense) than when we
firmly rest our ideas as well as our feet o firm
matter [materia] (Mariategui, 1987a: 250).

Consequently, the material basis of human action

offered

a

base upon which the human spiritual dimension

would also develop.

And further on,

in Historia de la

crisis mundial [History of World Crisis]

,

Mariategui points

out that

history shows us that political and social
organization in a society corresponds to the
structure, to the tendencies of the productive
forces (our emphasis) (Mariategui, 1959b: 135)
Many critics suggest that these latter views do not
seem consistent with Mariategui'

s

earlier affirmation of the

importance of myth in history, especially in the

contemporary epoch as they appear in works such as El alma
matinal v otras estaciones del hombre de hoy [The Matinal
Soul and Other Stations of Contemporary Man]
18-23).

(e.g.

1972a:

For instance, those critics see Mariategui's

diverse philosophical influences as

a

disparate "clash" of

the doctrines of Hegel, Croce, Marx, and Lenin against those
of Nietzsche,

Sorel, Bergson, Gobetti and the influence of

Note that "socialist" is here interchanged for
"Marxist"
34
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his early religious/mystical experience.

According to them,

they represent two sides of Mariategui's thinking that
were

probably never completely resolved.
1984)

Jorge Del Prado (1983,

supposes that if Mariategui had lived longer and

continued his Marxist Leninist readings"

,

it seems quite

probable that his thinking would have evolved in the

direction of

a

materialism.

more consistent Marxist historical
The argument follows a somewhat lineal

(teleological) reconstruction of Mariategui's writings.

traces Mariategui's development toward

Leninism as

a

a

It

"mature" Marxism-

process that seemed to have been underway in

1928-1930, and was interrupted by his untimely death.

It

contends that those writings more heavily influenced by the

notion of myth appear in El alma matinal and date from 1925,

while those of his writings which most strongly reflect his

Marxist materialism appear in Defensa del marxismo and date
from 1929.

Ergo, by merely looking at the chronological

development of Mariategui's work, one sees

a

much more

mature and consistent Marxism developing.
The critical consequence underlying this argument would

certainly jeopardize the validity of our defense of Latin

American philosophical authenticity.

Its assumptions taken

to a macro-level (i.e. at a continental and/or at a "Third

World" context) would suggest, firstly:

that the

authenticity of the philosophical identity of any
"underdeveloped" social formation would be certified insofar
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it indigenous development holds a
structural and historical

resemblance (i.e.

a

diachronic and

a

synchronic parallel)

with regard to the supposed philosophical systems
of the socalled "advanced" social formations; and secondly,
that the
"propitious" encounter (i.e. univocal identification)
would
be just a matter of a historical process, provided
that
the

social formation in question does not suffer a sudden
°kl iterat ion of its development by natural or political

causes 35

.

We argue that Mariategui's theoretical practice

definitely proves that there is not really much point in

wondering whether

a

given "Third World" thinker is a genuine

philosopher or on the other hand, that he/she regards

his/her theoretical praxis as an immanent affirmation of the
death of philosophy as understood by the "official"
tradition.

It is precisely the case,

particularly with

Mariategui, where many other theoretical disciplines have

assumed the function that Eurocentric culture has attributed
to philosophy.

Therefore, any form of thought (regardless

of its manifest will to validate itself as "philosophy" or

even as "anti-philosophy"), be that from the "advanced

nations" or the so-called "Third World", is fundamentally

a

living (material) expression which evolves and expresses

35

For instance, Germany and Spain would have become
socialist states had they defeated fascist aggression; Chile
would have become the second socialist state in Latin
America in 1973, had not they suffered Pinochet's coup de
etat
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ltSelf

~ith a discrete organic unity

Otherwise, the form

.

of thought just would immediately
lose its relevance

concerning reality, it would be unable to
interpellate
social and political reality or articulate
with

any of its

levels in a transformative way.

Following Gilles Deleuze

and Felix Guattari's nomenclature, Mariategui's
theoretical
praxis would be a "philosophy-becoming" (Deleuze
& Guattari,
1987a: 232-309) which has nothing to do with the
"official"

history of philosophy and which emerges through

a

revolutionary thinker whom the history of philosophy has
not
managed to classify, not even by the most colonized versions
of the history of philosophy in Latin America (e.g. Gracia,

1986,

1988,

1988-89 and others).

Consequently, to become is

never to imitate, nor to "do like" or "think like", nor to

conform to a sanctioned model, whether it is
justice or of truth.

a

model of

There is no boundary from where one

sets out, none which one arrive at or which one ought to

arrive at.

That is, as Mariategui "becomes", what he is

"becoming" changes as he does himself, and not necessarily

toward some validating pre-established theoretical model
(that would authenticate it as a "pure" offspring of

Marxism-Leninism)

.

As Deleuze himself illustrates this

process of x-becoming:
Becomings are not phenomena of imitation or
assimilation, but of a double capture, of nonparallel evolution (our emphasis)
of nuptials
between two reigns. Nuptials are always against
nature.
Nuptials are the opposite of a couple...
The wasp and the orchid provide the example.
The
,

259

orchid seems to form a wasp image, but in fact
there is a wasp-becoming of the orchid, a orchidbecoming of the wasp, a double capture since
"
what" each becomes changes no less than "that
which" becomes (our emphasis)
The wasp becomes
part of the orchid's reproductive apparatus at the
same time as the orchid becomes the sexual organ
of the wasp.
One and the same becoming (our
emphasis)
a single bloc of becoming.
(Deleuze,
.

,

.

1987b: 2-3).

.

Accordingly, Mariategui's theoretical praxis regarded as
"becoming" would be an entity mostly imperceptible.

a

It is

an act (an event) which is indeed contained in a time-

confined life and expressed in
way of "doing").

a

writing -thinking) style
(

(a

And styles are not constructions, any more

than are modes of life

To regard Mariategui's complete

.

works, and perhaps any other writer's complete works (we ask

ourselves if this may be also correct of any "complete
works") as a "completed work", that is, close in itself,

imports an error.

A "living man/woman" exists in a

"

He/She lives in a complementary plenitude

plurivocal " way.

against which an analysis of
existence necessarily renders

would be equivalent to

his/her extremities.

a

single aspect of such

a

a

deficient symmetry.

It

separate examination of any of

Although we have attempted an

interpretation of Mariategui in its full organic unity, we
admit that we have overlooked (perhaps involuntarily) the

anthropological or even the ontological aspect of this
We are even willing to acknowledge our approach as

problem.
a

specific form of

works of

a

a

"complementary entry point" in the

Latin American philosopher.
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We therefore argue, that these apparently antagonistic

tendencies are "organically" resolved in Mariategui'
thought in

a

greater extent than seems readily apparent to

other readers.

While it is true that he originally thought

that "myth moves men in history" (Mariategui, 1972a:

19)

,

he

felt that Marxist materialism offered all the possibilities
of spiritual, ethical, and philosophical ascension 36

.

Myth

could, therefore, also be firmly rooted in the material

reality of the epoch and would not be an external,
philosophical reality that was being imposed on
situation.

a

concrete

It was a function of the material conditions of

such a situation, the dominant mode of production.

Wherefore, the fact that the bourgeoisie lacked

a

myth in

the historical epoch in which Mariategui was writing was not
a result of some abstract metaphysical deduction,

but of the

historical stage in which the Occidental world found itself
after World War

I.

The fact that the proletariat (the

result of the dialectical forces in history in itself) was

experiencing

a

revolutionary myth and the actual possibility

of the construction of a concrete utopia was the result of

the material forces in history (e.g. the Bolshevik

Revolution)

.

It was actually a function of the historical

epoch in which the proletariat was living.
36

In El alma

Mariategui s thought is not, in this instance,
different from aspects of Gramsci's thought or entirely
distinct from Marx, who continually noted that the superstructure of a social formation resulted from its economic
base
'
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matina

,

Mariategui expresses the dialectic between the

historical material conditions and the realm of ideas which
are contained in his particular notion of social myth in the

following compact formulation:

possessed and enlightened by
(Mariategui,

1972a:

19)

a

"History causes men to be
superior belief..."

.

Many critics have not entirely realized the nature and
function of Mariategui' s concept of myth.

As one assumes

and understands the diverse philosophical influences which

inform the development Mariategui'

s

special brand of

Marxism, the nature and origin of this concept becomes more

comprehensible. Like Antonio Gramsci and many other

progressive intellectuals in the 1920s, Mariategui was
reacting against the extreme rationalism of "fin de siecle"
thought which was manifest in movements such as

positivism 37

.

In Argentina,

for instance, the positivist

influence completely pervaded the cultural and philosophic

37

Leopoldo Zea, the Mexican philosopher and historian
of Latin American philosophy, argues with regard to the
influence of positivism on Latin American intellectuals
that,

(positivism) presented itself (to the Latin
American intellectuals committed to the
independence of Latin America) as the most
suitable instrument to achieve its (i.e. Latin
America's) entire mental emancipation and, with
it, a new order that was to reflect its
consequences in the political and social realm.
Positivism presented itself as the most adequate
philosophy to create a new order (Zea, 1976c, Vol.
I: 63-64)
.
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environment.

Consequently, some positivists became

interested in socialism and
(some),

like. Jose Ingenieros and Juan
B. Justo,
S
n
f Marxism in which
they
£°
combined
’?
it wi?h t
th^
SltlV1Sm ° f Spencer Zea 197 6c,
?08^°
r

Vol

.

(

II:

>

But as Leopoldo Zea remarks, the
resulting socialism never
became a revolutionary Marxism (Zea,
1976c, Vol.
II

:

109

115).

Positivism seems to have prevented the
ideology form
assuming its revolutionary potential. in
this way it was
very similar to European social democracy,
which also
believed that structural change must only come
about

according to certain laws and in harmony with
certain

predetermined stages.

Of course, this assumption dismissed

the necessity of direct action or revolutionary
violence.
In Europe and Latin America alike, the reaction
of

progressive sectors to such ultra-rationalism (and the
resulting rationalization of the status guo) forced many to
look for intellectual sources that would distance them from

positivism and the deterministic orientation that it
implied:

from its subordination of human will and action to

the "laws" of human development.

Acknowledging the latter contention with regard to the

positivistic tendency of the 1920s Marxism, Mariategui, reinterpreted the traditional, Third World reality in the
light

of highly "redesigned" Marxist thought.

If his

reconstruction of Peru's pre-colonial "Golden Age" (i.e. the
so-called Incaic communism) was not entirely accurate, his
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appreciation for some of the virtues in traditional

communalism or "ayllus" was groundbreaking.

It wa also a

major step in affirming Peru's Third World character and
thus negating the basis for Eurocentric thought among

Peruvian and Latin American intellectuals.

Mariategui

'

s

On this regard,

example constitutes an immanent critique of the

recurring Latin American disciples of Marx who did not know
how to elaborate or resolve the dialectical relationship

between the national

,

problematic and the world context.

Consequently, and all too frequently, their works seem to be

more echo of commentary of other formulations than the
result of authentic intellectual creation.
A similar view is expressed by Jorge Abelardo Ramos in
El marxismo de Indias

.

He vehemently criticizes the

"disproportionate Europeanization of Marxism in Latin
America", he proposes a complete break with revolutionary

phraseology that is copied and thus, lacking in substance,
actually creates an obstacle to the specific understanding
of the Latin American reality (Ramos,

1973:

7-8).

As should

be drastically clear, Mariategui was very much the

exception.

He focused on the Indians, the peasants, a

different of type of revolutionary party (from the

predominant Leninist idea of an excessively centralized

organization of revolutionary "professionals")
importance of popular culture.

Thus,

,

and the

for instance, Carlos

Altamirano in El marxismo en la America Latina

,

notes that
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Mariategui was without doubt the most
brilliant intellectual
the early history of Latin American
Marxism

m

1972.

(Altamirano,

9).

He,

like Ramos and many other current Marxist

intellectuals, now realizes the importance of
Mariategui’s

effort in adapting Marxism to the national realities

precisely so it could serve as a tool to better understand
and eventually change that reality.

that

Altamirano, remarks

the road that Mariategui chose shows us the only

legitimate way to use Marxist thought and practice"
(Altamirano, 1972: 9).

4.5

Theory As a Pluralistic Instrument For Revolutionary
Combat
Marx and Engels never quite articulated a theory of

revolution and its strategic and tactical considerations.
Lenin and the Bolsheviks, attentive to this unfortunate
deficiency, claimed that there could not be a revolution

without a revolutionary theory.

However, the historical

fact of their efficacy in the seizure of power and the

creation of a workers and peasants state initially based on
the Soviets does not necessarily imply that this auspicious

outcome was the direct consequence of having created a

"revolutionary theory".

We believe that what actually

happened (not only with Lenin and the Bolsheviks but also
with the succeeding "Marxist-Leninist " organizations that
still persist totally disconnected from reality) was a
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misrecognition of that old dialectic between
theory and
practice which has haunted Marxist tradition

for so long.

This brings us to consider Mariategui's
views on the
interrelated nature of theory and practice.
Mariategui's
entry into professional life and indeed the
intellectual
world w as through pract i cal work (beginning
as
a

linotypist's assistant and then evolving to
editor and journalist)

.

a

full-fledged

With the exception of his reading

during his hospital confinement as

a youth,

his self-

education occurred while he was engaged in practical
activity.

Although he was exposed to

a

great many

theoretical and philosophical influences in Europe, the
great majority of these were Marxist and Mariateguui was
also clearly aware of the admonitions Marx had made in The

Poverty of Ph ilosophy to keep all theory practically
oriented.

Thus his theory was never too far removed from

reality, and tended to be practical in nature:

The perfect, absolute, abstract idea which is
indifferent to the fact, to the mobile, changing
reality is not valued.
It is the concrete,
operational idea - which is rich in potential and
capable of movement, that works four emphasis)
(Mariategui, 1987a: 246)
We nonetheless consider that the theoretical production of

Mariategui constitutes the actual enactment of

a

unique

relationship between theory and practice, distinct from the
Leninist model.

We argue that such relationship does not

follow exactly the Leninist ascendancy that Mariategui

himself sought (and thought of his own theoretical
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production)

What is more, as

.

a

result of a rather forceful

re-reading of Mariategui (and an explicit determination to
recover actuality and competence of his thought for the

revolution of our times)

contributed

a

,

we believe that Mariategui has

different dialectical juxtaposition of theory

and practice, a resolution intensely informed by the

dynamics of revolutionary practice.

This would help to

explain the nature of the theoretical import in Mariategui'

analysis and the concrete nature of his writings.

Likewise,

the formative influence in (and nature of) his revolutionary

practical political activity becomes more intelligible.
In Marxist tradition from Engels to Lenin and Trotsky;

from Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara to Mao Zedong
and Ho Chi-minh; there has been a sustained and urgent

preoccupation concerning the strategic and tactical
difficulties implicated in the fundamental question of
"doing a (successful) revolution".

In these cases, practice

has been generally regarded as an application of theory, a

consequence; at other times, it had an opposite sense and it
was thought to inspire theory, to be indispensable for the

slight modifications that the old theory had to suffer in
order to work.

In any event, their relationship was

understood in terms of

a

process of "totalization", and

there is always in their theoretical practices, an

underlying persistence to keep themselves within the
theoretical and ideological boundaries of Marxism, to
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maintain at any cost its theoretical "purity". For us,
however, the question is seen in

a

different light in view

of the re-reading Mariategui's theoretical practice that we

have attempted.

We argue that Mariategui (implicitly)

conceived the relationships between theory and practice as
far more partial and fragmentary.

Evidently dominated by

multiple and dissimilar philosophical inspirations on one
hand, and by the appropriation and reconstructive

"ingestion" of various disciplines into

single organic

a

theoretical discourse (e.g. economics, literary theory,
anthropology, mythology, etc.), on the other, Mariategui had

conceived a distinct resolution between theory and practice.
He assumed that a theory is always local and related to a

limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or
less distant from it.

We observe that Mariategui was

attempting to develop

a

correlation between theory and

practice by stating implicitly that the relationship which
holds in the application of
resemblance.
a

a

theory is never one of

Moreover, from the moment

theory moves into

a

proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles, walls,

and blockages which require its transmission by another type
of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it

eventually passes to

a

different domain 38

)

.

We would

Take for instance, Mariategui's tacit acknowledgment
of the Eurocentric Marxism's ineptitude to cope with the
Quechua cultural "universe" and his (critical) invocation to
the legacy of significant mythologists such as George James
Another interesting case of this
Frazer The Golden Bough
38

(

)

.
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portray Mar idtegui
a_s

1

s

understanding of theoretical practice

a set of relays from one theoretical point to another,

and theory as a relay from one practice to another

.

Therefore, no theory could develop without eventually

encountering

a

wall, and practice, according to Mariategui,

is necessary for piercing this wall.

This activity would

necessarily re-state the ways of "doing philosophy".
Mariategui could be well included in an inventory of Latin

American intellectual history as one of those instances
where action has been privileged vis

a

vis cultural

production (envisioned as textual "fetishes").

Conceivably,

for Mariategui was also influenced by Henri Bergson, he was

reasonably persuaded by the hypothesis that the only

possible pertinence regarding human subjectivity
(particularly those who exhibited

a

discrete desire to

"change reality") operating within the social realm was that

there were only action (events); that is, theoretical action
and practical action which serve as relays and form

networks.

In this sense theory does not express, translate,

relay by another type of discourse forced by a certain
obstacle, is Mariategui' s utilization of psychoanalysis to
interpret and recognize the revolutionary merit of
This perhaps, discloses an
Surrealist art and literature
implied critique to the lack of a theory of subjectivity
underlying the 1920s Marxism. In the section on
"Freudianism and Marxism", Mariategui suggests that the
Marxist dialectical principle does not reduce human action
to a mechanical economy that would exclude psychological
factors (Mariategui, 1985: 69). On the contrary, Mariategui
does not find the teachings of Marxist theory incompatible
with psychoanalytic theory.
.
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or serve to apply practice:

it is practice

But it must be

.

conceived as

a

totalizing

For Mariategui, theoretical practice was

.

fundamentally

local and regional endeavor, and not

a

struggle against power,

struggle aimed at

a

revealing and subverting power where it is most invisible
and deceitful.

A theory (and this definition is what

exactly underlies Mariategui' s conception of theoretical
practice)

is exactly like a "box of tools".

It has nothing

to do with the signifier (concepts are no longer treated as

privileged repositories of transparent and univocal
"essences"

)

Mariategui is not content to say that we must re-think
certain notions regarding Marxist principles.
even mention it, he just goes on to do it

proposes new coordinates for praxis.

.

He does not

and in this way

His approach to

theoretical practice could well be summarized in the
formulation:
for itself.

theory must be useful.
If no one uses it,

It must work

;

and not

beginning with the

theoretician himself (this situation is clearly embodied in
most academic intellectuals and/or scholars), then the

theory is worthless or the moment is just inappropriate.
One must not revise a theory, but construct new ones; we

have no choice but to "manufacture" others.

His

appropriation and adaptation of other philosophical
persuasions implicitly confirms that he regarded theory had
to be considered as a pair of glasses directed to the
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outside;
pair.

if they did not suit you,

you had to find another

Mariategui’s theoretical practice unexpressedly

indicated the imperative that we must leave it to the
agents
involved in (revolutionary) action, those crucially

constrained by a radical necessity of social change, to find
their own theoretical instrument, which is necessarily an

instrument for combat

.

An attentive reading of Mariategui’s

complete writings would show his refusal to construct a
totalizing theoretical discourse.

His endeavor could be

best defined as a "theoretical pluralism":

an idea of

theoretical practice in which theory does not totalize; it
intended to be an instrument for multiplication which

is

also multiplies itself in its effective performance.
is an

There

underlying suggestion in Mariategui’s thought in the

sense that it is already in the nature of power to totalize
and consequently,

it must be our explicit position,

that

theory thus conceived, is by nature opposed to power.

We

must then resolve, that as soon as a theory is entrenched in
a

particular point, we must realize that

it will never

possess the slightest practical importance unless it can
erupt in a totally different area.

4.6

MariAtegui’s Thought: Decoding the Way Toward the
Validation of Authentic Latin American Philosophical
Discourses
Chapters One and Two discussed extensively the problem

of creating an authentic Latin American philosophical
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discourse.

Furthermore, the crucial intention of Chapters

Three and Four is the assessment of Mariategui's
Marxism in

order to present a distinct expression of the "anatomy"
of
an authentic Latin American philosophical discourse.

The

fundamental strategy utilized in the first two chapters was
a hermeneutical analysis of the arguments provided by
the

respective interlocutors who have addressed and taken part
in this philosophical dialogue that has pervaded Latin

American cultural history.

We implemented this specific

textual analysis for we regarded it as the most appropriate

procedure, among other contending interpretive strategies
that have attempted to elucidate.

Our approach to these

texts allowed a genuine recovery of their intrinsic sense
and meaning pertaining the issue under consideration.

We

assumed that a real understanding of these authors

presupposed that the concepts that were meaningful in their
historical past, had to be recuperated in such a way that
they necessarily included our own current historical

perspective
What we expected to prove in this theoretical dialogue

with the Latin American philosophical tradition is that any

attempted program for an authentic Latin American philosophy
must be envisioned in terms a culturally de-central ized

revision of the official (i.e. Eurocentric) history of
philosophy.

However, we have emphasized that this

historical deconstruction should never be misconceived as an
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anti-European reaction with regard to Europe’s philosophical
legacy.
i

Our scrutiny should not be construed, under any

urns t anc

center

,

as a programmatic intention to replace a

of philosophical activity from Europe to Latin

America.

Essentially,

it

is a critique of the formations of

centers that incidentally self— appoint themselves as

ubiquitous paradigms for any form of philosophical
reflection.
This therapeutic destruction of the traditional

exercise of philosophy is informed by an imperative re-

encounter of the Latin American philosopher with his own
cultural foundations.

The consequence of placing the

question for a "Latin American philosophy" in the greater
context of Latin American cultural production is that it has
enabled me to draw more productive suggestions through the

examination of other intellectual sources that have
eventually facilitated the elucidation of the Latin American
philosophical identity.
In attention to the central question concerning this

dissertation we have claimed that a hermeneutic strategy of
devising a re-interpretation of just one thinker would have
yielded better and more illuminating results than just a
general survey.

Therefore, that is why the "case study

chose has been that of the Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos

Mariategui

we
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We were convinced that Marxism
could (and must) be

legitimately pursued as one of the many
philosophical
discourses along with many others of
European descent (e.g.
analytical philosophy, phenomenology,
existentialism)
adopted and adapted to the particular
historical, socio-

political, and even anthropological
circumstances of Latin
America.
Consequently, we were persuaded
that an

examination of the reception of Marxism in Latin
America
provided the reader with the historical and
cultural

background that would facilitate first, an appropriate

clarification of Mariategui

’s

intellectual production; and

second, the textual confirmation of an authentic Latin

American philosophical discourse.

Namely, the analysis of

Mariategui may enable us to visualize the delineation and
portrayal of the allocation of alien philosophical
influences into the pattern and practice of indigenous forms
of thought in Latin America.

We have shown that although Mariategui was an

internationally aware Marxist, his Peruvian and Latin
American identity inclined his thinking in some highly
original ways.

He was one of the first to develop

revolutionary thought from within the Latin American
reality.

Mariategui immanently (and successfully)

accomplished in his thought what Helio Gallardo suggests
that committed Latin American philosophers must do: to think
in Latin American [pensar en lat inoamericano

]

.

Such
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"thinking" is a "practical socio-historical
activity", which
must be aware of its socio-historic roots"
(Gallardo, 1981:
Such thought may be couched in general
Marxist theory,

18).

but its is historic and thus fully conscious
of the

particularities that determine the reality at hand.
By thinking in context, Mariategui has been
able to

elucidate the Peruvian and Latin American reality in the
light of his Marxist method and the wealth of personal and

intellectual experiences ha had gained in Europe and Peru.
He always strived for an original analysis of his own

reality.

In La filosofia americana como filosofia sin mas

T

Leopoldo Zea cites Simon Bolivar’s teacher Simon Rodriguez
to the effect that Latin America must not imitate either

Europe or the United States, must be original.

The

necessity in for originality in culture and philosophy

especially great, Zea adds.

is

One cannot slavishly academic

or philosophic systems that are imported from Europe or

elsewhere.

It is necessary to think,

from within one’s own reality.

to analyze, to create

Only in this way can

formerly colonized people affirm their own culture and

indigenous-mixed character and contribute to universal

philosophy and culture (Zea, 1969: 32-33).

This argument

which parallels in many respects the thinking of Frantz
Fanon

(

The Wretched of the Earth

World nationalists,

.

1968) and other Third

is most applicable to Mariategui.

He
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attempted to analyze and interpret Peruvian reality
in light
of a consciously and deliberately articulated
interpretive

paradigm that relied on Marxist methodology and other
intellectual innovative appropriations, but effectively
applied them in the context of the peculiar Peruvian
^s&lity*

The result has been an extremely fresh and very

original analysis of Peruvian reality.

Such outcome marked

on one hand, the beginning of an authentically Latin

American Marxism, and another example of an authentically
Latin American philosophical discourse.
We must point out however,

that Mariategui’s initial

efforts in this area did not generate immediate acclaim.
One could argue that the full import of the Seven Essays was
not widely realized for many years after his death.

The

second edition of the work was not issued until 1943
(fifteen years after the first edition in 1928); the third
did not appear until 1952 (Falcon,

1978).

It did not begin

to be widely read until the late 1950s.

One could argue,

for instance, that any of the attempts

of other Latin American intellectuals to interpret Marxist

theory could also stand as instances of authentic Latin

American philosophical discourses.
context,

Even in that particular

it is difficult to locate Mariategui in the epoch

which he was writing.

There were a few Latin American

Marxists, like Anibal Ponce, who ma have been better versed
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in the classical categories of
European Marxism and thus

better able to frame their analyses in
accepted Marxist
terminology.
As with many later Marxists in Latin
America,
this classical Eurocentric Marxist view
would, however,

militate strongly against original analyses in
situ (from

^ thin

the Latin American contextual reality).

It would not

engender the creation of Latin American Marxist thought
or
analysis, but would permit Latin Americans to employ
a

European Marxism that (like previous philosophic and
cultural systems) was not of their own making.

This,

it

could further be argued, would only help to perpetuate Latin

American cultural dependency in a new, albeit far more
subtle, way.

Conversely, there were Peruvian writers, like

Victor Andres Belaunde and Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, who
were beginning original analyses of aspects of the Peruvian

reality

(

Chang-Rodr i guez

,

1957), but who were doing so

without the full benefit of the intellectual and analytic
innovations that Marxism and other philosophical discourses
were contributing to world culture.

For Mariategui stands

as an instance of the unique encounter (or coupling) of

"alien" philosophical discourses and indigenous forms of

thought staged in his theoretical practice, he would be

criticized by Europeanized Marxists like Eudocio Ravines for
being too nationalist and by the nationalist for being too
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Marxist

39
.

Evidently, neither understood the nature
of

Mariategui’s original enterprise.

Both views have failed to

perceive that Mariategui’s thought encompasses,
on one
front, an immanent and devastating critique of

regionalized

or nationalistic philosophical discourses,

and on the other,

the rejection of colonized forms of

thought captivated and eventually trapped in their

respective local accounts of philosophical and cultural

Eurocentrism

4.7

Beyond a Reading of Mariategui: Eurocentric Rationality
and its Discontents
Frequently, some Latin Americans are taken at times for

apprentices, for rough drafts or uninteresting copies of
Europeans, including among these latter whites who

constitute what Marti called "European America".
Accordingly, Latin America culture is taken as an

apprenticeship, a rough draft or copy of European
(bourgeois) culture ("an emanation of Europe", as Bolivar
said).

This last error is more recurrent than the first,

since confusion of a Puerto Rican with an Englishman, or a

Guatemalan with a German, tends to be impeded by a certain
ethnic tenacity.

The confusion lies in the root itself,

39

See, for instance, Manuel Aquezolo Castro, ed La
This works contains the
polemica del indigenismo (1976).
original texts of the now famous debate between Luis Alberto
Sanchez and Mariategui about "indigenismo" and socialism.
.
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because as descendants of numerous Indian,
African, and
European communities, we have only a few languages
with
which to understand one another: those of the
colonizers.
While other colonials or ex-colonials in
metropolitan

centers speak among themselves in their own language, we
Latin Americans continue to use the language of the
colonizers.

These are the

linguas francas" capable of

going beyond the frontiers that neither the aboriginal nor

Creole languages succeed in crossing.
as we are expounding,

At this very moment,

as we are defending our distinct

philosophical tradition, how else can we do it except in one
of the ir languages, which is by virtue of academic and

institutional reasons, now our language, and with so many of
their conceptual tools, which are now (by virtue of

appropriation or cultural anthropophagy) our conceptual
tools?

This is precisely the extraordinary outcry that we

uncover in

a

work by perhaps the most extraordinary writer

of fiction who ever existed.

In The Tempest

,

William

Shakespeare’s last play, the deformed Caliban (enslaved,
robbed of his island, and trained to speak by Prospero

rebukes Prospero thus:

on’t/ Is,

I

"You taught language, and my profit

know how to curse.

For learning me your language!"

The red plague rid on you/

(1.2.362-64).

We must not

forget that "Caliban" is Shakespeare’s anagram for

"cannibal", an expression that he had already used to mean
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anthropophagus "

,

in the third part of Henry IV and in

Othello and that comes in turn from the word "carib"
Before the arrival of the Europeans, whom they resisted
heroically, the Carib Indians were the most indomitable and

warlike inhabitants of the very lands that we occupy today.
Their name lives on in the name of the Caribbean Sea
(referred to graciously by some as the

American

Mediterranean, just as if we were to call the Mediterranean
the Caribbean of Europe).

But the name "carib" itself, as

well as in its deformation, cannibal

,

has been perpetuated

in this sense in the eyes of the Europeans above all as

denigration.

It is the term in this sense that Shakespeare

takes up and elaborates into a complex and ideologically

saturated symbol.

Because of its exceptional importance

regarding the present philosophical reflection we have been

compelled to make a legitimate use of it.

We have invoked

the forceful validity of this metaphor as the guiding

intuition of our endeavor.

We have turned its original

meaning around, transforming it into a lucid self-

understanding of our own philosophical character, whose

authenticity rests upon the indispensable condition that

it

conceives itself as a philosophical experience of alterity
with regard to the metropolitan centers of philosophical

production
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William Shakespeare’s The Tempest, has been
regarded by
many contemporary critics as the great literary
metaphor of
Europe’s turbulent colonization of the new world.
Conceivably, all the anti-colonial revolutions that
took
place during the 1960s ultimately established their

interpretive hegemony of this work.
Wain,

For instance, John

in The Living Wo rld of Shakespeare (1964) will points

out that Caliban
has the pathos of the exploited peoples
everywhere, poignantly expressed at the beginning
of a three-hundred-year wave of European
colonization; even the lowest savage wishes to be
left alone rather than be "educated" and made to
work for someone else, and there is an undeniable
justice in his complaint:
"For I am all the
subjects that you have,/ Which once was mine own
king".
Prospero retorts with the inevitable
answer of the colonist: Caliban has gained in
knowledge and skill (though we recall that he
already knew how to build dams to catch fish, and
also to dig pig-nuts from the soil, as if this
were the English countryside).
Before being
employed by Prospero, Caliban had no language:
"... thou didst not, savage,/ Known thy own
meaning, but wouldst gabble like/ A thing most
brutish".
However, this kindness has been
rewarded with ingratitude.
Caliban, allowed to
live in Prospero ’s cell, has made an attempt to
ravish Miranda.
When sternly reminded of this, he
impertinently, says, with a kind of slavering
guffaw, "Oh ho! Oh ho! - would it have been done!/
Thou didst prevent me; I had peopled else/ This
Our own age which is much
isle with Calibans".
given to using the horrible word "miscegenation",
ought to have no difficulty in understanding this
passage (Wain, 1964: 226-227).

Therefore,

in place of an elegant and academic

approach, that is, a rhetorical technique of argumentation
(where points are made and won), we have deliberately
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pursued this undertaking by embracing instead
an "organic"
metaphor and not a "rational" argument" (i.e.

"Caliban" and

philosophical cannibalism").

We have sought to defend and

validate Mariategui’s reading of Marxist theory
in

particular and of European philosophical discourses
in
general as a paradigmatic practice that describes
concretely
the authentic Latin American philosophical identity.

We

argue that this phenomenon, at least in Mariategui’s case
(and others), could be metaphorically characterized by the

organic allegory of anthropophagy

.

For this reason, the

sub-title of the present dissertation has been designated as

"Philosophy as 'Caliban’ or a Defense of Philosophical
Cannibalism".

Namely, the philosophical appropriation of

alien philosophical discourses, that is, Mariategui’s case,
has been understood as a process of "cultural

anthropophagy": a destructive
(

"digestion"

)

(

"mastication" /construct ive
)

process which generally characterizes the

allocation of alien philosophical influences into the
pattern and practice of indigenous forms of thought in Latin
America.
practice.

We have re- interpreted Mariategui’s theoretical
We privileged aspects in his thought that other

critics have otherwise obliterated, or just misinterpreted.
In general terms,

the Mariategui "experts" can be

divided into two opposing tendencies.

emphasized what validates Mariategui as

One tendency has
a

"true" Marxist,
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assuming the Marxist-Leninist "paradigm" as the
sanctioning
criteria in the interior" of his theorizing; the
other

discredits his

Marxism",

inexorably branding him as an

irrationalist

of sorts.

His work is regarded by some

within this last tendency as ordinary philosophical
eclecticism, an unprincipled juxtaposition of disparate

philosophical doctrines.

However,

in agreement with the

proposed "organic" metaphor of "anthropophagy" suggested
above, the interpretation would be indeed, radically

different.

We believe that the utilization of such a

metaphor as an alternative (yet legitimate) path to truth
(Lakoff and Johnson,

1980) would inform its effects in a

structural re-organization of the various philosophical

discourses under play right in the interior
of Mariategui’s theoretical practice (i.e.

corpus).

(

"organicity"

its textual

We have construed some of the most (presumably)

problematic elements in his thought (i.e. Sorelianism,
Bergsonism, Nietzsche i sm

,

utopianism, Freudianism, his

mytho-poetic approach to "philosophical thinking", etc.),
firstly, as a positive sign (a healthy symptom of an

emerging and vigorous new form of thought), and secondly, as
a relatively autonomous force that ultimately developed into

an entirely new and highly functional hierarchy (structure).

This new hierarchy had as its guiding principle of action,
as its praxeolog ical

"translator" (that is,

if metaphor is
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allowed in this academic exercise):

to effect a direct

action able to encourage a socialist revolution.
In a compilation of essays by contemporary French

philosophers dedicated to the so-called political
discourses, that is, the centralizing discourses of power

underlying every single philosophical doctrine (Dominique
Grisoni.

Politicas de la filosoffa

.

Chatelet speaks of philosophy as powe

1982),
.

Francois

He considers

philosophy as the discourse of power that conceals the

domination of the master over the slave, the lord over the
servant, of the center over the periphery

.

Regarding this

"rendezvous" of philosophy and power he points out the

following
Every past philosophy was more or less engaged to
the master’s discourse, and as a result, our
ancient philosophers, despite some absurdities,
did nothing else but to express (if not repeat,
intensify) that masterly (author’s emphasis)
discourse (Chatelet, 1982: 28).

Philosophy is seen as a language that pretends to dominate
over other languages and over those who uphold them:

masterly philosophy as the only possibility of every
philosophical discourse, which frustrates any other
expressions that does not identify with that of the master
manipulator.

According to Chatelet (and other philosophers

included in this anthology), it was precisely against this

philosophy of domination that prevails not only over the

284

peoples tyrannized by

it,

but also over the peoples who
are

tyrannized with it, that the youth
have resisted all over
the world.
They affirmed the right to
express a nonmasterly philosophical discourse,
a concrete philosophy of
the multiple and concrete men
and women, and not necessarily
incomprehensible.
From such a perspective,
it is then

possible to conceive the emergence of
philosophical projects
that concern a multitude of men and
women, perhaps all men
and women, but not in the abstract.
The revolution of the
Parisian youth in May of 1968, has been
interpreted as a
powerful movement that had the primary purpose
of liberating
these young men and women from the masterly
philosophies
that

restricted" them to engaging in projects that they

could not acknowledge as theirs.

Dominique Grisoni remarks

the following:

With May (1968), philosophy had also experienced
some blows.
The most violent, and perhaps the
most decisive, will be the one that splintered the
omnipotence of the logos (author’s emphasis). The
word "liberated" itself, for everyone took hold
spontaneously of the right to discourse (author’s
emphasis).
Where everything turns into word, in
May, language re-invents itself perpetually,
without rules of use or of comprehension or of
syntax... (Grisoni, 1982: 17).
We definitely agree with this definition of language

expression and its philosophical consequences, where

a

discourse does not necessarily have to rely on pre-

established models and which only wants to make itself
understood without rules that conceal the reality of what is
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being expressed.
of this notion.
as a

Mariategui is certainly
Mariategui

nomadization

’s

a

clear testimony

theoretical practice proceeds

of thought.

"Nomadization" would imply

a displacement with regard to a philosophical activity
that

could be designated as an "institutional" philosophy.

Such

activity represents itself as a sedentary machine, or else,
as a device of

"

sedentarizat ion"

.

On the other hand, the

philosophical activity we have attempted to illustrate with
Mariategui’

s

"marginality"

case, must be visualized in terms of
,

as a "nomadic war machine",

"nomadization" (Cf. Deleuze & Guattari

,

as a device of

1987a:

Whatever discourse moves at the margins, that

351-423).
is,

"nomadic

thought", defies the institutional sedentary machine,

encoded in the masterly discourse.

In this way, we find in

one field the professionals of philosophy and on the other,
the philosophy of those who want to know

,

those who ask,

those who inquire what the world is or what they do not

Nomadic philosophy is precisely the one that realizes

know.

itself every single moment in close agreement to the

questions it addresses directly to the ever-moving reality.

Sedentary philosophy institutionalizes itself,
itself;
out.

its antagonist nullifies those codes,

What is then "nomadism"?

subversion.

it

encodes

it leaves them

It is the resurgence of

Subversion with regard to the established code.

The essential element of "nomadism" is the dismissal of
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codes, of their codes (i.e. the colonizing metropoli); those

codes that have originated in the techno-urban civilization,
and which proscribe the sovereign displacement, the agile

movement and the absence of foundations.
Therefore, subversion is equal to barbarism

,

it

is

its

proper name, yet absolutely improper with regard to the

masterly discourse.
practice,

It is a discourse,

if you like,

make itself heard.

a theoretical

that pursues and provokes violence to

Caliban replies to Prospero,

"barbarizing" Prospero’

s

language,

in order to tell him what

he ought to know about himself even if it horrifies him.

Caliban manifests himself most emphatically, when an entire
cultural tradition "revolts" by establishing
"barbarian" or "savage" patterns of thought.

a

seemingly
This takes

place precisely when the cosmopolitan philosophical

discourses which impose on the indigenous culture become
alienating prisons.

"Caliban" as philosophy aspires to a

legitimization that would not be defined as imitation or
quest for resemblance.
di f f erence

,

a

Such a project affirms itself in its

in its individuality.

We believe that

envisioning Mariategui’s thought as a case of philosophical
"

nomad i zat ion" might even open the possibility of recovering

and re- i nterpre t ing the "old nomadism", that is, the

historical or the anthropologically legitimized "nomadism".
From this perspective, Mariategui’s thought is a subversive
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act of a "barbarian" or a philosophical
Caliban, that seeks
to identify itself with the past subversions
and

"barbarisms" in order to validate the existence of
his

national culture

.

It is an accomplishment that does not

abdicate its inalienable right to affirm such a national
culture; regardless of the colonizer’s reticence,

bewilderment or even, in some cases,

a

"scholarly" consent

to the "colonized right to a native culture".

of the Earth

(

1963

),

The Wretched

regarded by many as "the handbook for

the Black Revolution", was written precisely by a colonized
man.

Unfortunately, this work has also been considered a

mere diatribe against the white man or the West.

Notwithstanding, Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), the distinguished
Black psychiatrist from Martinique, and leading spokesman of
the revolution which won independence for Algeria, has left
us in this work a brilliant examination of the role of

violence in effecting historical change.

For instance,

in a

characterization of the dialectics underlying the struggle
of the young colonized intelligentsia to affirm its national

culture in confrontation with a supposedly consenting
colonial intelligentsia, Fanon points out the following:
Inside the political parties, and most often in
offshoots from these parties, cultured individuals
For
of the colonized race make their appearance.
national
for
a
demand
the
these individuals,
culture and the affirmation of the existence of
such a culture represent a special battlefield
While the politicians situate
(our emphasis).
their action in actual present-day events, men of
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culture take their stand in the field of history.
Confronted with the native intellectual who
decides to make an aggressive response to the
colonialist theory of pre-colonial barbarism,
colonialism will react only slightly, and still
less because the ideas developed by the young
colonized intelligentsia are widely professed by
specialists in the mother country.
It is in fact
a common place to state that for several decades
large numbers of research workers have, in the
main, rehabilitated the African, Mexican, and the
Peruvian civilizations. The passion with which
native intellectuals defend the existence of their
national culture may be a source of amazement; but
those who condemn this exaggerated passion are
.strangely apt to forget that their own psyche and
their own selves are conveniently sheltered behind
a French or German culture which has given full
proof of its existence and which is uncontested
(our emphasis) (Fanon, 1968: 208-209).

Mariategui’s endeavor must be construed as an excruciating
effort to differentiate itself from the peoples at the other
side of the mirror who have struggled through the centuries
to become just like their masters,

the prostrated colonized.

to be their counterparts:

Our approach has been the

recognition of his work as an instance of Latin America’s
presumed "barbarism", and then an attempt to build upon such
"quality" the foundations of our identity, an identity

redefined in terms of a mutual recognition among men and

women without mistaking their respective singularities.

The

emergence of "patterns of thought" like Mariategui’s in
Latin America or in the rest of the Third World is actually
the appearance of philosophical discourses conceived as

projects, not the already established official discourses of
the metropolis

-

discursive projects articulated by

a myriad
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of speakers.

Mariategui and all the other creative

revolutionary thinkers who have embodied
in their life-works
the destiny and historical aspirations
of those human beings
who belong to the so-called "wretched of
the
Earth" (Fanon)

have opened the possibility of bringing down
the "Tower of
Babel" that has confused that part of the human
community.

They have set down the foundations of

a

new and unwavering

"tower" by incorporating all the diverse discourses
of their

creators
The Latin American disjunctive between "civilization

and barbarism" has been promoted by Europe itself in order
to manipulate nations and their indigenous cultures.

Furthermore, we claim that there is not such a conflict

between civilizaton and barbarism that supposedly defines
the "Third World" cultural situation in general.

has created a pseudo-problem.

That idea

What we have observed is a

profound discrepancy between false erudition and nature,

between a wrong attitude regarding the reception of
"imported" cultural artifacts (bad hermeneutics?) and the

misrecognit ion of our own (anthropological and political)
reality.

We believe that this has been a manifest

consequence of an "alienated enlightenment".
"barbarism",

However,

"nomadism", or call it "Cal ibanism"

,

is

necessarily the expression of the concrete man and woman,
the man and woman who live and die and refuse to fade away
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in anonymity.

Apparently, this delusion of Europe and the

rest of the so-called advanced nations with regard to

us^

seems to be in the process of a succeeding clarification,

alert perhaps (at a quite elusive level), to the threatening
fact that their civilization has turned into a regressive

mechanism threatening its own creator.
This dissertation should be envisioned as a fragmentary
effort, as a discrete and supplementary voice determined to

assume and profess our condition as Caliban.

To assume such

status has required rethinking and reinterpreting our

intellectual history from the other side, from the viewpoint
of the other protagonist.

The other protagonist of The

Tempest is not of course Ariel but, rather, Prospero.
is no real Ariel -Cal iban polarity:

There

both are slaves in the

hands of Prospero, the foreign enchanter.

Nonetheless,

Caliban is the rude and unconquerable master of the island,
while Ariel, a creature of the air, although also a child of
the island,

you will.

is the uprooted and colonized

intellectual

,

if

Hence, the symbol we have embraced as our battle

ensign cannot be Ariel, as Rodo would have preferred
1976), but rather Caliban.

(

Ariel

,

This is something that we, the

"mestizo" inhabitants of these same territories where

Caliban lived, see with particular clarity: Prospero invaded
our lands, killed our ancestors, enslaved Caliban, and

taught him his language to make himself understood.

What
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else can Caliban do but use the same language (today we have
no other) to curse him,

fall on him?

to wish that the "red plague" would

We know no other metaphor more expressive of

our cultural situation and therefore of our current

philosophic endeavor, of our future reality.
Amaru,

"Tiradentes"

,

Toussaint-Louverture

Benito Juarez, Antonio Maceo

,

,

From Tupac

Simon Bolivar,

and Jose Marti, to Emiliano

Zapata, Augusto Cesar Sandino, Julio Antonio Mella, Pedro

Albizu Campos, Fidel Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, from
the popular music of the Antilles, Eugenio Maria de Hostos,
to Mexican muralism,

Heitor Villa-Lobos, Oswald de Andrade,

Jorge Amado, to Cesar Vallejo, Jose Carlos Mariategui,

Carlos Gardel (why not?), Pablo Neruda, Gabriel Garcia
Marquez, Carlos Fuentes, Julio Cortazar, Alejo Carpentier,

Nicolas Guillen, Aime Cesaire, and Frantz Fanon...

What is

our history, what is our culture, if not the history and

culture of Caliban?
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